Opinion
No. 2009-CC-282, 2009-C-466.
June 9, 2009.
Carol Mehle Publication Coordinator West Publishing Corporation 610 Opperman Drive Eagan, MN 55123
Dear Carol:
Enclosed please find 2 sets of corrected pages in the following Per Curiams, rendered by the court on May 15, 2009.
In Gwen Lynch vs. Wendy Kennard, et al. No. 2009-CC-282, please substitute page 2 for the page which you have.
In Michael Banquer, et al. vs. Donald Guidroz, et al. No. 2009-C-466, please substitute pages 2, 3, and four for the pages which you have.
With kindest regards, I remain,
CBY Enclosure ccs: Lexis-Nexis Lois Law In this case, it is uncontested that the UM rejection form was "signed by the named insured." La.R.S. 22:680(1)(a)(ii) 3. Furthermore, when the UM rejection form was returned to Progressive, the form, on its face, was "properly completed."4 La.R.S. 22:680(1)(a)(ii). On the UM rejection form at issue, Royden Lynch's initials are placed in the blank next to the option for rejecting UM coverage; Royden Lynch's name is typed in the blank for the printed name of the insured; Royden Lynch's signature is in the blank for the signature of the named insured; the correct policy number is typed into the appropriate blank, and; the blank for the date is filled in. See Duncan v. U.S.A.A. Ins. Co. , 06-363, pp. 11-12 (La. 11/29/06), 950 So.2d 544, 551. The legislature has made it abundantly clear that "[a] properly completed and signed form creates a rebuttable presumption that the insured knowingly rejected coverage. . ." La.R.S. 22:680(1)(a)(ii). Respondent, Gwen Lynch, has presented no evidence to rebut the presumption that Royden Lynch knowingly rejected UM coverage. Thus, under the facts of this case, we find that Progressive has established that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The lower courts erred in finding otherwise.
ACE applied for supervisory review of this ruling. ACE also filed a motion to certify the district court's granting of plaintiffs' motion as a final judgment proper for appeal. The district court granted ACE's request for certification, and ACE subsequently appealed the decision to the First Circuit Court of Appeal. The First Circuit consolidated the appeal with the issues raised in ACE's writ application.
After briefing and oral argument, the First Circuit issued an opinion which affirmed the ruling of the district court. In the opinion, the court of appeal began its analysis by explaining that the Louisiana Revised Statutes state that rejection or selection of lower limits of UM coverage shall be made "only on a form prescribed by the commissioner of insurance." La.R.S. 22:680(1)(a)(ii)'. The First Circuit then observed that in Duncan v. U.S.A.A. Insurance Company this Court reviewed the form produced by the commissioner of insurance for waiver of UM coverage and noted six tasks which are required to successfully complete this UM waiver form:
[Essentially, the prescribed form involves six tasks:] (1) initialing the selection or rejection of coverage chosen; (2) if limits lower than the policy limits are chosen (available in options 2 and 4), then filling in the amount of coverage selected for each person and each accident; (3) printing the name of the named insured or legal representative; (4) signing the name of the named insured or legal representative; (5) filling in the policy number; and (6) filling in the date. (emphasis added).
Banquer v. Guidroz , 08-0356, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/23/08), 5 So.3d 206, 209-210 (quoting Duncan v. U.S.A.A. Ins. Co. , 06-363, pp. 11-12 (La. 11/29/06), 950 So.2d 544, 551). The court of appeal asserted that the form at issue in the present case did not satisfy the criterion described as task #3 in Duncan , that is, printing the name of the named insured or legal representative on the UM waiver form.
On the UM waiver form at issue, in the blank for the printed name of the insured, Halliburton's name is typed, appearing as follows, "Halliburton Energy Services, Inc." In the blank for the signature of the insured, a signature is affixed. ACE established through an unrefuted affidavit that James Ferguson was the individual whose signature appears on the UM waiver form at issue, and that Mr. Ferguson was authorized to reject UM coverage on behalf of Halliburton. Before the court of appeal, ACE argued that these facts were sufficient to satisfy the requirements described in Duncan as task #3 and task #4. The First Circuit disagreed.
Citing the jurisprudence of this Court, the court of appeal found that the purpose of the inclusion of the printed name on the UM waiver form was to identify the signature provided. Thus, in the case of a juridical person, this meant that a correct and complete printed name on a UM waiver form must both identify the signing individual who is the legal representative of the juridical person and clearly indicate that the individual is acting on behalf of the pertinent juridical person. Accordingly, the court of appeal found that the text placed in the blank for the printed name of the insured on the UM waiver form at issue in the present case should have read "James Ferguson on behalf of Halliburton Energy Services." Since the printed name on the UM waiver form at issue did not meet this standard, the First Circuit held that the UM waiver form was invalid for failure to satisfy the requirement described in Duncan as task #3. After the First Circuit issued its opinion, ACE submitted a writ application to this Court.
The sole issue presented for our consideration is whether the court of appeal was correct in finding that Halliburton improperly rejected UM coverage. ACE asserts that the decision of the First Circuit, rendered on December 23, 2008, must be reversed as it conflicts with our recent holding in Harper v. Direct General Insurance Co. , 08-2874 (La. 2/13/09), 2 So.3d 418. We agree with ACE.
As in the present matter, in Harper the dispute revolved around the tasks described in Duncan as task #3 and task #4. On the UM waiver form at issue in Harper , in the blank for the printed name of the insured or legal representative, the name of the juridical person insured, Sears, was typed on the form, appearing as follows "Sears, Roebuck and Company." In the blank for the signature of the insured or legal representative, a signature was affixed. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, the purported UM insurer, established through an unrefuted affidavit that the signature on the UM waiver form at issue was the signature of Laurence Jenchel, Sears' legal representative who was authorized to reject UM coverage on behalf of Sears. This Court found that the Harper UM waiver form satisfied the requirements listed in Duncan. The Court held, "as long as the name of the named insured is printed and the legal representative signs the form, [the tasks described in Duncan as task #3 and task #4] are satisfied." Harper , 08-2874 at p. 3, 2 So.3d at 420. Under the standards enunciated in Harper , the UM waiver form at issue in the present case satisfies the requirements described in Duncan as task #3 and task #4. The First Circuit erred in holding otherwise.
DECREE
Accordingly, the writ is granted. For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the First Circuit Court of Appeal is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
This revised statute was redesignated as 22:1295 by Act 415 of the 2008 Louisiana Legislative Session, effective January 1, 2009. This act made no substantive changes to the language of the provision. Furthermore, during the temporal period at issue in these proceedings, no substantive changes were made to the pertinent language in the provision at issue.