Opinion
2022-01395 Index 650291/19
03-03-2022
Christopher Mahne, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Cell Source, Inc., Defendant-Appellant. Appeal No. 15428-15428A Case Nos. 2021-01423, 2021-01493
Law Offices of Michael M. Cohen, Brooklyn (Michael M. Cohen of counsel), for appellant. Moses & Singer LLP, New York (David Lackowitz of counsel), for respondent.
Law Offices of Michael M. Cohen, Brooklyn (Michael M. Cohen of counsel), for appellant.
Moses & Singer LLP, New York (David Lackowitz of counsel), for respondent.
Before: Manzanet-Daniels, J.P., Mazzarelli, Singh, Scarpulla, Higgitt, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Nancy M. Bannon, J.), entered February 4, 2021, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied defendant's motion to vacate a default judgment, unanimously affirmed, without costs. Order, same court and Justice, entered on or about April 15, 2021, which denied defendant's subsequent motion to vacate the judgment or, in the alternative, to renew and reargue, unanimously affirmed, and otherwise dismissed, without costs, as taken from an unappealable order.
Defendant's CPLR 5015(a)(4) claim of lack of personal jurisdiction - which arises from inadequate notice periods set forth in the notice of motion that accompanied plaintiff's June 2019 renewed CPLR 3213 motion - is unavailing, as it does not take into account that the motion court previously acquired jurisdiction over defendant when plaintiff served his initial CPLR 3213 motion in January 2019. When the court denied plaintiff's initial motion, it did not dismiss the action, and thus it retained jurisdiction over defendant.
In the order determining defendant's initial motion to vacate, the court observed that defendant offered no grounds to rebut the presumption of proper service upon it via service on the Secretary of State in January 2019, and defendant offers no reason to revisit the court's conclusion on appeal. Defendant's jurisdictional claims focus on the defects in the June 2019 notice of motion only. Defendant does not challenge the validity of service in January 2019, or the notice periods provided for in that notice of motion. Thus, the CPLR 3213 motion that was defective as to its notice provisions was served on defendant after personal jurisdiction over him had already been secured (see e.g. U.S. Bank N.A. v Cadoo, 197 A.D.3d 588, 590 [2d Dept 2021]; Doyle v Happy Tumbler Wash-O-Mat, 113 A.D.2d 818 [2d Dept 1985]), and plaintiff's failure to serve another summons along with his renewed CPLR 3213 motion did not warrant vacating the judgment under CPLR 5015(a)(4) (see Pinto v House, 79 A.D.2d 361, 365-366 [1st Dept 1981]).
We decline to address defendant's arguments under CPLR 5015(a)(3), as these arguments formed part of its motion for leave to reargue, the denial of which is not appealable (see e.g. Kocak v Dargin, 199 A.D.3d 456, 458 [1st Dept 2021]). Although defendant's CPLR 5015(a)(1) arguments could be construed as part of a motion to renew based on new facts not offered on the initial motion, i.e., facts concerning the timeliness of the motion, they too are unavailing because defendant does not show it has a meritorious defense as required by CPLR 5015(a)(1) (see Batra v Office Furniture Serv., 275 A.D.2d 229, 231 [1st Dept 2000]). Defendant's defense, which arises from the parties' alleged transactions concerning collateral for plaintiff's loan, neither alters defendant's unconditional, unambiguous promise to pay plaintiff, as memorialized in the promissory note (see Solomon v Langer, 66 A.D.3d 508 [1st Dept 2009]; Mehta v Mehta, 168 A.D.3d 716 [2d Dept 2019]), nor does it show that the note was an unsuitable basis for CPLR 3213 relief (see e.g. LaBoeuf v Saide, 134 A.D.3d 515, 516 [1st Dept 2015]; Warburg, Pincus Equity Partners, L.P. v O'Neill, 11 A.D.3d 327 [1st Dept 2004]).
We have considered defendant's remaining arguments and find them unavailing.