Opinion
No. CV 09 500 65 69
July 13, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE RELATIVE TO CLAIM OF RECKLESSNESS
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On April 28, 2009, Plaintiff Robert Maceachern, Jr. brought the present action against Defendant Nancy Olson as the result of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on April 7, 2007. Robert Maceachern, Jr. alleges that while he was driving his motor vehicle westerly on East High Street, East Hampton, Connecticut, Nancy Olson exited the commercial driveway of the premises known as 193 East High Street and in doing so, so caused her vehicle to collide with his. He further alleges that the accident caused him substantial injuries and that he was forced to expend large sums of money for expenses necessary for his recovery, was unable to attend and enjoy his usual activities, and was unable to attend to his employment in the manner in which he could prior to this incident.
Plaintiff's complaint is in two counts. Count One is cast in Negligence, and Count Two in Recklessness. Defendant Nancy Olson has moved to strike Count Two from the Complaint on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action. The parties have submitted memoranda in support of their respective positions.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Practice Book § 10-39 provides in part that "[w]henever any party wishes to contest the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, . . . that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof." So, "[a] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading." Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 108 (1985). It admits all facts that are well pleaded, but "it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinion stated in the pleadings." Id.
CT Page 11905
The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint. The court must construe the facts in the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff.
(Citations omitted; internal quotations omitted.) Gordon v. Bridgeport Hous. Auth., 208 Conn. 161, 170 (1988).
C. CLAIMS AND ARGUMENTS
As stated above, this action is in Two Counts, to wit: Count One, Negligence; and Count Two, Recklessness. In Count One, plaintiff Robert Maceachern, Jr. alleges that while he and Nancy Olson were operating separate motor vehicles, Nancy Olson through her negligence failed to yield the right of way and caused a collision between the vehicles, resulting in his injuries. The plaintiff further alleges that he was forced to expend large sums of money for expenses necessary for his recovery, was unable to attend and enjoy his usual activities, and was unable to attend to his employment in the manner in which he could prior to this incident.
In Count Two, plaintiff Maceachern first re-alleges the contents of Count One, then adds two additional paragraphs. He first alleges that Nancy Olson intentionally and deliberately pulled out of a private driveway onto a public highway in the direct path of Robert Maceachern, Jr. He adds that Plaintiff knew that unless she traveled at an unreasonably fast rate of speed, she would likely collide with Plaintiff's vehicle. Plaintiff finally alleges that Defendant Nancy Olson acted deliberately and/or with reckless disregard in violation of § 14-218a, § 14-242(e) and § 14-247 of the Connecticut General Statutes, and said recklessness was a substantial contributing factor in bringing about such injuries. He seeks double or treble damages, authorized by § 14-295, by reason of the defendant's deliberate and reckless disregard of those statutes.
In her memorandum supporting her Motion to Strike, Nancy Olson argues that Robert Maceachern, Jr. did not allege a cause of action distinct from negligence. She claims that the conduct Plaintiff alleges as reckless in Count Two is the same conduct he alleges as negligent in Count One. Robert Maceachern, Jr. counters by citing the fact that neither Connecticut's Supreme nor Appellate Court has addressed the pleading requirements for recklessness under § 14-295, and that there is a division of authority among the opinions in the Superior Court as to the pleading requirements in this regard. Even so, he asserts that no matter what standard this court adopts, his complaint is sufficient to set forth a cause of action for recklessness.
In regard to a cause of action based in negligence and one based in recklessness, our Supreme Court has declared that
[t]here is a wide difference between negligence and a reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others, and a complaint should employ language explicit enough to clearly inform the court and opposing counsel that reckless misconduct is relied on . . . Simply using the word `reckless' or `recklessness' is not enough. A specific allegation setting out the conduct that is claimed to be reckless or wanton must be made.
Dumond v. Denehy, 145 Conn. 88, 91 (1958). In that case, the defendant pled guilty in criminal court to a count of negligent operation of a motor vehicle resulting from a motor vehicle accident. Id. at 89. In the civil case that followed, the plaintiff made eleven pertinent allegations, all of which sounded in negligence. Id. at 90. Plaintiff then referenced those eleven allegations when claiming that the Defendant's conduct was negligent, reckless, and careless. Id. The Supreme Court upheld the Trial Court's decision to not charge the jury with an allegation of reckless or wanton conduct because the plaintiff did not specifically allege as much. Id. at 91.
The distinction between causes of action in negligence and recklessness was also discussed in Kostiuk v. Quelly, 159 Conn. 91 (1970). In that case, the defendant, in an action regarding a motor vehicle accident, appealed from the jury's finding. He claimed that the judge erred in charging the jury with recklessness because the complaint did not support such a charge. Id. at 93-94. The Supreme Court of Connecticut requires "a complaint [to] set forth language that was explicit enough to clearly inform the court and opposing counsel that reckless misconduct is relied upon." Id. at 94. In the complaint in that case, seven of eight alleged actions sounded in negligence; the other referred "to the defendant's operation of his vehicle in a reckless manner." Id. The court held that such a brief reference to reckless conduct, in a count which otherwise sounded of negligence, was not enough to sufficiently allege reckless or wanton misconduct. Id.
Defendant cites Urena v. Castillo, 2008 WL 4926772 (2008), a Connecticut Superior Court case from the Judicial District of Fairfield, as evidence of the division in authority in Superior Court decisions regarding what degree of specificity is required in pleading recklessness under § 14-295. That case involved a three car accident, and in the subsequent litigation, the defendant attempted to strike plaintiff's claim for statutory recklessness. Id. at *1. According to that Court, "[n]either the Connecticut Supreme or Appellate Court has . . . address[ed] the pleading requirements for recklessness under § 14-295." Id. at *2. In terms of how the Superior Courts have ruled, "a slight majority of . . . decisions has required that a plaintiff only plead the general allegations enumerated in § 14-295, namely, that the defendant has deliberately or with reckless disregard violated one of the enumerated statutes, and the violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff injuries." Id. On the other hand, "a minority of courts have required that plaintiffs plead the specific conduct that is reckless, above and beyond what must be pleaded for mere negligence." Id. at *3.
The court will now discuss the applicable statutes.
Section 14-218a of the Connecticut General Statutes sets forth that "no person shall operate a motor vehicle . . . at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable . . ." Section 14-242(e) of the Connecticut General Statutes states that "the driver of a vehicle intending to turn to the left within an intersection or into an alley, private road or driveway shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction . . ." Section 14-247 of the Connecticut General Statutes sets forth that the driver of a vehicle exiting a private road or driveway onto or crossing a highway shall yield the right-of way to all vehicles approaching on such highway.
In terms of the requirements of § 14-295, assuming that the majority view applies, as set forth in Urena, a plaintiff must only plead the general allegations of § 14-295. Urena, 2008 WL 4926772 at *2. That is, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has deliberately or with reckless disregard violated one of the enumerated statutes, and the violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries. Id.
Section 14-295 of the Connecticut General Statutes provides that the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party pleads that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violations of section 14-218a, 14-218, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239, or 14-240a and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death, or damage to property.
D. CONCLUSION
As stated earlier, in a motion to strike, facts in the complaint are accepted as if they were true. Mingachos, 196 Conn. at 108. When looking at the facts in the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-movant, the Court finds that the allegation of a breach of sections 14-247, 14-218a and 14-242(e) are sufficient to withstand a motion to strike as to recklessness. As noted earlier, proof of a violation of § 14-218a invokes the double or treble damages provision of § 14-295.
Accordingly, the Motion to Strike Count Two must be and hereby is denied.