Opinion
2014-10-3
In the Matter of LYLLY M.G., Mary L.G. and Joseph R.G. Onondaga County Department of Social Services, Petitioner–Respondent; Christina T., Respondent, and Theodore T., Respondent–Appellant.
D.J. & J.A. Cirando, Esqs., Syracuse (Elizabeth deV. Moeller of Counsel), for Respondent–Appellant. Gordon J. Cuffy, County Attorney, Syracuse (Polly E. Johnson of Counsel), for Petitioner–Respondent.
D.J. & J.A. Cirando, Esqs., Syracuse (Elizabeth deV. Moeller of Counsel), for Respondent–Appellant. Gordon J. Cuffy, County Attorney, Syracuse (Polly E. Johnson of Counsel), for Petitioner–Respondent.
Francis I. Walter, Attorney for the Children, Syracuse.
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., FAHEY, WHALEN, and DeJOSEPH, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
Respondent stepfather appeals from an order of fact-finding and disposition determining that he sexually abused his stepdaughter and derivatively neglected his other stepchildren. We reject the contention of the stepfather that Family Court abused its discretion in excluding him from the courtroom during his stepdaughter's testimony. Although the court did not have before it an affidavit attesting to the harm the stepdaughter could suffer if she were compelled to testify in open court, the court stated that it had considered various factors, including: the stepdaughter's age; the serious nature of the allegations; the fact that the stepdaughter had previously testified in camera at the stepfather's criminal trial; the undisputed fact that the stepdaughter was seeing a therapist; the fact that the stepfather did not controvert the point that it would be in the stepdaughter's psychological best interest to have her testimony conducted in camera; and the fact that the stepfather's interests would be safeguarded by his counsel's presence and ability to cross-examine the stepdaughter ( see generally Matter of Ian H., 42 A.D.3d 701, 703, 840 N.Y.S.2d 202, lv. denied9 N.Y.3d 814, 848 N.Y.S.2d 25, 878 N.E.2d 609). Under the circumstances, the court properly balanced the respective interests of the parties and reasonably concluded that the stepdaughter would suffer emotional trauma if compelled to testify in the stepfather's presence ( see Matter of Donna K., 132 A.D.2d 1004, 1004–1005, 518 N.Y.S.2d 289; see generally Matter of Alesha P. [Audrey B.-Michael B.], 110 A.D.3d 1461, 1461, 973 N.Y.S.2d 508; Matter of Lynelle W., 177 A.D.2d 1008, 1009, 578 N.Y.S.2d 313; cf. Matter of Robert U., 283 A.D.2d 689, 690–691, 724 N.Y.S.2d 527). Moreover, inasmuch as “[the stepfather's] counsel was permitted to be present while the child testified and ... was also given the right to cross-examine her,” the stepfather's constitutional rights were not violated by his exclusion from the courtroom (Donna K., 132 A.D.2d at 1005, 518 N.Y.S.2d 289; see Matter of Kyanna T. [Winston R.], 99 A.D.3d 1011, 1014, 953 N.Y.S.2d 121, lv. denied20 N.Y.3d 856, 959 N.Y.S.2d 691, 983 N.E.2d 770).
Contrary to the stepfather's further contention, the court's finding of sexual abuse is supported by a preponderance of the evidence ( seeFamily Ct. Act § 1046[b][i] ). “ ‘A child's out-of-court statements may form the basis for a finding of [abuse] as long as they are sufficiently corroborated by [any] other evidence tending to support their reliability’ ” (Matter of Nicholas J.R. [Jamie L.R.], 83 A.D.3d 1490, 1490, 922 N.Y.S.2d 679, lv. denied17 N.Y.3d 708, 2011 WL 4028757; see§ 1046[a][vi] ). Courts have “ ‘considerable discretion in determining whether a child's out-of-court statements describing incidents of abuse have been reliably corroborated and whether the record as a whole supports a finding of abuse’ ” (Nicholas J.R., 83 A.D.3d at 1490, 922 N.Y.S.2d 679). Here, the out-of-court statements of the stepdaughter were sufficiently corroborated by her sworn in camera testimony describing the incidents of sexual abuse by the stepfather ( see Matter of Aaliyah B. [Clarence B.], 68 A.D.3d 1483, 1484, 892 N.Y.S.2d 242; Matter of Heather S., 19 A.D.3d 606, 608, 797 N.Y.S.2d 136; see generally Matter of Christina F., 74 N.Y.2d 532, 535–537, 549 N.Y.S.2d 643, 548 N.E.2d 1294). Furthermore, “[a]lthough repetition of an accusation by a child does not corroborate the child's prior account of [abuse] ..., the consistency of the child['s] out-of-court statements describing [the] ... sexual conduct enhances the reliability of those out-of-court statements” (Nicholas J.R., 83 A.D.3d at 1490–1491, 922 N.Y.S.2d 679 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). We note that the stepfather denied that he abused the stepdaughter, but his “denial of the[ ] allegations, along with other contrary evidence, merely presented a credibility issue for [the court] to resolve” (Matter of Zachary Y., 287 A.D.2d 811, 814, 731 N.Y.S.2d 514). “We accord great weight and deference to [the court]'s determinations, ‘including its drawing of inferences and assessment of credibility,’ and we will not disturb those determinations where, as here, they are supported by the record” (Matter of Arianna M. [Brian M.], 105 A.D.3d 1401, 1401, 963 N.Y.S.2d 895, lv. denied21 N.Y.3d 862, 2013 WL 4516332; see Matter of Peter C., 278 A.D.2d 911, 911, 718 N.Y.S.2d 551).
Finally, we reject the contention of the stepfather that the court erred in determining that he derivatively neglected his other stepchildren. “The record supports the determination of the court that the [stepfather]'s sexual abuse of the [stepdaughter] demonstrated fundamental flaws in [his] understanding of the duties of parenthood and warranted a finding of derivative neglect with respect to the [other stepchildren]” (Matter of Leeann S. [Michael S.], 94 A.D.3d 1455, 1455, 942 N.Y.S.2d 846 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Michelle M., 52 A.D.3d 1284, 1284, 861 N.Y.S.2d 542).
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.