Opinion
Case Number: 01-74406
June 10, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION AND DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
I. Introduction
Petitioner Steven O'Brien Mabry, Sr., a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Ryan Correctional Facility in Detroit, Michigan, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Now before the Court is Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition and Dismissal of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the motion and dismisses the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
II. Procedural History
Following a jury trial in Genesee County Circuit Court, Petitioner was convicted of armed robbery and habitual offender fourth. On April 20, 1994, he was sentenced to eighteen to forty years imprisonment. Petitioner filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentence. People v. Mabry, No. 175037 (Mich.Ct.App. Feb. 26, 1996). Petitioner then filed a delayed application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied on December 20, 1996. People v. Mabry, No. 106099 (Mich. Dec. 20, 1996).
On December 16, 1999, Petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court. On June 19, 2000, the trial court issued an order denying Petitioner's motion for relief from judgment. People v. Mabry, No. 93-49343 (Genesee County Circuit Court June 19, 2000). Thereafter, Petitioner filed applications for leave to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion for relief from judgment in the Michigan Court of Appeals and Michigan Supreme Court. Both the Michigan Court of Appeals and Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Mabry, No. 231411 (Mich.Ct.App. May 18, 2001); People v. Mabry, No. 119393 (Mich. Oct. 29, 2001).
Petitioner filed the pending petition for a writ of habeas corpus on November 5, 2001.
III. Analysis
Respondent has filed a Motion for Summary Disposition on the ground that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is barred from review because it is untimely. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 ("AEDPA" or "the Act") applies to all habeas petitions filed after the effective date of the Act, April 24, 1996. Petitioner's application for habeas corpus relief was filed after April 24, 1996. Therefore, the provisions of the AEDPA, including the limitations period for filing an application for habeas corpus relief, apply to Petitioner's application. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 337 (1997).
Among other amendments, the AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 to include a one-year limitations period within which habeas petitions challenging state court judgments must be filed. A prisoner must file a federal habeas corpus petition within one year of the "date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C.(d)(1)(A). However, the time during which a prisoner seeks collateral review of a conviction does not count toward the limitations period. Section 2244(d)(2) provides:
The time during which a properly filed application for post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
In the pending case, the Michigan Supreme Court denied Petitioner's delayed application for leave to appeal on December 20, 1996. Petitioner's conviction became final ninety days later, on March 29, 1997, when the time during which Petitioner could have filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court expired. Thus, absent state collateral review, Petitioner was required to file his habeas corpus petition by March 29, 1998.
Petitioner did not file his motion for relief from judgment until December 16, 1999. Thus, the limitations period commenced on March 29, 1997, and continued to run, uninterrupted, until it expired on March 29, 1998. Petitioner's motion for relief from judgment was not filed until approximately one-and-a-half years after the limitations period expired and, consequently, did not serve to toll the limitations period.
In his petition, Petitioner argues that his petition should not be dismissed as untimely because he is entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has identified the following five factors to be considered in determining the appropriateness of equitably tolling a statute of limitations: (1) the petitioner's lack of notice of the filing requirement; (2) the petitioner's lack of constructive knowledge of the filing requirement; (3) diligence in pursuing one's rights; (4) absence of prejudice to the respondent; and (5) the petitioner's reasonableness in remaining ignorant of the legal requirement for filing his claim. Dunlap v. U.S., 250 F.3d 1001, 1008 (2001).
Petitioner claims that he is entitled to equitable tolling because he was unaware that the filing of a motion for relief from judgment tolled the limitations period rather than starting the limitations period anew. "Ignorance of the law does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance justifying equitable tolling." Neloms v. McLemore, 2000 WL 654942, *2 (E.D. Mich. May 22, 2000), citing Rose v. Dole, 945 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1991); see also Washington v. Elo, 2000 WL 356353, *6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 29, 2000) (holding that "neither excusable neglect nor ignorance of the law alone are sufficient to invoke equitable tolling"); Moore v. Hawley, 7 F. Supp.2d 901, 904 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (same); Sperling v. White, 30 F. Supp.2d 1246, 1254 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (citing cases establishing that ignorance of the law, illiteracy, and lack of legal assistance do not constitute extraordinary circumstances). Therefore, Petitioner's ignorance of the law is insufficient to warrant equitable tolling of the limitations period.
Petitioner also claims that his petition should not be barred from review by the one-year limitations period because he is actually innocent. In Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), the United States Supreme Court articulated the standard applicable to claims of actual innocence that are accompanied by claims of constitutional violations. To make a showing of actual innocence, "a petition must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 327. The Court further explained this standard as follows:
The . . . standard is intended to focus the inquiry on actual innocence. In assessing the adequacy of petitioner's showing, therefore, the district court is not bound by the rules of admissibility that would govern at trial. Instead, the emphasis on "actual innocence" allows the reviewing tribunal to consider the probative force of relevant evidence that was either excluded or unavailable at trial. . . . The habeas court must make its determination concerning the petitioner's innocence in light of all the evidence, including . . . evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after trial.
. . . .
. . . [A]ctual innocence does not merely require a showing that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the new evidence, but rather that no reasonable juror would have found the defendant guilty. It is not the district court's independent judgment as to whether reasonable doubt exists that the standard addresses; rather the standard requires the district court to make a probabilistic determination about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do. Thus, a petitioner does not meet the threshold requirement unless he persuades the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Petitioner does not present a credible claim of actual innocence. He fails to present any new evidence which would establish that no juror or judge, acting reasonably, would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, Petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus is barred by the one-year statute of limitations.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the habeas corpus petition was filed outside the one-year limitations period prescribed in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Further, the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to establish that equitable tolling of the limitations period is justified.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition is GRANTED and the matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.