Un. Tel. Co. v. James, 162 U.S. 650; Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299; Chicago Ry. Co. v. Solan, 169 U.S. 133; Lake Shore Ry. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U.S. 285; Wisconsin Ry. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U.S. 287; Louis. Nash. R.R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U.S. 503; McNeill v. Southern Ry. Co., 202 U.S. 543; Gulf, Colo. S.F. Ry. Co. v. Texas, 204 U.S. 403; Ware v. Mobile Co., 209 U.S. 405; New York v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Larabee Flour Mills Co., 211 U.S. 612; Louis. Nash. R.R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U.S. 503, 518; Alabama V. Railway Co. v. Mississippi R.R. Comm., 203 U.S. 496; Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204, 209; Houston Tex. Cent. Ry. Co. v. Mayes, 201 U.S. 321, 328; Penna. R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U.S. 477, 488.
As applied to a company engaged in both interstate and intrastate traffic, a state regulation, in respect of the latter only, which forbids any railroad company in general terms from charging more for a shorter haul than for a longer haul for the same class of freight over any portion of its lines within the State without regard to direction, circumstances or condition, and which allows the shipper an absolute right to recover any overcharges collected from him in violation of the prohibition, is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the Interstate Commerce Acts, in the absence of special facts and circumstances warranting a different conclusion in the particular case. Louisville NashvilleR.R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U.S. 503. To claim exemption from such regulations under the Contract Clause, the existence of a special protecting contract must be shown by the record. 178 S.W. 1179, affirmed.
If a statute is constitutional, this court must be governed by it and its plain meaning; with the wisdom of Congress in adopting the statute this court has nothing to do. In Louis. Nash. R.R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U.S. 503, this court decided that a general enforcement of the long and short-haul clause of the Act to Regulate Commerce would not be repugnant to the Constitution, and will not now reconsider and overrule that decision. The Commerce Court had jurisdiction of a suit to enjoin the enforcement of the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission involved in these cases and which refused the request of carriers to put in force rates requested by them.
San Diego Land Co. v. National City, 174 U.S. 739, 754; Knoxville v. Water Co., 212 U.S. 1, 8, 16; Chic., Mil. St. P. Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, 176 U.S. 167, 173; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards, 183 U.S. 79, 91, 97; Reagan v. Farmers' L. T. Co., 154 U.S. 362, 395; Bridge Co. v. Henderson City, 173 U.S. 592, 614; St. L. San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Gill, 156 U.S. 649, 666; Day v. Chic. N.W.R.R. Co., 35 F. 866, 874; Louis. Nash. R.R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U.S. 503, 511. The freight and passenger rates involved are not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment and are not, therefore, confiscatory.
The commission's order is presumptively lawful. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113; Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 U.S. 536, 541; Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 392; Chicago c. R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 344; San Diego c. Co. v. National City, 174 U.S. 739, 754; Chicago c. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 176 U.S. 167, 173; Louisville c. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U.S. 503, 511; Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U.S. 1. 8; Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 41. There is no standard by which the reasonableness of a rate can be tested purely as matter of law. Illinois Central R. Co. v. Int. Comm. Comm., 206 U.S. 441; Texas Pac. R. Co. v. Int. Comm. Comm., 162 U.S. 197; Cincinnati, N.O. T.P.R. Co. v. Int. Comm. Comm., 162 U.S. 184.
The cases of Louisville Nashville Railroad Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U.S. 503, and Louisville Nashville Railroad Co. v. Eubank, 184 U.S. 27, concerned the validity of the long and short haul provision of the constitution of Kentucky adopted in 1891. In the first case, violation was charged with respect to the transportation of coal from Altamont to Lebanon, an intermediate station, as compared with charges for transportation from Altamont to Elizabethtown and Louisville, all places being within Kentucky.
The construction of this section by the Supreme Court of Iowa must be accepted. Railroad Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U.S. 503, 507. The tax imposed by this statute, as it is construed by the Supreme Court of Iowa, is nothing more than a tax on capital, void in so far as the capital is invested in government bonds. Code, § 1321.
There was no opinion delivered by the judge holding the court in which the case was tried, and as the case did not go to the highest court of that State, we are without the benefit of any written opinion of the courts of Kentucky in regard to the question involved. We have already held, in the case of the Louisville Nashville Railroad Company v. Kentucky, 183 U.S. 503, that the section of the Kentucky constitution above set forth, as applied to places, all of which are within the State, violates no provision of the Federal Constitution. The effect of the decision by the state court now under review is to hold that the provision of section 218 of the state constitution is not confined to a case where the long and short hauls are both within the State of Kentucky, but that it extends to and embraces a long haul from a place outside of to one within the State, and a shorter haul between points on the same line and in the same direction, both of which are within the State, and the question is whether the provision of that constitution as thus construed is or is not a violation of the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States.
H.H. Larimore and Thos. J. Cole for appellants. (1) The order entered by the Public Service Commission of Missouri here under review would directly affect and regulate interstate commerce, contravenes, and is in violation of, the Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the United States and the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, U.S.C.A., Title 49, Chapter 1. Louisville Nashville, Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U.S. 503; Louisville Nashville Ry. Co. v. Eubank, 184 U.S. 27; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 429; Houston Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 354. (2) The Public Service Commission of Missouri is without authority to fix a relation of interstate and intrastate rates and charges of a carrier by railroad, or remove what it finds to be unjust discrimination against intrastate rates caused by an interstate adjustment by requiring the carrier to reduce its intrastate rate and charge or increase its interstate rate and charge. Houston Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 354; Wisconsin Railroad Comm. v. C.B. Q. Railroad, 257 U.S. 563; Sec. 5262, R.S. 1929.
Legislation, in a great variety of ways, may affect commerce and persons engaged in it without constituting a regulation of it, within the meaning of the Constitution.' Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 103; Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343; Louisville Nashville R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U.S. 503; The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352; Boston Maine R. Co. v. Armburg, 285 U.S. 234; Collins v. American Buslines, Inc., 350 U.S. 528." 362 U.S., at 443-444.