Opinion
No. 10-05-00023-CR
Opinion delivered and filed March 22, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH.
Appeal fromthe 213th District Court, Tarrant County, Texas, Trial Court No. 0930509D. Affirmed.
Before Cheif Justice GRAY, Justice VANCE, and, Justice REYNA (Chief Justice GRAY concurring)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted John Louis Lyons of aggravated robbery and assessed his punishment at fifty-five years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. Lyons contends in a single issue with two sub-parts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel: (1) "fail[ed] to obtain a ruling on his motion for mistrial when the State attacked the credibility of Appellant's counsel during the State's closing argument"; and (2) "failed to object when the State's closing argument . . . placed the jury in the shoes of the victims and encouraged a decision based on emotion rather than impartiality." We will affirm.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, the familiar Strickland v. Washington test must be met. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L. Ed. 2d 471 (2003) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)); Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 101-02 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005) (same). Under Strickland, an ineffective assistance claim will be sustained if it is determined that: (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) the defense was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521, 123 S. Ct. at 2535; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064; Andrews, 159 S.W.3d at 101. Generally, the record on direct appeal will not be adequate for analysis of an ineffective assistance complaint, particularly when, as here, the issue was not addressed in a hearing on a motion for new trial. See Andrews, 159 S.W.3d at 102. In this situation, an appellate court will usually reject the complaint in a summary fashion. See, e.g., Scheanette v. State, 144 S.W.3d 503, 510 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). However, "when no reasonable trial strategy could justify the trial counsel's conduct, counsel's performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness as a matter of law, regardless of whether the record adequately reflects the trial counsel's subjective reasons for acting as [counsel] did." Andrews, 159 S.W.3d at 102. Lyons contends that the alleged failings of trial counsel which form the basis of his appellate complaint are failings which "no reasonable trial strategy could justify." Accordingly, we will examine the merits of Lyons's contentions.Failure to Obtain Ruling on Motion for Mistrial
Lyons contends in the first sub-part of his sole issue that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel "fail[ed] to obtain a ruling on his motion for mistrial when the State attacked the credibility of Appellant's counsel during the State's closing argument." The pertinent argument is as follows:Prosecutor: And when [defense counsel] gets up here and tells you that this Defendant's worthy of probation or of some lower sentence, remember this is the same person that stood up before you and embraced the defense of duress yesterday and that told you —
Defense Counsel: Object. Object, object to counsel's argument —
The Court: Sustained.
Defense Counsel: — and I object to that. Can we have the jury instructed to disregard.
The Court: The jury is instructed to disregard that portion of the argument.
Prosecutor: You now know —
Defense Counsel: Move for mistrial.
Prosecutor: — you now know the rest of the story. You now know the truth. You now know what this Defendant is capable of. This Defendant, who is capable of donning a terrifying mask, of wielding a weapon. And not just any weapon, a shotgun, and not an empty shotgun.The four generally permissible areas of prosecutorial jury argument are: (1) summation of the evidence; (2) reasonable deduction from the evidence; (3) answer to argument of opposing counsel; and (4) plea for law enforcement. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 115 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Guy v. State, 160 S.W.3d 606, 616 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref'd). Argument which strikes at the defendant through his attorney is generally impermissible. See Wilson v. State, 7 S.W.3d 136, 147 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999); Magana v. State, 177 S.W.3d 670, 674 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.); Guy, 160 S.W.3d at 616. "[A] prosecutor runs a risk of improperly striking at a defendant over the shoulder of counsel when the argument is made in terms of defense counsel personally and when the argument explicitly impugns defense counsel's character." Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998); accord Magana, 177 S.W.3d at 674-75; Guy, 160 S.W.3d at 617. Here, the prosecutor's argument at least implicitly attacked defense counsel's credibility by calling into question defense counsel's argument that Lyons should receive community supervision because the jury had only recently rejected defense counsel's argument at guilt-innocence that Lyons had acted under duress. Because the argument directly refers to defense counsel, we conclude that the argument is improper. See Guy, 160 S.W.3d at 617. However, the court promptly sustained counsel's objection and instructed the jury to disregard the argument. "Where arguments that strike over the shoulders of defense counsel are not particularly egregious, an instruction to disregard will generally cure the error." Wilson, 7 S.W.3d at 148; accord Phillips v. State, 130 S.W.3d 343, 355-56 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. granted). We do not consider the complained-of argument to be "particularly egregious." Cf. Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 258 ("In its most egregious form, this kind of argument may involve accusations of manufactured evidence, or an attempt to contrast the ethical obligations of prosecutors and defense attorneys.") (citations omitted). Because the complained-of argument is not "particularly egregious" and because the trial court promptly instructed the jury to disregard it, we hold that the prejudicial effect of the argument was cured by the court's instruction. See Wilson, 7 S.W.3d at 148; Phillips, 130 S.W.3d at 355-56. The denial of a motion for mistrial, appropriate for "highly prejudicial and incurable errors," is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Simpson v. State, 119 S.W.3d 262, 272 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) (quoting Wood v. State, 18 S.W.3d 642, 648 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000)). "Only in extreme circumstances, where the prejudice is incurable, will a mistrial be required." Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). We have determined that the prejudicial effect of the complained-of argument was cured by the court's instruction to disregard. Thus, the court would not have abused its discretion by denying Lyons's motion for mistrial, and Lyons was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to pursue an adverse ruling.
Failure to Object to Closing Argument
Lyons contends in the second sub-part of his sole issue that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel "failed to object when the State's closing argument . . . placed the jury in the shoes of the victims and encouraged a decision based on emotion rather than impartiality." A representative sample of pertinent selections from the prosecutor's closing argument follows:When you go to the shopping malls at night this holiday — maybe some of you went last night, maybe some of you went the night before. How many of you locked your cars or made sure you had your keys ready when you were heading to your car? How many of you made sure you remembered exactly where your car was parked when you walked out at night in the dark?
It's people like him that we fear. This is who we fear. You've shared a courtroom with him and you know exactly what he's capable of.
. . . .
John Lyons didn't destroy a life. He destroyed six lives. And that's a low estimate. Because, ladies and gentlemen, for the rest of their lives, they are John Lyons' victims. For the rest of their life, you think they're going to be able to walk into a convenience store and not look twice? Do you think they're going to be able to walk into a Whataburger and not think about it? Honestly, do you think you're going to be able to walk into a Whataburger and not think about him? You can't. Because what he did is so heinous and so scary and so terrifying that it will stay with all of us.
. . . .
And now, ladies and gentlemen, it's time for you to tell her and it's time for you to tell Christy Green's children, it's time for you to tell Christy, it's time for you to tell Maria, it's time for you to tell Smile, time for you to tell Angie, time for you to tell Carol what their heroism is worth, what their safety is worth, what their peace is worth.
. . . .
You let him out, the next victim, maybe next time they don't obey. You're telling these people what their safety is worth. Make sure you can look them in the eye. Give him a life sentence.The complained-of arguments may be grouped in the following categories: (1) asking the jurors to reflect on the impact the facts of the case has had on their personal lives; (2) asking the jurors to assess a punishment with which they can be comfortable facing the victims and their families; and (3) advising the jurors that their verdict impacts community safety. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals has recognized that a distinction must be made
between properly asking the jury to place themselves in the shoes of the victim to understand the pain, injury, or loss suffered by the victim versus improperly asking the jury to place themselves in the shoes of the victim to consider what punishment the victim would want to impose upon the defendant.Torres v. State, 92 S.W.3d 911, 922-23 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd); accord Gonzalez v. State, No. 10-01-00393-CR, 2003 WL 21877663, at *1 (Tex.App.-Waco Aug. 4, 2003, no pet.) (not designated for publication). In a similar context, it has been held that argument is improper if it "urges the jury to lend its ear to the community rather than to be the voice of the community." Rodriguez v. State, 90 S.W.3d 340, 365 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2001, pet. ref'd); accord Cortez v. State, 683 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984); Gonzalez, 2003 WL 21877663, at *2-3. Here, the State essentially asked the jurors to "lend their ears" to the punishment the victims and their families expected. This was improper. See Cortez, 683 S.W.2d at 421; Torres, 92 S.W.3d at 922-23; Rodriguez, 90 S.W.3d at 365; see also Gonzales, 2003 WL 21877663, at *2-3. Nevertheless, Lyons cannot establish the requisite prejudice from his trial counsel's failure to object to this improper argument if we conclude that the argument did not affect his substantial rights. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Martinez v. State, 17 S.W.3d 677, 692 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Zunker v. State, 177 S.W.3d 72, 84 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd). To determine harm, we consider: (1) the severity of the misconduct (prejudicial effect), (2) curative measures, and (3) the certainty of the punishment assessed absent the misconduct (likelihood of the same punishment being assessed). See Martinez, 17 S.W.3d at 692-93; Zunker, 177 S.W.3d at 84. Regarding the severity of the improper argument, we hold that the degree of impropriety was minimal. In Martinez, the Court of Criminal Appeals considered an argument in which the prosecutor advised the jury, "The family of the murdered victims, the family — the victims themselves, they cry out to you for the death penalty in this case." Martinez, 17 S.W.3d at 692. The Court held "the degree of misconduct, if any" in this argument was "relatively mild." Id. at 693. In Rivera v. State, the following punishment argument was challenged:
But why, ladies and gentlemen, if 60 years is the same as life, minimum number of years wise, why would you give him the break and say 60 years? Why? After all these breaks that he's been given, why wouldn't you give the break to the victim's family and let them hear what they believe is the appropriate punishment?82 S.W.3d 64, 69-70 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. ref'd). The San Antonio Court relied on Martinez to conclude that the degree of misconduct in this argument was "relatively mild." Id. at 70. Following Martinez and Rivera, we likewise conclude that the degree of misconduct in the challenged argument is "relatively mild." Because counsel did not object to the challenged argument, the trial court did not employ any curative measures. See Martinez, 17 S.W.3d at 693; Zunker, 177 S.W.3d at 85; Rivera, 82 S.W.3d at 70. Nevertheless, the portion of the argument which arguably informed the jury that the victims and their families wanted a life sentence was a relatively small portion of the prosecutor's closing argument. See Martinez, 17 S.W.3d at 693; Rivera, 82 S.W.3d at 70. Regarding the certainty of the punishment assessed absent the improper argument, we note that the State presented evidence at punishment that Lyons had committed robberies at two convenience stores in the same area as the Whataburger restaurant he was convicted of robbing. The State presented evidence of the impact one of these extraneous robberies had had on children who were present at that store. The State also presented evidence that Lyons was on community supervision for burglary at the time he committed these robberies. See Archie v. State, 181 S.W.3d 428, 432 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, pet. filed) (finding it "likely that the same punishment would have been assessed regardless of the improper comment" "due to the strength of the State's punishment case"); Zunker, 177 S.W.3d at 87-88 (considering extraneous offenses in evaluating certainty of punishment); Rivera, 82 S.W.3d at 71 (considering defendant's extensive criminal history in evaluating certainty of punishment). Given the relatively mild nature of the improper argument and the certainty that the jury would have assessed the same punishment regardless of the improper argument, we conclude that the improper argument did not affect Lyons's substantial rights. See Martinez, 17 S.W.3d at 694; Zunker, 177 S.W.3d at 88; Rivera, 82 S.W.3d at 70-71. Thus, Lyons was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to object to the argument.
Conclusion
The trial court's instruction to disregard cured any prejudicial effect from the prosecutor's argument which attacked defense counsel's credibility. Accordingly, Lyons was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to obtain a ruling on the motion for mistrial. The prosecutor's improper argument regarding the sentencing expectations of the victims and their families did not affect Lyons's substantial rights. Accordingly, Lyons was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to object to the argument. Therefore, we overrule Lyons's sole issue. We affirm the judgment.CONCURRING OPINION
We need to identify the prong of the Strickland standard that is being reviewed when we are conducting a review for ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). It is one thing to skip the first-prong analysis by assuming without deciding counsel's performance was deficient and then resolve the case by evaluating whether the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency as alleged, a second-prong analysis. It is entirely different to make it appear, even if that is not the intent, that "no reasonable trial strategy could justify" the action or inaction of counsel, thus meeting the first-prong analysis, when we are actually conducting a second-prong prejudice analysis. Both prongs of the Strickland standard must be established before ineffective assistance of counsel results in a reversal. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). Thus, failure to meet either prong will result in an affirmance. From the perspective of judicial economy, if it appears that the appellant can meet neither prong, a court normally addresses the prong of the Strickland analysis that can be resolved most easily, unless there are other motives at work. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984) ("The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel's performance. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed."). I do not join in any part of the majority's discussion of the merits of the issues in this case. There is no need to discuss whether Lyons was prejudiced because the record in this case does not support a determination that counsel was ineffective under a Strickland first-prong analysis. For example, in connection with the analysis of the failure to make an objection, trial counsel should be given an opportunity to explain why no objection was made before determining that counsel was ineffective. Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 836 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). The same analysis would apply to the allegation that trial counsel failed to pursue the matter to an adverse ruling, i.e., making a motion for mistrial and obtaining a denial thereon. Counsel could easily have concluded that based upon how the case had developed up to that point in time, the last thing the defendant needed was to start over and let the State put on an even stronger case the next time. Accordingly, Lyons has not established that counsel failed the first-prong analysis of Strickland. I would not conduct a second-prong analysis. For the reasons stated, I would affirm the judgment on the failure to meet the first prong of Strickland. I concur in the judgment of this Court, which affirms the trial court's judgment of conviction, but not in the majority opinion.