Opinion
2:21-cv-02714-JD-MGB
01-11-2022
Miguel Loyola, #A-N15968 Plaintiff, v. Environmental Protection Agency; Black Lives Matter Movement; Tyler Perry; Donald J. Trump; Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr.; Channing Dungey; and Queen Elizabeth II, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Miguel Loyola (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action alleging violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the assigned United States Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint and submit a recommendation to the United States District Judge. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed, without issuance and service of process.
BACKGROUND
The undersigned notes at the outset that the rambling, incoherent nature of Plaintiff's Complaint makes it difficult to discern the true causes of action underlying this case. Indeed, Plaintiff's numerous supplemental filings are largely nonsensical, disorganized, and insubstantial in their attempts to present a constitutional violation. Based on the undersigned's review, however, the Complaint appears to primarily challenge the social justice movement known as Black Lives Matter (“BLM Movement”), which Plaintiff repeatedly refers to as a “domestic terrorist group” that is threatening the nation's “historical landmarks, confederate monuments, and family value[s].” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2; see also Dkt. No. 1 at 5.)
The undersigned clarifies that any references to the “Complaint” herein encompass Plaintiff's original Complaint (Dkt. No. 1 and the attachments thereto) and his related amended claims (Dkt. No. 8 and the attachments thereto), which are considered together as one pleading. The undersigned does not, however, consider Plaintiff's more recent “supplemental” filings, which include a jumbled two-hundred-page packet consisting of incoherent handwritten documents, newspaper articles, magazine images, and documents from different state court proceedings, among other things. (See Dkt. Nos. 13, 14.) Many of these documents are illegible and without context, such that their purpose is unclear. Based on the undersigned's review, however, these filings appear to be wholly unrelated to the claims raised in the instant case. For example, Plaintiff submitted media publications about Catholic schools (Dkt. No. 13 at 21- 29); handwritten documents naming “torturers” of immigration detainees at Tomoka Correctional Institution (“Tomoka”) and “German concentration camp” (id. at 43); a handwritten request for “emergency seizure” and “sovereignty possession” of Tomoka and the arrest of Ron DeSantis, Governor of Florida (id. at 13-14); and various handwritten allegations regarding what appear to be administrative filing issues involving both state and federal courts (id. at 47; see also Dkt. No. 14). Given the wide swath of unrelated allegations and issues in these disorganized supplemental filings, the undersigned notes that such documents are not appropriately filed or considered in the instant matter. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1) (permitting the joinder of multiple defendants only where the right to relief asserted against them arises out of the same transaction or occurrence and concerns a common question of law or fact); see also Coles v. McNeely, No. 3:11-cv-130, 2011 WL 3703117, at *3 (E.D. Va. Aug 23, 2011) (referencing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)) (“Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits, not only to prevent the sort of morass that these complaints have produced but also to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees.”) Accordingly, any references to the Complaint herein do not encompass Dkt. Nos. 13, 14, or the attachments thereto.
More specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the BLM Movement has committed the “most racist deceitful act in American history” by manipulating the name “Martin Luther King, Jr.”-a “white man's name of the 14th century”-into a “tool” for a “black man's movement” and “domestic terrorism.” (See Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2-3, suggesting that Martin Luther King, Jr. is an “imposter” profiting from the “real” Martin Luther of the Protestant Reformation.) Plaintiff seems to suggest that Martin Luther King, Jr.'s Estate is ultimately liable for $5 trillion in damages based on the “fraudulent” naming of schools, highways, parks, and daycare centers in his honor; the annual closing of America's businesses, schools, and banks on Martin Luther King, Jr. Day; and the erecting of statues “with a white man's name with black face.” (Id. at 3; see also Dkt. No. 1 at 6.)
Plaintiff further claims that Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has intentionally allowed the BLM Movement to “infiltrate” the country's national parks, landmarks, and monuments in an attempt to discourage southern states from displaying confederate memorials. (Dkt. No. 1 at 6; see also Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2, stating that the EPA “is from the northern states, ‘Yankees,' where the mindset is only to make sure that the southern states become weak. . . .”) For example, Plaintiff suggests that the EPA allowed Defendant Tyler Perry, an actor/producer and apparent supporter of the BLM Movement, to purchase over one thousand acres of land on what used to be a “confederate military stronghold” in Georgia, thereby desecrating a historical landmark. (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) Plaintiff also claims that former President Donald Trump contributed to the EPA's purported failure to protect historical landmarks because his administration was “neglectful” and “weakened” the agency. (Dkt. No. 8 at 1.)
Plaintiff claims that Defendant Channing Dungey, CEO of Warner Bros. Television Studios, also contributed to the success of the BLM Movement by broadcasting the removal of a monument of General Robert E. Lee from a site in Virginia. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff contends that Dungey's actions were “dishonorable, disrespectful and displeasing to our United States history and people.” (Id.) Similarly, Plaintiff claims that Queen Elizabeth II has supported the BLM Movement by violating “royal protocol” and allowing Prince Harry to marry Meghan Markle. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff seems to suggest that the Queen broadcasted their wedding on BBC World News knowing that the United States was “going pro-black.” (Id.)
With respect to injuries, the Complaint asserts “defamation and destruction of [United States] landmarks, parks, and monuments.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 7.) Plaintiff asks that the Court order, among other things, the removal of the name “Martin Luther King, Jr.” from any highways, streets, parks, schools, etc.; the removal of any memorials dedicated to Martin Luther King, Jr.; and the cancellation of Martin Luther King, Jr. Day. (Id.) Plaintiff also seeks $1 trillion from the BLM Movement for the destruction of national monuments; $50 billion from Tyler Perry for destroying a confederate landmark; $10 billion from Queen Elizabeth II for mental damages and ownership of Frogmore Cottage at Windsor; and $10 billion from Donald Trump and/or ownership of Trump Tower. (Id.; see also Dkt. No. 8 at 1, 5.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). This action has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Thus, a claim based on a “meritless legal theory” or a “fantastic or delusional” factual scenario may be dismissed sua sponte at any time under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25, 327-28 (1989); see also McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting that examples of frivolous claims include those whose factual allegations are so “wholly fanciful” as to be simply “unbelievable”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In order to satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations, ” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390- 91 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”).
DISCUSSION
Even considering Plaintiff's claims under the more liberal pro se pleading standard, the instant action is subject to summary dismissal for several reasons. The undersigned first notes that Plaintiff's case was not in proper form when he initially filed the Complaint. Accordingly, the undersigned issued instructions to remedy those proper form issues-which Plaintiff substantially did-prior to reviewing the substance of the claims here. (See Dkt. No. 6.) In the proper form order, the undersigned warned Plaintiff that a cursory review of the Complaint suggested that this Court may be the wrong venue for his claims:
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, a civil action may be brought in the following: (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the state in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). If an action is filed in the improper venue, the court may dismiss the case, or transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought for the convenience of the parties and in the interests of justice. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a). . . .
Your claims against Defendants do not appear to meet any of the criteria under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.(Dkt. No. 6 at 2 n.1.)
Having had the opportunity to now review the substance of Plaintiff's Complaint, the undersigned maintains that this Court is not the proper venue for this case. Indeed, none of the Defendants appear to reside in South Carolina, and Plaintiff is incarcerated at the Tomoka Correctional Institution in Daytona Beach, Florida. (Dkt. No. 10.) Moreover, the Complaint generally challenges a nationwide social movement, such that the claims and events alleged in this action are not specific to South Carolina. To the contrary, most of the events cited by Plaintiff appear to involve other cities and states. Consequently, the Court may dismiss Plaintiff's case or transfer it to any district or division in which it could have been brought for the convenience of the parties and in the interests of justice. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a); see also United States v. Espinoza, 641 F.2d 153, 162 (4th Cir. 1981) (noting that the decision of whether to transfer or dismiss a case is committed to the sound discretion of the district court); Rouse v. Nessel, No. 8:20-cv-954-DCC-JDA, 2020 WL 6279198, at *8 (D.S.C. July 6, 2020), adopted, 2020 WL 4435189 (D.S.C. Aug. 3, 2020) (“A court may raise the issue of defective venue sua sponte.”).
The undersigned recognizes that the BLM Movement has had a presence in South Carolina, including various rallies. However, even if Plaintiff intended to tailor his claims more narrowly to South Carolina-specific events, this case would still be subject to summary dismissal for the reasons discussed in greater detail below.
Upon further review, the undersigned finds that transferring this case to another district court would be futile, as Plaintiff clearly lacks standing to bring this lawsuit in the first instance. The Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to “cases” and “controversies, ” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1., and “standing is an essential and unchanging part of that case-or-controversy requirement, ” Doe v. Obama, 631 F.3d 157, 160 (4th Cir. 2011). Thus, “[s]tanding implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction” and is “a threshold jurisdictional issue. . . .” See Career Counseling, Inc. v. Amerifactors Fin. Grp., LLC, 509 F.Supp.3d 547, 553 (D.S.C. 2020) (citing Covenant Media of N.C., LLC v. City of Monroe, N.C. , 285 Fed.Appx. 30, 34 (4th Cir. 2008)).
In order to demonstrate standing, a plaintiff must show “a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (noting that the plaintiff must have suffered a “particularized” injury, which means that “the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way”). In other words, a plaintiff cannot demonstrate standing by bringing suit on behalf of the general public. See Moss v. Spartanburg Cnty. Sch. Dist. Seven, 683 F.3d 599, 604-05 (4th Cir. 2012) (explaining that plaintiffs may not establish standing “merely because they disagree with a government policy . . . or because they share the generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Moreover, “mere interest in a problem, no matter how longstanding the interest . . . is not sufficient by itself” to establish a particularized interest. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 737, 739 (1972).
As noted above, the Complaint in this case is based on Plaintiff's personal criticisms and beliefs regarding the BLM Movement and race relations in the United States; it does not, however, reflect an interest personal to Plaintiff that would render him any more injured than other people nationwide who might share those same criticisms and ideals. In fact, the Complaint does not appear to allege any cognizable injury to Plaintiff whatsoever. Instead, Plaintiff explicitly states that the purpose of this action is “for the people to get justice” for Defendants' crimes against “the whole nation.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 1.) Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate the requisite standing to bring the instant suit and therefore recommends that this action be dismissed. See, e.g., Heinemann v. Kennedy, No. 2:07-cv-000091, 2008 WL 649061, at *4-5 (N.D. W.Va. Mar. 10, 2008) (dismissing case for lack of standing because personal beliefs in the ideals for which an organization stands are not enough to show a personal interest); Murray v. Singhi, No. 0:09-451-PMD-PJG, 2009 WL 2447987, at *5 (D.S.C. Aug. 7, 2009) (finding complaint subject to partial summary dismissal with respect to plaintiff's allegations about matters applicable to “all mankind” and not directly related to plaintiff's own, individual constitutional rights or injuries).
Although the Court need not address the merits of the Complaint here, it is also worth noting that even if Plaintiff could somehow establish standing in this case, the incoherent and frivolous nature of his claims would still preclude survival beyond initial review. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The undersigned addresses each element in turn.
First, while Plaintiff's Complaint contains isolated references to the United States Constitution (see Dkt. No. 1 at 4), it is very difficult to distill an actionable federal claim from Plaintiff's rambling, nonsensical allegations. See, e.g., Green v. Sumter Court, No. 3:07-cv-1570-JFA-BM, 2007 WL 2022199, at *2-3 (D.S.C. July 9, 2007) (dismissing pro se complaint where the allegations were “so incomprehensible and filled with what could only be considered by a reasonable person as unconnected, conclusory, unsupported statements or ‘gibberish' that they [did] not state a cause of action.”); Bell v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 1:13-cv-00478-RDB, 2013 WL 6528966, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 11, 2013) (“Although a pro se plaintiff is general[ly] given more leeway than a party represented by counsel . . . a district court is not obligated to ferret through a [c]omplaint . . . that is so confused, ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Windham v. Graham, No. 9:08-cv-1935-PMD-GCK, 2008 WL 3833789, at *6 (D.S.C. Aug. 14, 2008) (noting that “a complaint is insufficient where it simply expounds a collection of legal buzzwords but fails to make any factual allegations against the defendants”). Consequently, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a clear constitutional violation.
With respect to the second element, the Complaint plainly fails to name a defendant amenable to suit under § 1983. Indeed, most of the Defendants in this case are private actors and, thus, do not act under color of state law. See American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999) (“[T]he under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct. . . .”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Additionally, organizations like the BLM Movement “consist of buildings and grounds, ” and therefore do not qualify as “persons” for purposes of § 1983. Bryan v. F.B.I., No. 1:10-cv-2554-TLW-SVH, 2011 WL 5025317, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 9, 2011), adopted, 2011 WL 5025312 (D.S.C. Oct. 21, 2011). And finally, § 1983 does not extend to the federal government or its officers, which includes agencies like the EPA. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 650 n.2 (1963); see also Thompson v. Pretzello, No. 1:15-cv-1302-RDB, 2016 WL 2610112, at *5 (D. Md. May 5, 2016) (noting that § 1983 provides “no avenue for relief against the federal government or its officials). Accordingly, Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a plausible claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and is therefore subject to dismissal.
Former President Donald Trump is also entitled to complete immunity for any claims regarding the performance of his duties while in office. See Sykes v. Frank, No. 8:08-cv-4049-GRA-BHH, 2009 WL 614806, at *8 (D.S.C. Mar. 6, 2009).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court summarily dismiss this action without prejudice and without issuance or service of process.
The undersigned finds that Plaintiff's allegations are “so detached from reality that there is no conceivable way for [him] to cure the complaint's deficiencies through amendment.” See Kraim v. Virginia, No. 3:21-cv-00326, 2021 WL 3612305, at *2 (S.D. W.Va. July 26, 2021), adopted, 2021 WL 3610509 (S.D. W.Va. Aug. 13, 2021); see also Boyd v. United States Cent. Intel. Agency, No. 7:21-cv-1133-BHH-JDA, 2021 WL 2482415, at *5 (D.S.C. May 26, 2021) (finding that it would be futile to allow plaintiff an opportunity to amend complaint “given the preposterous and frivolous nature” of the allegations), adopted, 2021 WL 2477170 (D.S.C. June 17, 2021).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiffs attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court Post Office Box 835 Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).