• 2 It is a well-settled rule of law that under the Dramshop Act "means of support" has been construed as requiring that the person injured did in fact render support and that no damage award can be based on a future potentiality of support not presently provable. ( Shiflett v. Madison, 105 Ill. App.2d 382, 245 N.E.2d 567; Robertson v. White, 11 Ill. App.2d 177, 136 N.E.2d 550; Lowrey v. Malkowski, 23 Ill. App.2d 371, 163 N.E.2d 528, aff'd, 20 Ill.2d 280, 170 N.E.2d 147, cert. denied, 365 U.S. 879, 6 L.Ed.2d 191, 81 S.Ct. 1029.) Thus, in Robertson v. White, the court affirmed the dismissal of an action for loss of "means of support" brought by the parent of a deceased four-year-old boy who had not been contributing to her support at the time of his death.
) Loss of means of support includes loss of income which results from termination of voluntary contributions. Lowrey v. Malkowski, 23 Ill. App.2d 371, 163 N.E.2d 528; I.L.P. Liquor § 155. • 7 Plaintiffs contend that when they attempted to discharge their burden of proof on the issue of loss of means of support by Morris Weiner, they were unduly restricted by the rulings of the trial court which sustained objections to questions asked by their counsel.
Bowman v. County of Lake, 29 Ill.2d 268, 281. • 7 The proposed amendment also mentions injury to the father's means of support, but this would require that support had previously been provided by the son ( Shiflett v. Madison, 105 Ill. App.2d 382, 387; Lowrey v. Malkowski, 23 Ill. App.2d 371, 375; Robertson v. White 11 Ill. App.2d 177; see Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 1332), and the point was not urged on this appeal. Accordingly we will not disturb the trial judge's ruling on the motion for leave to amend.
Loss of means of support includes loss of income which results from the termination of voluntary contributions. ( Lowrey v. Malkowski, 23 Ill. App.2d 371, 163 N.E.2d 528.) We do not deem it material that Ronald, now free from incarceration and remarried, could still support the minor children as he did prior to the death of their mother.
[1] It is a well-settled rule of law that under the Dram Shop Act "loss of means of support" has been construed as requiring that the person injured did in fact render support and that no damage award can be based on a future potentiality of support not presently provable. Robertson v. White, 11 Ill. App.2d 177, 136 N.E.2d 550; Lowrey v. Malkowski, 23 Ill. App.2d 371, 163 N.E.2d 528. In the instant case the evidence pertaining to Jack Shiflett's employment is as follows: He was unemployed during all of 1962, and in 1963 he was employed for about four months as a painter at a weekly salary of approximately $100, but had never been fully paid for his services, having received only $60.40. He also worked for a plumbing and heating firm, but only for a few days. He earned $10 to $15 a week in part-time work at Cliff's Lounge. Although Shiflett testified that at the time of the injury in question he was employed and had been employed four to five weeks previously, his testimony is contradicted by his own answers to interrogatories and by his failure to include in his 1963 income tax return any income supposedly derived from that employment.
" Also see: Lowrey v. Malkowski, 23 Ill. App.2d 371, 376, 163 N.E.2d 528 (1959). [4] In the case at bar, the cause of action accrued on August 1 or 2, 1965, and under section 14, the action would be barred unless commenced within one year from that date.
Count III alleges that the daughter was unable to support herself following the collision, that she was likely to become a public charge, and that the parents had expended $5,000 for her medical expenses. The law is settled that recovery may be had for injury to means of support where the injured person was actually furnishing support, and this is so even though there may have been no legal obligation to do so. Lowrey v. Malkowski, 23 Ill. App.2d 371, 375, 163 N.E.2d 528; Robertson v. White, 11 Ill. App.2d 177, 180, 136 N.E.2d 550; McClure v. Lence, 345 Ill. App. 158, 164, 102 N.E.2d 546; Cook v. Kingan, 332 Ill. App. 294, 297, 75 N.E.2d 120. Likewise, the payment of medical expenses by a parent, or by a spouse, constitutes damage to property which is recoverable under the Dram Shop Act. Shepherd v. Marsaglia, 31 Ill. App.2d 379, 383, 176 N.E.2d 473, 475; Fortner v. Norris, 19 Ill. App.2d 212, 215, 153 N.E.2d 433.