Opinion
No. 1867 C.D. 2012
09-25-2013
David C. Lynch, Petitioner v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, Respondent
BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE COVEY
David C. Lynch (Lynch), an inmate at State Correctional Institution - Coal Township, pro se, petitions this Court for review of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole's (Board) September 6, 2012 order denying Lynch's administrative appeal and affirming the Board's July 17, 2012 decision. The sole issue for this Court's determination is whether the Board erred when it recalculated Lynch's maximum release date to reflect the time Lynch was incarcerated on an unrelated prison sentence.
Lynch was incarcerated for retail theft with a maximum sentence release date of April 6, 2013. He was paroled on September 26, 2011. On January 6, 2012, the Board declared Lynch delinquent after he failed to report to his parole office. Lynch was subsequently arrested on February 29, 2012 on a bench warrant for failing to appear at a hearing before the York County Common Pleas Court. Accordingly, the Board lodged a detainer against Lynch for technical parole violations. On March 7, 2012, Lynch executed a Waiver of Violation Hearing and Counsel/Admission Form (Waiver), therein admitting several parole violations, waiving his hearing rights, and notifying the Board that he was "currently serving a 6-23 month sentence at York County Prison for a probation violation on the Burglary Count (Docket CR-3446-11)."
By decision mailed on April 5, 2012, the Board recommitted Lynch as a technical parole violator and extended his maximum sentence release date from April 6, 2013 to May 30, 2013, to reflect the 54 days he was delinquent between January 6, 2012 and February 29, 2012. The April 5, 2012 decision did not reflect the time Lynch was not in good standing due to his 6 to 23-month term in York County Prison referenced in the Waiver. On June 7, 2012, Lynch was returned to a state correctional institution.
Lynch was incarcerated in York County Prison from March 1, 2012 until June 4, 2012.
On July 17, 2012, the Board mailed its decision, wherein, it again extended Lynch's maximum sentence release date to September 3, 2013. This determination reflected the additional 95 days he was not in good standing due to his incarceration in York County Prison.
Lynch filed a petition for administrative review with the Board, objecting to the new September 3, 2013 maximum sentence release date, and challenging the Board's authority to issue the July 17, 2012 decision after it had already issued its April 5, 2012 decision. The Board denied Lynch's petition on September 6, 2012. Lynch appealed to this Court.
Our scope of review of a Board's decision denying administrative relief is limited to determining whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, an error of law was committed, or constitutional rights have been violated. McNally v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 940 A.2d 1289 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).
Lynch argues that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel prohibited the Board from modifying his maximum sentence release date by way of the July 17, 2012 decision. We disagree.
It appears that Lynch's maximum date has passed. However, because it is unclear whether the disposition of this matter may impact other sentences, we will issue a decision on the merits. --------
This Court has stated:
The doctrine of res judicata generally applies when the cause of action in one proceeding is identical with that involved in a prior judgment. Under the doctrine, a final judgment on the merits is conclusive of the rights of the parties and constitutes a bar to a subsequent action involving that same claim, demand, or cause of action and issues determined therein. The doctrine of res judicata applies to administrative agency determinations. The four conditions which must be shown to support a claim of res judicata are 1) the identity of the thing sued upon; 2) identity of the cause of action; 3) identity of the persons or parties to the action; and 4) identity of the quality or capacity of the parties suing or sued. An identity of causes of action is found when in both the old and new proceedings the subject matter and the ultimate issues are the same.Knox v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 588 A.2d 79, 81-82 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991) (citations omitted).
. . . .
Further, the doctrine of res judicata, which reflects the public policy to minimize the judicial energy diverted to individual cases to establish certainty and respect for court judgments, and to protect the party relying on the prior adjudication from vexatious litigation, also prevents the litigation and determination of issues after a final adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction which might have been raised and were not.
As to collateral estoppel, this Court has noted:
The doctrine of collateral estoppel is applicable when the second cause of action is different than the first in order to prevent the relitigation of issue[s] of fact or law actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment in the first action. The following elements must be present for collateral estoppel to apply: (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical with the one presented in the latter action; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party who is to be estopped was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and, (4) the party who is to be estopped had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question in the prior action.Cromartie v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 680 A.2d 1191, 1197 n.12 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (citation omitted).
Lynch correctly argues that the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to the Board's determinations. Id.; see also Hall v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 733 A.2d 19 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). However, this Court has also repeatedly held that "an administrative agency, on its own motion, having provided the proper notice and explanation, may correct typographical, clerical and mechanical errors obviated and supported by the record." Armbruster v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 919 A.2d 348, 350 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007); see also Lord v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 580 A.2d 463 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990).
Here, the July 17, 2012 decision appears to be the Board's attempt to correct a miscalculation of Lynch's maximum sentence release date to reflect the time Lynch was delinquent due to his 95 days of incarceration in the York County Prison. Lynch admitted in his Waiver that he was incarcerated, and he does not challenge the Board's calculation of the additional time. Instead, he merely contends that the Board was precluded from issuing a subsequent determination modifying his maximum sentence release date, based upon the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
Section 6138(c) of the Prisons and Parole Code, pertaining to technical parole violators, provides in relevant part:
(2) If the parolee is recommitted under this subsection, the parolee shall be given credit for the time served on parole in good standing but with no credit for delinquent time and may be reentered to serve the remainder of the original sentence or sentences.61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(c).
(3) The remainder shall be computed by the [B]oard from the time the parolee's delinquent conduct occurred for the unexpired period of the maximum sentence imposed by the court without credit for the period the parolee was delinquent on parole. The parolee shall serve the remainder so computed from the date the parolee is taken into custody on the warrant of the [B]oard.
The record is clear that when the Board recommitted Lynch for the technical parole violation he was not entitled to credit for delinquent time, which includes the time he was incarcerated in York County Prison on a different sentence. See Obringer v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 547 A.2d 449 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988). The denial of credit for delinquent time is not a discretionary function of the Board, but rather a statutorily mandated one. Once the Board recommitted Lynch as a technical parole violator, the Board was required pursuant to Section 6138(c) of the Prisons and Parole Code to deny Lynch credit for his delinquent time. Thus, upon learning that the maximum sentence release date calculated in its April 5, 2012 decision did not reflect Lynch's delinquent standing for the 95 days he was incarcerated in the York County Prison, the Board was required to correct the calculation of his maximum sentence release date to comply with the statute. "To conclude otherwise and preclude the Board from taking corrective action would essentially result in the Board commuting a portion of [Lynch's] sentence that he was statutorily required to serve. The Board lacks authority to commute a sentence either intentionally or by way of clerical error." Armbruster, 919 A.2d at 352 n.3.
For the above reasons, the Board's decision is affirmed.
/s/_________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
ORDER
AND NOW, this 25th day of September, 2013, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole's September 6, 2012 denial of Lynch's administrative appeal is affirmed.
/s/_________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge