Opinion
No. X07-CV02 0083292S
March 31, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The defendant, Ski Sundown, Inc., moves for summary judgment as to both counts of the complaint filed by the plaintiff, Daniel MacDonald, individually, and as administrator of the estate of his deceased son, Jason MacDonald.
Summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings and documentary proof submitted demonstrate that no genuine dispute over material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Practice Book § 17-49.
The following facts are undisputed. On January 26, 2001, Jason MacDonald was seventeen years old and an employee of the defendant. On that day he tested a snow ramp constructed by coworkers, which ramp was to be used the next day in a snowboarding contest known as the "Big Air Snowboard Competition." In this event, snowboarders glided down the ramp, became airborne, and performed various aerial maneuvers.
On January 27, 2001, Jason, independent of his employment, was one of the contestants. He, along with other participants, practiced utilizing the ramp. During his actual performance, at around 11 a.m., Jason sustained serious injuries. He died from these injuries on February 10, 2001.
The complaint avers that Jason MacDonald's injuries and death were caused by the negligence of the defendant's staff. The gist of the divers specifications of negligence is that the snow ramp was constructed and maintained in an unreasonably dangerous manner; that the event was poorly supervised; and that the competition course lacked the conspicuous markings mandated by General Statutes § 29-211(3).
The plaintiff has never disclosed any expert witnesses regarding these claims, and the court-ordered deadline for such disclosure passed in July 2004. The movant contends that the lack of expert testimony warrants the granting of summary judgment in its favor. The court agrees.
Under some circumstances, expert testimony is required to support a cause of action. Doe v. Yale University, 252 Conn. 641, 687 (2000). These circumstances exist when the factual issues are "beyond the field of the ordinary knowledge and experience" of the average trier-of-fact. Harlan v. Norwalk Anesthesiology 75 Conn.App. 600, 613 (2003).
The elements of negligence which a plaintiff must prove are the presence of a duty of care, breach of that duty, causation, and actual injury. Ryan Transportation v. M G Associates, 266 Conn. 520, 525 (2003). if the determinations of the standard of care pertinent to a given situation and/or whether that standard was satisfied necessitates information beyond the ken of ordinary fact finders, expert testimony is required to prove negligence. Santopietro v. New Haven, 239 Conn. 207, 226 (1996).
The need for expert testimony may arise even with respect to mundane activities such as baseball. Santopietro v. New Haven, supra. In that case our Supreme Court held that expert testimony was essential for a jury to decide whether an umpire could be held liable for injury to spectators caused by an alleged failure to discipline unruly players. Id., 229. This requirement may also occur as to claims of negligence regarding an activity as commonplace as caring for a sleeping infant, LePage v. Horne, 262 Conn. 116, 124 (2002); at least where knowledge sufficient to assess certain risks lies outside ordinary experience.
The court holds that the question of whether a snow ramp built for aerial snowboarding performances was constructed or maintained reasonably safely falls outside of the knowledge and experience of the average trier-of-fact. Likewise, the standard of care necessary to supervise and screen participants adequately for such inherently risky activity is beyond the information available to laypersons.
The allegation concerning statutory negligence is of a different ilk, however. Subsection 29-211(3) obligates ski area operators to mark the entrance to each "trail or slope" with symbols adopted or approved by the National Ski Area Association to identify "the relative degree of difficulty" of such trail or slope.
The doctrine of statutory negligence serves to superimpose a legislatively prescribed standard of conduct. Staudinger v. Barrett, 208 Conn. 94, 101 (1988). The claimant is relieved of the burden of establishing, through evidence, the standard of care and can prove negligence merely by demonstrating violation of the applicable statute plus causation and injury. Wendland v. Ridgefield Construction Services, Inc., 184 Conn. 173, 178 (1981).
Under the uncontroverted circumstances of this case, expert testimony is still necessary to prove breach of this statutory obligation. "Trail" or "slope" are not defined by statute. Whether a snow ramp amassed for aerial snowboarding competitions is such a trail or slope or constitutes part of a trail or slope will necessitate expert evidence. Even assuming that the statutory meaning of trail or slope embraces the ramp in question, expert testimony is required to inform laypersons regarding what level of difficulty was created by the ramp and which symbol, if any, ought to have been applied. The absence of expert evidence in this regard renders the plaintiff's statutory negligence claim unprovable.
The motion for summary judgment is granted.
Sferrazza, J.