Opinion
Case No. CV 20-5888-DOC (AS)
08-11-2020
KYLE MALBRUE, Plaintiff, v. JAMES MORALES, et al., Defendants.
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
INTRODUCTION
On June 25, 2020, Kyle Malbrue ("Plaintiff"), a California inmate proceeding pro se, filed a Civil Rights Complaint ("Complaint") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 1). The Court has screened the Complaint as prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. For the reasons discussed below, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's Complaint WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
Magistrate judges may dismiss a complaint with leave to amend without approval from the district judge. McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
Plaintiff claims that the following four Defendants, sued in their individual and official capacities, violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights at California State Prison - Los Angeles County ("CSP-LAC") in Lancaster, California: (1) correctional officer James Morales, (2) correctional officer Daniel Chavez-Vasques, (3) correctional officer James Alvarado, and (4) licensed psychiatric technician T. Lundgren. (Complaint at 3-6). He seeks monetary relief. (Id. at 7).
Citations to the Complaint refer to the page numbers assigned by the Court's electronic case filing system (CM/ECF).
Plaintiff alleges that on September 8, 2019, he was approaching the medication window for his scheduled dose when Officer Morales confronted him and began making "disrespectful sexual comments." (Id. at 5). Plaintiff and Morales started arguing, which continued after Plaintiff took his medication. (Id.). Plaintiff states that he then told Morales he "would be making a complaint," and started walking away. (Id.). At that point, according to Plaintiff, Morales "charged" into Plaintiff from behind, causing Plaintiff to hit his head on the concrete. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that Morales began punching Plaintiff in the face and head, and he sounded the institutional alarm, summoning Officer Chavez-Vasquez and Officer Alvarado, who joined in by punching and kicking Plaintiff. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that the officers then grabbed his arms, handcuffed him, and continued striking him. (Id.).
Plaintiff was sent to the hospital and treated for injuries to his face, head, eye, and wrist. (Id. at 5-6). According to Plaintiff, he later returned to the prison to find that the officers, in an effort to "cover up" their own misconduct, had falsely accused him of battery on the staff. (Id. at 6). Plaintiff alleges that he was "also denied a[n] excessive force videotape interview on the date of the incident," and had to file an appeal to obtain the interview. (Id.).
Plaintiff additionally alleges that Lundgren, a licensed psychiatric technician, denied "medical treatment" to Plaintiff, falsely claiming that Plaintiff had refused the treatment "by writing 'Naw, I'm good'" on a form. (Id.). Lundgren was then overruled by a supervisor after Plaintiff continued to complain of his injuries. (Id.).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Congress mandates that district courts initially screen civil complaints filed by prisoners seeking redress from a governmental entity or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A court may dismiss such a complaint, or any portion thereof, if the court concludes that the complaint: (1) is frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b); see also id. § 1915(e)(2) (The court "shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief."); accord Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). In addition, dismissal may be appropriate if a complaint violates Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996); Nevijel v. Northcoast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).
In considering whether to dismiss a complaint, a court is generally limited to the pleadings and must construe "[a]ll factual allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as true and . . . in the light most favorable" to the plaintiff. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Moreover, pro se pleadings are "to be liberally construed" and "held to less stringent standards" than those drafted by a lawyer. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, dismissal for failure to state a claim can be warranted based on either the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of factual support for a cognizable legal theory. Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff's Complaint warrants dismissal due to the deficiencies discussed below. Leave to amend is granted, however, because it is not "absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment." Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012).
First, while Plaintiff purports to sue every Defendant in both their individual and official capacities (Complaint at 3-4), he fails to state any official-capacity claim. Official-capacity suits provide "another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978). Because Defendants are employed or contracted by CDCR, claims against them in their official capacities are effectively claims against the State of California. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (official-capacity suits "generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent"); Community House, Inc. v. City of Boise, Idaho, 623 F.3d 945, 966-67 (9th Cir. 2010) (an official capacity suit is treated as a suit against the entity). To state a claim against a state officer in his or her official capacity, Plaintiff must identify a custom, policy, or practice of the state or prison that is responsible for the conduct alleged in the Complaint. See Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2001) (state prison administrators sued for injunctive relief were "liable in their official capacities only if policy or custom played a part in the violation of federal law"); Tyson v. Ratelle, 166 F.R.D. 442, 446 (C.D. Cal. 1996) ("To warrant injunctive relief under Section 1983, . . . there must be an affirmative link or a causal relationship between the constitutional deprivation and the adoption of a policy, express or implied, showing the official's authorization or approval of the conduct leading to the constitutional deprivation." (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976))). Plaintiff fails to allege any facts demonstrating that his harms resulted from any policy, practice, or custom of the State of California or its agencies.
Even if the Complaint stated official-capacity claims, only declaratory or injunctive relief would be available for such claims. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for damages against states and their official arms. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990); Brown v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009) ("The State of California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims brought under § 1983 in federal court, and the Supreme Court has held that § 1983 was not intended to abrogate a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity.") (citation omitted).
Second, Plaintiff fails to state any claim against Defendant Lundgren. Plaintiff claims Lundgren, a licensed psychiatric technician, violated the Eighth Amendment through deliberate indifference by denying "medical care" to Plaintiff, and falsely claiming that Plaintiff had refused treatment. (Complaint at 6). To establish an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, a prisoner must show (1) that the deprivation suffered was "objectively, sufficiently serious" (i.e., the objective component), and (2) that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his safety in allowing the deprivation to take place (i.e., the subjective component). Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff can satisfy the objective component of the deliberate indifference standard by demonstrating that a failure to treat the plaintiff's condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014). A plaintiff can satisfy the subjective component of the deliberate indifference standard by showing that a prison official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety." Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004). A jail official must "both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
Here, Plaintiff's vague allegations against Lungren fail to demonstrate either the objective or subjective components of the claim. First, because Plaintiff does not specify what "medical treatment" Lundgren refused to provide, or for what particular injuries, he does not demonstrate any objectively serious harm. Moreover, because Plaintiff states that Lundgren's supervisor "overruled" Lundgren's decision, it is unclear whether any harm at all resulted from Lundgren's actions. (See Complaint at 6). Second, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that Lundgren was actually aware of Plaintiff's injuries and the need for treatment. As such, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that Lundgren was deliberately indifferent in violation of Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's claims WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
If Plaintiff still wishes to pursue this action, he shall file a First Amended Complaint no later than 30 days from the date of this Order. The First Amended Complaint must cure the pleading defects discussed above and shall be complete in itself without reference to the Complaint. See L.R. 15-2 ("Every amended pleading filed as a matter of right or allowed by order of the Court shall be complete including exhibits. The amended pleading shall not refer to the prior, superseding pleading."). This means that Plaintiff must allege and plead any viable claims in the Complaint again.
In any amended complaint, Plaintiff should identify the nature of each separate legal claim and confine his allegations to those operative facts supporting each of his claims. For each separate legal claim, Plaintiff should state the civil right that has been violated and the supporting facts for that claim only. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), all that is required is a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." However, Plaintiff is advised that the allegations in the First Amended Complaint should be consistent with the authorities discussed above. In addition, the First Amended Complaint may not include new defendants or claims not reasonably related to the allegations in the previously filed complaint. Plaintiff is strongly encouraged to utilize the standard civil rights complaint form when filing any amended complaint, a copy of which is attached.
Plaintiff is explicitly cautioned that failure to timely file a First Amended Complaint, or failure to correct the deficiencies described above, may result in a recommendation that this action, or portions thereof, be dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute and/or failure to comply with court orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Applied Underwriters, Inc. v. Lichtenegger, 913 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 2019) ("The failure of the plaintiff eventually to respond to the court's ultimatum - either by amending the complaint or by indicating to the court that it will not do so - is properly met with the sanction of a Rule 41(b) dismissal." (emphasis omitted; quoting Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004))). Plaintiff is further advised that if he no longer wishes to pursue this action in its entirety or with respect to particular defendants or claims, he may voluntarily dismiss all or any part of this action by filing a Notice of Dismissal in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). A form Notice of Dismissal is attached for Plaintiff's convenience.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: August 11, 2020
/s/_________
ALKA SAGAR
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE