Opinion
No. 2 CA-JV 2017-0178
05-03-2018
LUIS L., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, L.A.L., L.E.L., AND J.L., Appellees.
COUNSEL Luis L., Tucson In Propria Persona Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General By Cathleen E. Fuller, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety Pima County Office of Children's Counsel, Tucson By Sybil Clarke Counsel for Minors
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 103(G). Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
No. JD20150720
The Honorable Dean Christoffel, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Luis L., Tucson
In Propria Persona Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General
By Cathleen E. Fuller, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety Pima County Office of Children's Counsel, Tucson
By Sybil Clarke
Counsel for Minors
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Staring authored the decision of the Court, in which Chief Judge Eckerstrom and Judge Brearcliffe concurred. STARING, Presiding Judge:
¶1 Luis L., acting in propria persona, appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating his parental rights to his son L.A.L., born in 2009, his daughter L.E.L., born in 2011, and his son J.L., born in 2013, on the ground that his sentence for a felony conviction "is of such length that the child[ren] will be deprived of a normal home for a period of years." A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4). We affirm the court's termination order.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 In October 2015, the Department of Child Safety (DCS) took the children into temporary physical custody and filed a dependency petition alleging a history of domestic violence between Luis and Marissa O., the children's mother. Luis reportedly had assaulted Marissa in front of the children on October 13, and, the following day, he allegedly broke into Marissa's home, armed with a baseball bat, and caused "extensive damage throughout the home," breaking every window, the children's bunk beds, a washing machine, and televisions, and "intentionally flood[ing] the bathroom." He was arrested for domestic violence and criminal damage, and was released on bond. Several weeks later, he was arrested for aggravated assault for allegedly "stabbing [a] bail bondsman."
¶3 According to DCS, although Luis had been referred for assessments and other services, none had been completed prior to his incarceration. Luis later participated in a self-study parenting class and sent "appropriate letters" to the children, but he allegedly had been sending Marissa threatening letters and had been "inappropriate" with her during telephone calls, despite his completion of an anger management course. In April 2017, the juvenile court changed the case plan to severance and adoption, and DCS filed a motion to terminate Luis's parental rights on the ground that the length of his incarceration would deprive the children of a normal home for a period of years.
¶4 After a contested hearing, the juvenile court granted DCS's motion. In its under-advisement ruling, it addressed factors relevant to termination based on length of incarceration, as identified by our supreme court in Michael J. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security, 196 Ariz. 246, ¶¶ 28-29 (2000), as well as the best interests of the children, who are presently placed with a paternal aunt who is willing to adopt them.
Discussion
¶5 A juvenile court may terminate a parent's rights if it finds clear and convincing evidence of a statutory ground for severance and finds by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the children's best interests. A.R.S. §§ 8-533(B), 8-537(B); Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, ¶ 41 (2005). "[W]e will affirm a termination order that is supported by reasonable evidence." Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, ¶ 18 (App. 2009). That is, we will not reverse a termination order for insufficient evidence unless, as a matter of law, no reasonable fact-finder could have found the evidence satisfied the applicable burden of proof. See Denise R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 221 Ariz. 92, ¶ 10 (App. 2009).
¶6 In his pro se opening brief, Luis does not allege any error or challenge the court's findings. Rather, he asks that he be allowed to use his remaining time in prison "in visitation, phone calls & letters to let my kids know I love them and I am planning for our reunion." This argument is similar to his testimony, at the termination hearing, that he saw no harm in the children remaining in a dependency until he was released from prison. Thus, in essence, Luis is asking this court to reweigh the evidence on review, which we will not do. See Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, ¶¶ 4, 14 (App. 2004).
Disposition
¶7 The juvenile court's ruling includes its well-reasoned analysis of the evidence in the context of the applicable law, and Luis does not suggest the court's findings are unsupported by the record. Under these circumstances, we see no need to restate the court's reasoning in detail. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 16 (App. 2002), citing State v. Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272, 274 (App. 1993). Instead, we affirm the court's termination of Luis's parental rights, for the reasons set forth in its under-advisement ruling.
As DCS observes, unrepresented litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys. Flynn v. Campbell, 243 Ariz. 76, ¶ 24 (2017); see also Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a) (opening brief must contain statement of issues and argument that includes citation to legal authorities and appropriate references to the record); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 106(A) (Rule 13, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., applies to appeals from final orders of juvenile court); Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, ¶ 62 (App. 2009) (failure to comply with Rule 13, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., waives argument on appeal). --------