A motion for judgment on the pleadings is reviewed under the same sufficiency standard as a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss. Loud Records LLC v. Minervini, 621 F. Supp. 2d 672, 676 (W.D. Wis. 2009). Thus, the court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Generally, a motion under Rule 12(c) challenging the sufficiency of the pleadings in the complaint is reviewed under the same basic legal standard as a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss. Loud Records LLC v. Minervini, 621 F. Supp. 2d 672, 676 (W.D. Wis. 2009). Specifically, the court will grant a Rule 12(c) motion "only if 'it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any facts that would support his claim for relief.'" N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of South Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Craigs, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 12 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir. 1993)). In resolving a Rule 12(c) motion, the court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Likewise, private parties such as copyright holders frequently use IP addresses to identify unknown defendants who allegedly engage in online copyright infringement. See, e.g. , Purzel Video GmbH v. St. Pierre , 10 F. Supp. 3d 1158, 1164 (D. Colo. 2014) ; Malibu Media, LLC v. Roldan , No. 8:13-cv-3007, 2014 WL 3805494, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2014) ; Loud Records LLC v. Minervini , 621 F.Supp.2d 672, 676 (W.D. Wisc. 2009). Given that the government as well as private parties successfully use IP addresses to identify wrongdoers in other contexts, there is no reason to believe that pre-trial discovery would not allow Attkisson to use the IPv4 addresses to identify the true identity of the Doe Defendants.
Likewise, private parties such as copyright holders frequently use IP addresses to identify unknown defendants who allegedly engage in online copyright infringement. See, e.g., Purzel Video GmbH v. St. Pierre, 10 F.Supp.3d 1158, 1164 (D. Colo. 2014); Malibu Media, LLC v. Roldan, No. 8:13-cv-3007, 2014 WL 3805494, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2014); Loud Records LLC v. Minervini, 621 F.Supp.2d 672, 676 (W.D. Wisc. 2009). Given that the government as well as private parties successfully use IP addresses to identify wrongdoers in other contexts, there is no reason to believe that pre-trial discovery would not allow Attkisson to use the IPv4 addresses to identify the true identity of the Doe Defendants.
Consistent with these holdings, other courts addressing the issue of files available on P2P networks have held that the files are available to the public and there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for files shared on P2P networks. See, e.g. Motown Record Co., L.P. v. Kovalcik, No. 07-cv-4702, 2009 WL 455137, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (finding that because the accessed files were located in a shared folder on a P2P network, "[n]o authorization was needed since the files accessed were accessible to the general public"); Loud Records LLC v. Minervini, 621 F. Supp. 2d 672, 678 (W.D. Wis. 2009) (holding that files on P2P network were "accessible by the public"); U.S. v. Brashear, No. 4:11-CR-0062, 2013 WL 6065326, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2013) ("Numerous cases have held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in files made available to the public through peer-to-peer file sharing programs"). With respect to the 1718 File, the FTC concluded that "LabMD made the file freely available for public viewing."
Gifford contends that the court cannot consider PHH's motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because PHH already filed an answer to Gifford's original complaint, which Gifford says is essentially identical to the amended complaint. In support, Gifford cites Loud Records LLC v. Minervini, 621 F. Supp. 2d 672, 675 (W.D. Wis. 2009), in which Judge Crabb construed defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) as a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) because defendant had filed his motion long after he answered the complaint. Gifford's argument and reliance on Loud is misplaced. "[I]t is well established that the amended pleading supersedes the original pleading," and that once amended "the original pleading no longer performs any function in the case."
"The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that complaints for copyright infringement are sufficient when they allege present copyright ownership by the plaintiff, registration in compliance with the applicable statute and infringement by the defendant." Loud Records LLC v. Minervini , 621 F.Supp.2d 672, 677 (W.D. Wis. 2009) (citing Mid Am. Title Co. v. Kirk , 991 F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 1993) ). Datacarrier has alleged present copyright ownership, registration, and, as discussed above, copying by WSG.
However, when extrinsic evidence outside the pleadings is relied upon in pursuit of a Rule 12(c), courts must either: (1) convert the motion into one for summary judgment under Rule 56; or (2) exclude the documents attached to the motion to dismiss and continue under Rule 12(c). See FED. R. CIV. PRO. 12(d) ("If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56."); see also Omega Healthcare Investors, Inc., 475 F.3d at 856 n. 3; Loud Records LLC v. Minervini, 621 F. Supp. 2d 672, 675 (W.D. Wis. 2009). "On summary judgment, a party is entitled to judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Omega Healthcare Investors, Inc., 475 F.3d at 857 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56).
At the pleading stage, a party alleging copyright infringement need only claim ownership over the copyrighted work, that the party has registered the work in accordance with statute, and that the defendant infringed. SeeWarren v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 952 F.Supp.2d 610, 617 (S.D.N.Y.2013) (citing Mid Am. Title Co., 991 F.2d at 421–22 ); Loud Records LLC v. Minervini, 621 F.Supp.2d 672, 677 (W.D.Wis.2009). Plaintiff has adequately alleged ownership of a valid copyright registration (Compl.¶ 25) and copying of the piece, and has therefore adequately alleged infringement.