Magallenez v. State

Full title: ALEX MAGALLENEZ, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas, First District, Houston

Date published: Nov 18, 2004

No. 01-03-01102-CR (Tex. App. Nov. 18, 2004)

Opinion

No. 01-03-01102-CR

Opinion issued November 18, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b).

On Appeal from County Criminal Court at Law No. 9, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 1181293.

Panel consists of Chief Justice RADACK and Justices KEYES and ALCALA.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

EVELYN V. KEYES, Justice.

A jury found appellant, Alex Magallanez, guilty of the misdemeanor offense of indecent exposure,¹ and the trial court assessed his punishment at 150 days in the Harris County Jail. In five points of error, appellant challenges (1) the legal and factual sufficiency of his conviction; (2) the effectiveness of his counsel; and (3) the trial court's discretion in denying his motion for new trial. We affirm.

1 A person commits indecent exposure when "he exposes his anus or any part of his genitals with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, and he is reckless about whether another is present who will be offended or alarmed by his act." TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 21.08 (Vernon 2003). Indecent exposure is a Class B misdemeanor, with a punishment range of a fine up to $2,000, and/or confinement up to 180 days. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 12.22 (Vernon 2003).

Facts and Procedural Background

The complainant, with her two daughters, went to a Home Depot store to shop for wallpaper. While shopping, the complainant noticed appellant watching her. Appellant was wearing a pair of shorts. He bent down, opened his legs, moved his shorts to one side, and exposed his genitals to her. At first, the complainant thought he had accidentally exposed himself, so she moved down the aisle. Appellant followed her, made eye contact a second time, bent down again, moved his shorts to the side, and exposed himself again. The complainant moved two aisles over; appellant again followed her and repeated his actions. Complainant was nervous because she knew appellant was following her and believed he was not accidentally exposing himself, and his actions offended her. She reported him to a Spanish-speaking employee. Together, they reported the incident to a police officer. Although there was a security camera system in the store at the time of this encounter, no videotape was produced at trial by either the State or appellant. Appellant called the assistant store manager to testify regarding the surveillance cameras, but this manager had not begun working at the store until a few weeks after appellant exposed himself. He did not have access to the videotapes; nor did he review any videotapes before the trial. Appellant and appellant's counsel were admonished by the trial court before appellant took the stand to testify. The court warned appellant and his counsel that appellant's prior conviction for indecent exposure would be admitted if appellant's testimony opened the door. Specifically, the court stated that if appellant claimed his actions were an accident, his prior conviction would be admitted to disprove his mistake defense. Both appellant and his counsel told the trial court they understood that appellant's testimony would determine whether his prior convictions would be admitted. Appellant chose to testify. Appellant testified on direct examination that he was wearing loose-fitting jogging shorts, that he visited several locations in the store, and that he did not notice the complainant. He produced two photographs of himself dressed similarly to the way he was dressed at the Home Depot. During direct examination, appellant's counsel asked appellant to demonstrate how he squatted down in the store. Counsel asked appellant, "Could you have inadvertently without realizing it while you were squatting down maybe kind of pulled your pants back like this?" Appellant demonstrated how he might have been squatting. His counsel then asked, "Were you trying to expose yourself?" Appellant replied he was not. After establishing that the complainant did not tell appellant he was exposing himself and that she did not scream, appellant's counsel passed the witness. At this point, the State approached the bench and argued that appellant had opened the door to admission of his prior exposure conviction. The trial court told appellant and his counsel that the questions went directly to what they had been warned about. The court admitted appellant's prior convictions for indecent exposure and theft, but limited testimony to the fact there were convictions, and did not allow testimony about the facts of the previous cases. Appellant's counsel objected to the introduction of any testimony regarding the prior convictions. On cross-examination by the State, appellant testified that he did not see the complainant in the store until she made the police report. He stated that he was not wearing any underwear under his loose-fitting shorts and that he intended to go to a job site at a customer's house after leaving the store. He again denied intending to expose himself, at which point the State asked about his prior convictions. Appellant admitted that he had prior convictions for indecent exposure and theft, but insisted the complainant was lying. At the close of the evidence, the trial court asked the State and appellant's trial counsel whether they had any objections to the court's jury charge. Appellant's counsel objected. He requested that the paragraph limiting the jurors' use of appellant's prior convictions be deleted from the charge because it would remind the jury about the convictions and might bring into issue appellant's intent; he stated that he was making the request as a matter of trial strategy. The court deleted the paragraph from the charge. Closing arguments consisted of appellant's counsel's explaining that the exposure was an accident and that the complainant overreacted. The State rebutted defense counsel's arguments and explained why appellant's prior convictions were admitted. The State explained that the prior conviction for indecent exposure went to appellant's intent and to a showing that there was no mistake or accident. The State told the jury they should consider the theft conviction in relation to appellant's honesty. Appellant was convicted by the jury, and the court assessed punishment at 150 days' confinement. Appellant filed a notice of appeal, followed by a motion for new trial. In his motion, appellant argued that counsel was ineffective for opening the door to the admission of his prior convictions. In support of his motion, appellant obtained and attached a sworn and signed affidavit from his trial counsel. The affidavit stated that the attorney had "accidently opened the door for the admission of Alex Magallenez' prior conviction at trial, and was informed by the jurors that they would not have convicted him if they had not known of the prior convictions." The trial court denied the motion for new trial.

Discussion Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his first and second points of error, appellant argues that the evidence used to convict him was legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction.

Legal Sufficiency

We review the legal sufficiency of the evidence by viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Although our analysis considers all evidence presented at trial, we may not re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. King, 29 S.W.3d at 562. Under the law applicable to this case, a person commits indecent exposure "if he exposes . . . any part of his genitals with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, and he is reckless about whether another is present who will be offended or alarmed by his act." TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 21.08 (Vernon 2003). Appellant contends the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was reckless about whether another was present who would be offended or alarmed by his actions. The Penal Code's definition of recklessness is:

A person acts recklessly, or is reckless, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.

TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 6.03(c) (Vernon 2003). In an indecent exposure case, we focus on whether appellant was reckless regarding whether another person was present who would be offended. Hankins v. State, 85 S.W.3d 433, 435 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.); Hefner v. State, 934 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. ref'd). Appellant stated he knew others were in the store. He followed the complainant and exposed his genitals three times, in three different areas of the store. While the complainant was willing to accept one exposure as an accident, she testified that she felt that appellant's exposing himself three times was intentional and offensive. We conclude that this evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was reckless about exposing himself to a person who would be offended. Appellant also contends the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant acted with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. The intent to arouse or gratify can be inferred from the conduct, remarks, and circumstances surrounding the acts. Cate v. State, 124 S.W.3d 922, 931 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2004, pet. ref'd); Martins v. State, 52 S.W.3d 459, 474 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.). Appellant squatted down, made eye contact with the complainant, moved his loose-fitting shorts to the side, and exposed his genitals. He did this three times, in three different locations, within five minutes. We conclude that a rational fact-finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant acted with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desires of a person, in this case, himself. See Claycomb v. State, 988 S.W.2d 922, 925-26 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. ref'd) (finding the evidence sufficient to establish intent when a man was sitting on a bench in a mall, had his shorts pulled down, made eye contact with the complainant, looked down at his exposed and erect penis, then looked back up at the complainant, and made no effort to cover himself); Barker v. State, 931 S.W.2d 344, 347 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref'd) (finding the evidence sufficient to establish intent when two girls walked passed a man's truck, noticed the man's pants were pulled down to his thighs, and his penis was exposed). We overrule appellant's first point of error.

Factual Sufficiency

We review the factual sufficiency of the evidence by reviewing all the evidence as a whole neutrally, not in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). The Court of Criminal Appeals has recently stated:

There is only one question to be answered in a factual-sufficiency review: Considering all of the evidence in a neutral light, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? However, there are two ways in which the evidence may be insufficient. First, when considered by itself, evidence supporting the verdict may be too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, there may be both evidence supporting the verdict and evidence contrary to the verdict. Weighing all evidence under this balancing scale, the contrary evidence may be strong enough that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met, so [that] the guilty verdict should not stand. This standard acknowledges that evidence of guilt can "preponderate" in favor of conviction but still be insufficient to prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Stated another way, evidence supporting guilt can "outweigh" the contrary proof and still be factually insufficient under a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.

Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484-85 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004) (footnote omitted). We must consider the most important evidence that the appellant claims undermines the jury's verdict. Sims v. State, 99 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). Appellant contends that the evidence does not support indecent exposure. He argues the evidence shows his actions were accidental because the complainant testified that she first thought he was accidentally exposing himself. In other words, appellant argues that the evidence is too weak to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant fails to acknowledge that the complainant testified that she did not believe his actions were accidental after he made eye contact, followed her to different sections of the store, and exposed himself a total of three times. "As the exclusive judges of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given their testimony, the jury may believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness's testimony." McKinney v. State, 76 S.W.3d 463, 468-69 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). We will not substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder under these circumstances, which depend exclusively on whether the jury found the complainant or appellant more credible. See In re L.R., 84 S.W.3d 701, 705 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (noting that as the exclusive judges of witnesses' credibility, juries are entitled to believe the complainant and not believe appellant). After examining all of the evidence neutrally and weighing all the evidence, we hold that the proof of guilt was not so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury's determination; nor was the contrary evidence so strong that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met. We overrule appellant's second point of error.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his third and fourth points of error, appellant challenges the effectiveness of his trial counsel. Appellant contends his counsel was ineffective because (1) he opened the door to the admission of appellant's prior convictions; (2) he did not request that the trial court give a limiting instruction to the jury that appellant's prior convictions could be used only for impeachment purposes; (3) he requested that the instruction in the jury charge, which explains that the State must prove extraneous offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, be deleted; and (4) he did not object to the admission of the extraneous offenses. In reviewing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we evaluate the effectiveness of counsel under the two-pronged test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). See Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). First, the defendant must show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. To prove this deficiency in representation, the defendant must demonstrate that his counsel's performance deviated from prevailing professional norms. Id.; McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 842 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). Second, the defendant must show prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. In determining whether counsel's performance resulted in prejudice, we look to the weight, nature, and focus of the evidence admitted; the role that the evidence played in the State's closing argument; and the relative role the evidence played in the outcome of the trial. See Ex parte Nailor, 105 S.W.3d 272, 280 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003), aff'd, 2004 WL 574634 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004) (citing Ex parte Menchaca, 854 S.W.2d 128, 133 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993)). This test requires the defendant to show there is a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. The failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a court's need to consider the other. Id. at 697. Assuming, without deciding, that appellant's trial counsel's performance fell below prevailing professional norms, we find that the testimony taken during the trial was more than enough for a rational jury to conclude that appellant committed indecent exposure, so that the outcome would not have been different had the standard been met. The complainant testified that appellant made eye contact, squatted down, moved his loose-fitting shorts to the side, and exposed his genitals to her and her two daughters. She testified that appellant followed her down the aisle and exposed himself a second time. She testified that he followed her and her children two aisles away and exposed himself a third time. The only contrary evidence is appellant's own testimony. Appellant admitted he was not alone in the store, that he was wearing loose-fitting shorts with no underwear, and that he squatted down. He only disputed intentionally exposing himself. Appellant's prior convictions were admitted only to impeach appellant's testimony on the issues of intent and credibility. The State impeached appellant by asking if he had been convicted of the offenses; it did not go into the details of the crimes or dwell on appellant's past history. During closing argument, the State explained that appellant's prior conviction for indecent exposure went to appellant's intent and lack of accident and that the theft conviction could be considered to weigh the credibility of appellant's honesty. The State did not focus on the prior convictions during examination of the witnesses or in closing arguments. In light of the evidence of appellant's guilt in the record and the limited use made of appellant's prior conviction, we hold that the record does not support the conclusion that there was a probability of a different outcome on guilt if appellant's trial counsel had not opened the door to the admission of appellant's prior convictions. See Ex Parte White, Nos. 74757 74758, 2004 WL 2179272 *1 (Tex.Crim.App. Sept. 29, 2004) (finding the record did not support the conclusion that a probability existed that the result would have been different but for counsel's actions where the record had ample evidence to support the jury's conclusion); Greene v. State, 124 S.W.3d 789, 792-93 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd) (holding appellant did not meet his burden to show prejudice when there was substantial evidence to allow jury rationally to conclude that appellant committed crime for which he was charged). Nor was there a probability that appellant's punishment would have been different had appellant's counsel been effective. See Hernandez, 988 S.W.2d at 771-72 (applying Strickland's two-pronged test to punishment phase). A violation of § 21.08 of the Penal Code is punishable by a fine of $2,000 and/or incarceration up to 180 days. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 21.08, 12.22 (Vernon 2003). Despite two prior convictions, appellant was sentenced to only 150 days in the county jail. The record does not support the conclusion that the punishment assessed would have been different but for appellant's counsel's actions. See Ex Parte White, 2004 WL 2179272 *1. We hold that appellant has failed to carry his burden of proving that his counsel was ineffective. We overrule appellant's third point of error.

Failure to Object

In his fourth point of error, appellant complains that his trial counsel did not object to the admission of his prior convictions. The record does not support this contention. Trial counsel clearly objected to the admission of the prior convictions, and the trial court overruled his objection. We overrule appellant's fourth point of error.

Motion for New Trial

In his fifth point of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial. Ineffective assistance of counsel may be raised in a motion for new trial. State v. Gonzalez, 855 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993); Reyes v. State, 849 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). Because the decision on a motion for new trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, the standard of review on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 148 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001); Tollett v. State, 799 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990); Reyes v. State, 82 S.W.3d 351, 353 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner, or, in other words, if it acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990). Appellant's motion for new trial was premised on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Attached to the motion for new trial was an affidavit from appellant's trial counsel stating that he had accidently opened the door to the admission of appellant's prior convictions. The trial court considered appellant's motion for new trial on the pleadings, without a hearing, and subsequently denied the motion. The trial judge could have reasonably concluded that whether appellant's counsel accidently opened the door to appellant's prior convictions or not, the jury could reasonably have found appellant guilty and assessed punishment on the basis of the other evidence before it. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for new trial. Appellant's fifth point of error is overruled. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.