Opinion
16-P-228
03-16-2017
George MACHADO v. COMMISSIONER OF the DEPARTMENT OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION& another.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court dismissing his complaint against the commissioner of the department of elementary and secondary education (commissioner) and the Methuen school committee (school committee). The plaintiff's complaint contained three claims stemming from his termination from his position as a Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps (JROTC) teacher at Methuen High School. We affirm in part and vacate in part.
We review de novo the allowance of a motion to dismiss under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc ., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011). "For purposes of such review, we accept[ ] as true the facts alleged in the plaintiff['s] complaint and exhibits attached thereto, and favorable inferences that reasonably can be drawn from them." Goodwin v. Lee Pub. Schs ., 475 Mass. 280, 284 (2016) (quotation omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss, "[f]actual allegations [in the complaint] must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co ., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008), quoting from Bell Atl. Corp . v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
The plaintiff was terminated after he allegedly displayed a videotape titled "The Amazing Racist" to his students. Counts I and III of the complaint allege that his termination violated G. L. c. 71, §§ 41 - 42, which require teachers be provided with notice, just cause, or arbitration prior to being terminated; count II alleges that his termination breached his employment contract.
A teacher in the public schools of Massachusetts must have been granted a "certificate with respect to the type of position for which he seeks employment." G. L. c. 71, § 38G, as appearing in St. 1993, c. 71, § 41. As such, the plaintiff would need to show that he was properly certified in Massachusetts to advance these statutory claims. He contends that his JROTC certification, issued to him by the United States Army Cadet Command, is equivalent to the certificate required in Massachusetts. We disagree. Section 38G clearly provides that a teacher must be "granted by the commissioner a provisional, or standard certificate with respect to the type of position for which he seeks employment." Even if the commissioner had the authority to grant such a certificate based on the plaintiff's JROTC certification from the Army Cadet Command, it is clear that he did not explicitly do so. Without such a certificate, the plaintiff is not afforded the procedural safeguards provided by G. L. c. 71, §§ 41 - 42.
The plaintiff further contends that the electronic mail message sent by the commissioner on December 20, 2012, regarding the qualifications of JROTC instructors, could be interpreted to mean that the plaintiff's JROTC certificate was accepted by the commissioner as the equivalent of a State certificate. It is clear that the statute requires a Massachusetts certificate. The commissioner had the opportunity to offer such a certificate and did not. We therefore affirm the dismissal of counts I and III.
We conclude that there were sufficient facts pleaded to provide a basis for the plaintiff's allegations in count II to survive a motion to dismiss. The plaintiff alleged that he was summarily terminated in violation of his existing employment contract. The judge determined that the plaintiff did not provide a sufficient factual basis to support his claim that he was a contracted employee at the time of his termination, and that he would therefore be considered an employee at will. See Selmark Assocs., Inc . v. Ehrlich , 467 Mass. 525, 537 (2014).
With his complaint, the plaintiff provided his employment contract for the 2008-2009 school year, when he first began to work for the school committee. He also provided letters sent to him in June of each subsequent school year, informing him of his "assignment" for the following school year. We conclude that a fact finder could plausibly view those letters as extensions of the plaintiff's original employment contract. See Goldhor v. Hampshire College , 25 Mass. App. Ct. 716, 718 & n.4 (1988). In addition, it is unclear from the language of the 2008-2009 written contract (if it was in fact extended by means of the assignment letters) whether the plaintiff is entitled to the procedural protections afforded employees under the applicable collective bargaining agreement. The factual ambiguity regarding his employment status at the time of his termination cannot be resolved on the record before us, and thus we cannot say that count II of the plaintiff's complaint did not as a matter of law allege a set of facts that would entitle him to relief.
The assignment letters referenced the collective bargaining agreement between the school committee and the teachers' union but the original employment letter did not.
The portion of the judgment dismissing count II is vacated and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum and order. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
The school committee's request for attorney's fees is denied.
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So ordered .
Vacated and remanded in part; affirmed in part. .