"While it is unnecessary for an individual to specifically invoke the word discrimination when complaining in order to alert her employer to her protected activity, there must be some basis to conclude that the employer was aware that the plaintiff engaged in protected activity." Lucio v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 575 F. App'x 3, 6 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Sherman v. Fivesky, LLC, No. 19-CV-8015 (LJL), 2020 WL 2136227, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2020) ("although complaints need not mention discrimination or use particular language, ambiguous complaints must make the employer aware of the alleged discriminatory misconduct to put the employer on notice"). Further, "[t]o establish that his activity is protected under Title VII, a plaintiff need not prove the merit of his underlying discrimination complaint, but only that he was acting under a good faith, reasonable belief that a violation existed."

Although Plaintiff argues that he complained that the Wu Email was sinful, offensive, and went against his religious beliefs, he does not allege that the Wu Email was discriminatory. Cf.Lucio v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ. , 575 F. App'x 3, 6 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order) (affirming dismissal where plaintiff alleged she had complained of her supervisor's mistreatment but failed to allege that such treatment was discriminatory). Indeed, no reasonable reading of Plaintiff's March 8 email allows for the conclusion that Plaintiff was complaining of conduct that the Defendant would reasonably recognize as unlawfully discriminatory.

A plaintiff must, even at the pleading stage, allege some facts "that would allow a court to draw a reasonable inference that [she] was subjected to any mistreatment or adverse action because of her [protected characteristic]." Lucio v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ. , 575 F. App'x 3, 5 (2d Cir. 2014) ; see alsoAlfano v. Costello , 294 F.3d 365, 377 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Everyone can be characterized by sex, race, ethnicity, or (real or perceived) disability; and many bosses are harsh, unjust, and rude. It is therefore important in hostile work environment cases to exclude from consideration personnel decisions that lack a linkage or correlation to the claimed ground of discrimination."); Brown v. Henderson , 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001) ("It is axiomatic that mistreatment at work, whether through subjection to a hostile environment or through such concrete deprivations as being fired or being denied a promotion, is actionable under Title VII only when it occurs because of an employee's sex, or other protected characteristic.").

Any retaliation claim against Ricketts based on the filing of the EEOC complaint is without merit because Ricketts was no longer AMR's human resource manager at the time Plaintiff filed his EEOC complaint, (id. at 13-14) and therefore could not have retaliated against him for filing the EEOC complaint. See Jarrell v. Hosp. for Special Care, 626 F. App'x 308, 311 (2d Cir. 2015) (dismissing a plaintiff's retaliation claim because he failed to show that "he was retaliated against for engaging in a protected activity"); Lucio v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 575 F. App'x 3, 5 (2d Cir. 2014) (affirming dismissal of a plaintiff's retaliation claim because he failed to show that the alleged discriminating actor was "aware of the protected activity"). Plaintiff also alleges that on June 25, 2016, the day Vazquez made a racerelated comment to him, he notified Delores Brenner in AMR's human resources department of the comment, was given a warning the following day that he could face termination without benefits, and was subsequently terminated without benefits.

The NYCHRL still requires some awareness of the plaintiff's protected activities. See Lucio v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 575 Fed.Appx. 3, 5 n.2 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Brightman v. Prison Health Serv., Inc., 970 N.Y.S.2d 789, 792 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2013) (analyzing whether there was awareness of plaintiff's protected activities). As discussed above, Bhatti has failed to show that PAGNY had any awareness of her Corizon complaints.

This statement is too general to indicate that Natofsky was protesting his demotion as discriminatory and, therefore, cannot sustain a retaliation claim. Lucio v. New York City Dep't of Educ. , 575 F. App'x 3, 6 (2d Cir. 2014) ("While it is unnecessary for an individual to specifically invoke the word discrimination when complaining in order to alert her employer to her protected activity, there must be some basis to conclude that the employer was aware that the plaintiff engaged in protected activity."). Thus, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Natofsky's retaliation claims.

” Sosa v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 368 F.Supp.3d 489, 516 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (emphasis in original) (quoting Lucio v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 575 Fed.Appx. 3, 5 (2d Cir. 2014)). Mr. Wallace alleges that he was subject to a hostile work environment “based on his opposition to the treatment of the Muslim Chaplain” and “protesting” of the planned down-sizing for ORSL.

, the two-page statement containing detailed factual allegations fails to allege a basis in sex or gender discrimination. See, e.g., Lucio v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 575 Fed.Appx. 3, 6 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order) (finding no protected activity where plaintiff complained of her supervisor's mistreatment but failed to allege that such treatment was discriminatory); Bamba v. Fenton, 758 Fed.Appx. 8, 12-13 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (finding no protected activity where plaintiff's internal complaint contained conclusory allegation that plaintiff was “discriminated and defamed” and employer would not reasonably understand that such a complaint was directed at racial discrimination prohibited by Title VII). Therefore, I find that Defendants have carried their burden of establishing that Plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim is futile.

non-conclusory allegation[] that suggested] that the conduct that is the basis of the hostile work environment was as a result of her race or skin color"); Salas v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Investigation, 298 F.Supp.3d 676, 684 (S.D.N.Y.2018) (dismissing a hostile work environment claim where the plaintiff "ha[d] not alleged sufficient non-conclusory facts to support her hostile-work-environment claim under Title VII."); De La Pena v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 953 F.Supp.2d 393, 418 (E.D.N.Y.2013) (dismissing hostile work environment claims because the plaintiff "failed to plead that a hostile work environment was created and existed because of his protected status, either race, color, or national origin" and failed to "plead a [causal] connection between his protected status and the alleged hostile work environment"), aff'd, 552F. App'x 98 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order); see also Lucio v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ, 575 Fed.Appx. 3, 5 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order) (affirming dismissal of hostile work environment claims based on failure to plead facts indicating causation).

” Sosa v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 368 F.Supp.3d 489, 516 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (emphasis in original) (first quoting Lucio v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 575 Fed.Appx. 3, 5 (2d Cir. 2014); and citing Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 377 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Everyone can be characterized by sex, race, ethnicity, or (real or perceived) disability; and many bosses are harsh, unjust, and rude. It is therefore important in hostile work environment cases to exclude from consideration personnel decisions that lack a linkage or correlation to the claimed ground of discrimination.”); and then citing Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001) (“It is axiomatic that mistreatment at work, whether through subjection to a hostile environment or through such concrete deprivations as being fired or being denied a promotion, is actionable under Title VII only when it occurs because of an employee's sex, or other protected characteristic.”)