Opinion
No. C 02-3503 CRB (PR)
December 17, 2003
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
On June 17, 1999, petitioner pleaded no contest to possession of methamphetamine and misdemeanor being under the influence of methamphetamine in the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of Santa Clara. He also admitted a prior "strike" felony conviction and three prior prison terms. In exchange for his pleas and admissions, petitioner was sentenced to three years and eight months in state prison. He did not appeal.
On June 14, 2000, petitioner began collaterally challenging his conviction and sentence in the state courts. The Supreme Court of California denied his final petition for a writ of habeas corpus on March 27, 2002.
On July 9, 2002, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. The petition was transferred to this court and randomly assigned to the undersigned.
Per order filed on October 1, 2002, the court found that, when liberally construed, the petition stated two cognizable claims — (1) the admission of a prior second degree robbery conviction for sentencing enhancement purposes was not voluntary and intelligent, and (2) the prior second degree robbery conviction did not qualify as a "strike" for sentencing enhancement purposes — and ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted.
Upon respondent's motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state judicial remedies as to claim (2), petitioner voluntarily dismissed claim (2), and a new order to show cause issued as to claim (1) only. Respondent has filed an answer to the order to show cause and petitioner has filed a traverse.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On March 4, 1999, a parole agent conducted a parole search of petitioner's residence in Gilroy, California. A pat search of petitioner revealed a 1.42-gram baggie of methamphetamine in petitioner's pocket. A blood sample taken from petitioner incidental to booking on the possession count tested positive for methamphetamine.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
This court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
The writ may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Id. § 2254(d).
"Under the `contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). "Under the `reasonable application clause,' a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case."Id. at 413.
"[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 409.
The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy. 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). While circuit law may be "persuasive authority" for purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court's holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be "reasonably" applied.Id.
B. Claims
Petitioner claims that his admission of the alleged prior second degree robbery conviction was not knowing and voluntary because he was not advised of his constitutional trial rights with respect to the priors. Petitioner specifically claims that he was not advised of his right to confrontation and his privilege against self-incrimination, and that he did not expressly waive those rights. The claim is without merit.
Due process requires that a guilty plea be both knowing and voluntary because it constitutes the waiver of three constitutional rights: the right to a jury trial, the right to confront one's accusers, and the privilege against self-incrimination. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969). It does not require a state court to enumerate all the rights a defendant waives when he enters a guilty plea as long as the record indicates that the plea was entered voluntarily and understandingly, however. See Rodriguez v. Ricketts. 798 F.2d 1250, 1254 (9th Cir. 1986); Wilkins v. Erickson. 505 F.2d 761, 763 (9th Cir. 1974).
The long-standing test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is `"whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.'" Parke v. Raley. 506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992) (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)). A plea is "involuntary" if it is the product of threats, improper promises, or other forms of wrongful coercion, Brady v. United States. 397 U.S. 742, 754-55 (1970), and is "unintelligent" if the defendant is without the information necessary to assess intelligently "the advantages and disadvantages of a trial as compared with those attending a plea of guilty," Hill v. Lockhart. 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985).
The transcript of the plea hearing plays a significant role in an inquiry into the validity of a plea:
For the representations of the defendant, his lawyer, and the prosecutor at such a hearing, as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings. Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity. The subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible.Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977) (citations omitted).
Here, the record shows that before petitioner pleaded no contest to the charges and admitted the prior conviction and prison terms, the state trial court advised him that he had "constitutional rights" that applied "to not only the charge(s) but also the enhancements and allegations." June 17, 1999 Rep. Tr. at 3-4 (Resp't Ex. B). The trial court then proceeded to advise petitioner of his right to "a jury trial," his right to be present at trial and "see, hear and question any of the witnesses," his right to "compel the attendance of witnesses," his right "against self-incrimination," and his right to "take the witness stand and testify on [his] own behalf." Id. at 4-5. Petitioner stated in open court that he understood his rights, expressly waived them, and pleaded no contest to the charges and admitted the prior conviction and prison terms. See Id. at 4-5, 8-11. The trial court accepted petitioner's pleas and admission, specifically finding "a knowing, voluntary, intelligent waiver of [petitioner's] constitutional rights."Id. at 11. There is no indication whatsoever that the pleas and admissions were not knowing and voluntary. Cf. Parke, 506 U.S. at 31-34 (habeas petitioner bears burden of establishing that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary).
Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim that his admission of the priors was not knowing and voluntary. It simply cannot be said that the state courts' rejection of petitioner's claim was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, or that it involved an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file.
SO ORDERED.