Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-1821, Section "C"(1)
August 25, 2000
ORDER AND REASONS
Defendants Jefferson Parish School Board ("JPSB") and Melissa Caudle filed a Motion for Summary Judgment urging that the Court dismiss with prejudice all of Plaintiff Gayle Love's claims. See Rec. Doc. 45. Love filed opposition to the summary judgment motion in which she conceded one of her claims but contended that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on her other claims. See Rec. Doc. 52. The Court heard oral argument on Defendants' motion on Wednesday, August 2, 2000. At oral argument, the Court (1) granted summary judgment as unopposed on the grounds Love conceded and (2) granted summary judgment for the reasons explained at oral argument on the contested First Amendment and retaliation claims; but (3) denied summary judgment for the reasons explained at oral argument on the contested hostile workplace claim. See Rec. Doc. 58. The Court, however, found it impossible to rule on Love's salary claim because of confusion regarding her actual contract. The Court, therefore, ordered production of additional evidence and supplemental briefing on the issue. See Rec. Docs. 57-58. The parties have now provided the Court with the supplemental information necessary for the Court's ruling on the salary claim. For the reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS summary judgment on the claim.
I. FACTS
Love, a Black woman who was a former dean of students/disciplinarian and temporary acting principal at John H. Martyn High School ("Martyn"), filed the instant case claiming (1) racial discrimination based on a hostile work environment; (2) retaliatory non-promotion for making a racial discrimination complaint; (3) retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights; and (4) improper salary reduction. See Rec. Doc. 22 (Amd. Cmpl.). As explained above, the Court granted summary judgment dismissing the second and third claims, denied summary judgment on the first, and now rules on the fourth.
Love's general discrimination allegations stem from allegedly racially discriminatory based actions taken by Martyn's principal, Caudle, and Martyn's assistant principal, Sharon Sofford, who is not named as a defendant in this case.
In the salary reduction claim addressed herein, Love contends that she was entitled to continue at the salary she received as acting principal even after she returned to her position as dean of students when Caudle returned from sabbatical. Love claims that it is the practice and policy of the JPSB to continue employees at salaries raised for temporary promotions (i.e., "acting" positions) even when those temporary reassignments are completed and the employee returns to a previous position. See Rec. Doc. 22 (Amd. Cmpl.), at ¶¶ 26-27.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
A district court can grant a motion for summary judgment only when the "`pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the district court "will review the facts drawing all inferences most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Reid v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986). The court must find "[a] factual dispute . . . [to be] `genuine' if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party . . . [and a] fact . . . [to be] `material' if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law." Beck v. Somerset Technologies, Inc., 882 F.2d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
"If the moving party meets the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial." Engstrom v. First National Bank of Eagle Lake, 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53, and Fed.R.Civ. p. 56(e)). The mere argued existence of a factual dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative," summary judgment is appropriate. Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2511 (citations omitted).
Partial summary judgment dismissing only certain claims is appropriate under these same standards. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d). See also Corporate Investigative Division, Inc. v. American Telephone Telegraph Co., 884 F. Supp. 220, 223-24 (W.D. La. 1995) (using same standard of review for partial summary judgment on liability alone under 56(c)).
B. Discussion
Love has not identified the specific legal basis for her salary reduction claim. In a salary dispute based on 42 U.S.C. § 1981's protection of equal rights to make and enforce contracts, a court applies the same McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework as in a Title VII racial discrimination case. See Simmons v. Rothe Development, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 486, 488 (S.D. Tex. 1997), aff'd without published opinion, 132 F.3d 1465 (5th Cir. 1997). Under this test, Love's claim fails because she has not set forth any facts that White employees remained at inflated salaries once they completed temporary promotions while she was relegated to her former salary.
Title VII prohibits an employer from "fail[ing] or refus[ing] to hire or . . . [from] discharg[ing], or otherwise discriminat[ing] against an individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). A Title VII plaintiff bears the initial burden to prove a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). A prima facie case of discrimination consists of a plaintiff showing (1) that he was discharged; (2) that he was qualified for the position; (3) that he was a member of the protected class at the time of discharge; and (4) that he was replaced by someone outside the protected class. See Haynes v. Pennzoil Co., 207 F.3d 296, 300 (5th Cir. 2000). See also St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks; 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2747, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993).
If established, the plaintiff's prima facie case raises an inference of intentional discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. The defendant then must rebut that presumption by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). If the defendant articulates such a reason, the focus then shifts to the ultimate question: whether the plaintiff can prove that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. See id.
The plaintiff may attempt to overcome the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reason by providing evidence that the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is merely pretext for racial animus. See St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. at 2749. The plaintiff, therefore, "retains the ultimate burden of persuasion throughout the case." Faruki v. Parsons S.I.P., Inc., 123 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093). A plaintiff can meet his or her burden of demonstrating pretext and thereby establish a jury issue to avoid summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law "if the evidence taken as a whole (1) creates a fact issue as to whether each of the employer's stated reasons was what actually motivated the employer and (2) creates a reasonable inference that [the plaintiffs protected status] was a determinative factor in the actions of which plaintiff complains." Vadie v. Mississippi State Univ., 218 F.3d 365, 374, n. 23 (5th Cir. 2000) (explaining that this analysis first formulated in Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 994 (5th Cir. 1996), survives the Supreme Court's abrogation of Rhodes in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 2097, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2000)). A prima facie case and sufficient evidence of pretext would permit a court or jury to find unlawful discrimination, without additional independent evidence of discrimination, though such a showing will not always be adequate to sustain a jury's finding of liability. See Reeves at ___, 120 S.Ct. at 2106-2109.
If the basis of Love's claim is an implied contract due to past policy and practice, her own contract belies her claim. The contract for her temporary promotion to acting principal specifically provided that, when the term of the contract expired and was not renewed, "Appointee shall be returned to the last position in which he/she has acquired tenure or to one paying at least the same salary as that position unless Appointee chooses to terminate his/her employment." See Rec. Doc. 45 (Defs' Mem. Supp. Summ. J.), Ex. E (JPSB-Love May 1, 1997 Contract), at § VII(C). The contract speaks for itself, explaining that, unless Love's acting principalship was renewed, she would be returned to her former position as dean of students or some other position paying at least the same salary as the dean of students position. It is clear that upon Love's return to the highest level of tenure she had attained (i.e., dean of students), she would be entitled only to the salary for that position, not a continuation at the level paid for her temporary assignment as acting principal.
As the parties are aware, the Court was initially baffled by the 1998 contract because it called for a salary higher than even the acting principal position. That "glitch" has been adequately explained by the supplemental filings and is no longer a meaningful issue.
Love claims that the practice and policy of the JPSB was otherwise and thus that she should have been continued at the acting principal salary. Love has failed to adduce adequate evidence to support her assertion that other temporarily reassigned JPSB employees were continued at raised salaries after returning to their original positions. In her memorandum opposing summary judgment, Love merely claims, without presenting any evidence in support, that Thomas Hebert and Richard Caiton, previously temporarily reassigned JPSB employees, remained at raised salaries after returning to their original positions. This unsupported argument is insufficient to oppose the Defendants' proffer of evidence in the form of an affidavit of Ronald Ceruti, JPSB Executive Director of Personnel, attesting that: (1) Hebert receives the same pay as he did as a tenured principal even though he was involuntarily demoted to a lower paying position because he had achieved tenure as a principal and the state tenure law requires his continuation at that salary level; and (2) Caiton returned to a disciplinarian's salary, and has remained there, after his temporary assignment as an acting assistant principal in 1978-79. See id., Ex. F (Ceruti Aff.), at ¶ 6. In her supplemental filing, Love simply lists the names of eleven other apparent employees, nine of whom she concedes were not similarly situated. As for the one employee actually similarly situated, the JPSB likewise reduced her pay when she returned to her prior position.
Therefore, for these reasons, it is appropriate to dismiss Love's salary reduction claim on Defendants' summary judgment motion.
III. CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 45) is hereby GRANTED IN PART, dismissing Plaintiff's salary reduction claim.