Opinion
Case No. 00-4213-DES.
January 22, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count III of Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 6) pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 13) and defendant filed a Reply (Doc. 15). The court has reviewed the parties' filings, and for the following reasons, defendant's motion shall be granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
On December 22, 2000, plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) alleging defendant committed multiple violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and that defendant infringed upon plaintiff's rights pursuant to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Count III of plaintiff's complaint, in particular, alleges plaintiff was discriminated against on the basis of her religion, resulting in violations to Title VII and abrogations of rights secured by the First Amendment.
On April 18, 2001, defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss Count III of plaintiff's complaint. Defendant's motion to dismiss alleges plaintiff neglected to report religious discrimination to the Kansas Human Rights Commission, thus failing to exhaust administrative remedies as required by Title VII. Jones v. Runyon, 91 F.3d 1398, 1399 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a "jurisdictional prerequisite" to bringing a Title VII claim). Defendant's motion to dismiss also challenges plaintiff's constitutional claims on the basis that the guarantees of the First Amendment run only against the federal government, not private parties. Tilton v. Richardson, 6 F.3d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that the right to freedom of religion provided by the First Amendment is "not protected against private infringement.").
The rights guaranteed in the First Amendment also run against the states pursuant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Tilton v. Richardson, 6 F.3d 683, 687 (citing Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963)).
In her response, plaintiff alleges she has adequately exhausted her administrative remedies. Plaintiff did not, however, address the viability of her constitutional claim. In reply to plaintiff's response, defendant withdrew its challenge to plaintiff's Title VII claim of religious discrimination. The court is left to decide whether plaintiff has stated a constitutional claim based on violations to the First Amendment.
Defendant acknowledged it did not have in its possession, at the time it filed the motion to dismiss, the documents revealing plaintiff adequately exhausted her administrative remedies. Defendant has since received the relevant documents and thus withdraws it's challenge. Consequently, defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's Title VII claims for religious discrimination will be denied.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court may not dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless it appears beyond doubt that the claimant can prove no set of facts supporting its claim which would entitle it to relief. H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249-50 (1989). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must assume as true all well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant. Housing Auth. of the Kaw Tribe v. City of Ponca City, 952 F.2d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 1991); Swanson v. Bixler, 750 F.2d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 1984)
III. DISCUSSION
In its motion to dismiss, defendant argues Count III of plaintiff's complaint fails to state a constitutional claim because the guarantees of the Constitution run only against governmental entities, not private parties. Plaintiff does not allege, nor can it be reasonably inferred, that defendant is a governmental entity.
It is a bedrock principal of constitutional law that most protections of individual rights and liberties contained in the Constitution and its amendments, apply only to the actions of governmental entities. Tilton, 6 F.3d at 686. By its own terms, the First Amendment extends only to protect individuals against actions taken by the government. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 518 U.S. 727, 737 (1996) (stating that the terms of the First Amendment apply only to government action); Tilton, 6 F.3d at 687 ("The guarantees of the First Amendment run only against the federal government.") Plaintiff has not alleged that defendant is a governmental entity or that it is associated with the government. Consequently, plaintiff has failed to state a constitutional claim premised on the allegation that defendant violated her First Amendment right to freedom of religion.
Only the Thirteenth Amendment places prohibitions on private individuals, prohibiting slavery or involuntary servitude within the United States. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
The First Amendment states in pertiment part, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
IV. CONCLUSION
The court finds plaintiff's constitutional claim of religious discrimination premised on the First Amendment should be dismissed because the First Amendment protects individuals only from governmental action, not private action. Plaintiff's claim of religious discrimination pursuant to Title VII will not be dismissed as defendant has withdrawn its challenge to the claim.
IT IS THEREFORE BY THIS COURT ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count III of Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 6) is denied in part and granted in part. Plaintiff's constitutional claim of religious discrimination premised on the First Amendment is dismissed. Plaintiff's claim of religious discrimination pursuant to Title VII will not be dismissed.
Dated this 22nd day of January, 2002, at Topeka, Kansas.
DALE E. SAFFELS United States District Judge