Opinion
Case No. CV 14-05214-SVW (DFM)
07-28-2014
JOSEPH MACHUL, Plaintiff, v. PHILIP L. BROWNING et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
On July 3, 2014, Plaintiff lodged a pro se civil rights complaint together with a request to proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. 1. On July 7, 2014, the Court granted Plaintiff's in forma pauperis request. Dkt. 2. Plaintiff's complaint was accordingly filed on the same date. Dkt. 3 ("Complaint"). The Complaint names Philip L. Browning, Charles Tadlock, Tedji Dessalegn, Vivian Pham, the County of Los Angeles ("County"), the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Sendees ("DCFS"), the Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles, and Does 1 through 5 as Defendants.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court has screened Plaintiff's Complaint before ordering service for purposes of determining whether the action is frivolous or malicious; or fails to state a claim on which relief might be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
The Court's screening of the Complaint under the foregoing statute is governed by the following standards. A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for failure to state a claim for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory; or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, its allegations of material fact must be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). Further, since Plaintiff is appearing pro se, the Court must construe the allegations of the complaint liberally and must afford Plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. .See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). However, "the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989), "[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled." Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). Moreover, with, respect to Plaintiff's pleading burden, the Supreme Court has held that "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted, alteration in original); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (holding that to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." (internal citation omitted)).
After careful review and consideration of the Complaint under the foregoing standards, the Court finds that it suffers from the pleading deficiencies discussed below. Accordingly, the Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his complaint unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment). A. Younger Abstention and the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
It appears from the face of the Complaint that Plaintiff is challenging decisions being made or that have been made in state juvenile dependency court proceedings. See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 6-7, 11-17. In either circumstance, Plaitniff s claims are defective and accordingly subject to dismissal.
In Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982), the U.S. Supreme Court articulated a three-prong test for determining when a federal court must abstain from hearing a suit under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). A federal court must abstain from hearing a suit if deciding the merits of the suit would interfere with a state proceeding that: (1) is ongoing, (2) implicates important state interests, and (3) provides an adequate opportunity to raise federal questions. Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432; see also Mission Oaks Mobile Home Park v. City of Hollister, 989 F.2d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1993). If the state juvenile dependency court proceedings at issue here are ongoing, then it appears that all three criteria for Younger abstention are met.
If the state court proceedings arc concluded, then this Court is precluded from exercising jurisdiction by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which provides that federal district courts may exercise only original jurisdiction; they may not exercise appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); see also Bennett v. Yoshina, 140 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 1998) (as amended). Review of state court decisions may be conducted only by the United States Supreme Court. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476, 486; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Rooker-Feldman bars "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.. 280, 284 (2005). B. Failure to State a Claim Against the County and DCFS
A local government entity such as the County or DCFS "may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is only when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983." Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Thus, the County or DCFS may not be held liable for the alleged actions of its deputies or other agents unless "the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted or promulgated by that body's officers," or if the alleged constitutional deprivation was "visited pursuant to a governmental 'custom' even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels." Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91; accord Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1443-44 (9th Cir. 1991).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to identify any policy statements or regulations of the County or DCFS, or any officially adopted or promulgated decisions, the execution of which by County agents or employees allegedly inflicted the injuries about which he is complaining. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that either the County or DCFS has a governmental custom of removing children from the custody of their parents without good cause. Plaintiff's pleading obligation "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Plaintiff does not specifically allege that any specific action taken by the County or DCFS was the result of any "deliberate policy, custom, or practice" promulgated by the County or DCFS See, e.g., Rimac v. Duncan, 319 F. App'x 535, 537-38 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that dismissal of plaintiff's Monell claims was proper where plaintiff did not adequately plead that his injuries resulted from a municipal custom or policy); Galen v. Cnty, of L.A., 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that, to succeed on a Monell claim, a plaintiff must establish that the entity "had a deliberate policy, custom, or practice that was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violation he suffered" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts for the Court to "draw the reasonable inference" that the County or DCFS has a governmental custom of engaging in the kind of unconstitutional conduct that Plaintiff is alleging occurred here. See, e.g., Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy."); Thompson v. Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443-44 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Consistent with the commonly understood meaning of custom, proof of random acts or isolated events are insufficient to establish custom."), overruled on other grounds, Bull v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 595 F.3d 964, 981 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a claim against the County and DCFS. C. Eleventh Amendment I mmunity
The Los Angeles County Superior Court has absolute Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. See Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff's claims against the Los Angeles County Superior Court are accordingly subject to dismissal. D. Witness Immunity
To the extent that Plaintiff's claims against one or more of the individual Defendants are based on affidavits to the juvenile dependency court or court testimony, such claims are barred by the doctrine of witness immunity. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 345-46 (1983); Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 822 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that witnesses are entitled to absolute immunity for statements made in an affidavit to a court). This doctrine applies even to the extent that Plaintiff alleges that. Defendants conspired to provide perjured testimony. Franklin v. Terr, 201 F.3d 1098, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the absolute witness immunity doctrine also applies to conspiracy to provide perjured testimony). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff's claims against any of the individual Defendants are based, on their testimony in the juvenile dependency court, they are subject to dismissal. E. Supervisory Liability
Supervisory personnel generally are not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on any theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability in the absence of a state law imposing such liability. See, e.g., Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991). In Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that "[g]overnment officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior liability." However, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that, at least in cases where the applicable standard is deliberate indifference (such as for an Eighth Amendment claim), Iqbal does not foreclose a. plaintiff from stating a claim for supervisory liability based upon the "supervisor's knowledge of and acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct by his or her subordinates." Sarr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit thus held:
A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 'if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.' '[A] plaintiff must show the supervisor breached a duty to plaintiff which was the proximate cause of the injury. The law clearly allows actions against supervisors under section 1983 as long as a sufficient causal connection is present and the plaintiff was deprived under color of law of a federally secured right.'Id. at 1207-08 (internal citations omitted, alterations in original). In addition, to premise a supervisor's alleged liability on a policy promulgated by the supervisor, plaintiff must identify a specific policy and establish a "direct causal link" between that policy and the alleged constitutional deprivation. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989); Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992).
'The requisite causal connection can be established . . . by setting in motion, a series of ads by others,' or by 'knowingly refus[ing] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the supervisor] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.' 'A. supervisor can be liable in his individual capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.'
Here, Plaintiff names Browning as a Defendant but fails to set forth any specific allegations that he personally participated in the underlying alleged violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Nor does Plaintiff set forth any factual allegations that Browning either personally promulgated any policy that had a direct causal connection with the constitutional injuries of which Plaintiff complains or knowingly acquiesced to the other Defendants' alleged conduct. Plaintiff's claim against Browning accordingly fails to state a claim and is subject to dismissal.
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Although the Court is dubious that the Complaint's deficiencies can be overcome, the Court will afford Plaintiff the opportunity to attempt to do so. The Complaint therefore is dismissed with leave to amend. If Plaintiff still desires to pursue his claims against Defendants, he shall file a First Amended Complaint within twenty-eight (28) days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint should bear the docket number assigned in this case; be labeled "First Amended Complaint"; and be complete in and of itself without reference to the original Complaint or any other pleading, attachment or document. The Clerk is directed to send Plaintiff a blank Central District civil rights complaint form, which Plaintiff is encouraged to utilize.
Plaintiff is admonished that, if he fails to timely file a First Amended Complaint, the Court will recommend that this action be dismissed with prejudice for failure to diligently prosecute. Dated: July 28, 2014
/s/_________
DOUGLAS F. McCORMICK
United States Magistrate Judge