Opinion
Hearing Granted Jan. 29, 1942.
Appeal from Superior Court, Los Angeles County; Edward R. Brand, Judge.
Action by the County of Los Angeles against Gretta La Fuente to recover under provisions of the Old Age Security Law for aid furnished by the county to defendant’s father and mother. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
COUNSEL
Gretta La Fuente, in pro per.
J. H. O’Connor, Co. Counsel, and Gerald G. Kelly, Deputy Co. Counsel, both of Los Angeles, for respondent.
OPINION
SHAW, Justice pro tem.
The questions presented for decision in this case arise under the provisions of chapter 1 of division III of the Welfare and Institutions Code, St.1937, p. 1078. This chapter is self-denominated as the "Old Age Security Law" (section 2000). All sections herein referred to are parts of it and are viewed as enacted in 1937, this case having arisen before any subsequent amendments became effective.
Section 2001 declares that "Subject to the provisions of this chapter, every person residing in the State, if in need, shall be entitled to aid in old age from the State". The remainder of the chapter provides for fixing the amount of this aid, sets forth a more particular description of the persons who may claim it, states the terms and conditions on which it may be received, and provides the details of administration of the act. The primary duty of administration, including the decision whether aid shall be granted, and if so, how much, is cast upon the boards of supervisors of the several counties, subject to supervision by the State Department of Social Welfare. Payment of aid granted is to be made, subject to partial reimbursement, by the counties. Section 2224 provided when this case arose that "If the person receiving aid has within the State a spouse or adult child pecuniarily able to support said person", then on request of the board of supervisors of the county granting aid, the "civil legal officer of the county granting aid shall, on behalf of said county, maintain an action, in the superior court of the county granting such aid, against said relatives, in the order named, to recover for said county such portion of the.aid granted as said relative is able to pay."
This is an action brought under the authority of section 2224. The complaint alleged, in two counts, that under the Old Age Security Act aid had been rendered by plaintiff county to defendant’s father and mother, and that defendant was pecuniarily able to support her parents. Defendant in her answer denied that her income and property were as great as stated in the complaint. She further alleged as to each parent that "at all times referred to in the complaint herein, defendant has been ready, able and willing and has offered to support and provide for her said parent at and in the home of defendant, but said parent has refused to accept said offer or support"; that this offer was made known to plaintiff’s department of charities before any aid was granted, and that she was still ready, able and willing to support the parent in her home. While the findings covered the various allegations in some detail, their general effect was that the complaint was true and the answer was untrue. Regarding defendant’s offer of support, the findings were that defendant was not at the times alleged in plaintiff’s complaint ready, able and willing, nor did she at any time offer, to support her parents "in adequate living quarters", and that she never offered to give them "any financial assistance", and she was not "ready, able and willing" to do so.
Defendant’s principal contention is that prior to the payment of any money by plaintiff county to her parents, she had offered to support them in her own home and had made that offer known to the plaintiff, and therefore they were not "in need" within the meaning of section 2001, and so not eligible for the relief furnished.
It is undisputed that defendant did make such an offer and communicate it to plaintiff, but plaintiff argues that the home offered was inadequate, both from a physical standpoint and because of an incompatibility of temperament between defendant and her parents which made it impossible for them to "get along", as the mother testified. Since we conclude that a mere offer, such as defendant made, constitutes no defense to this action, we need not consider the matter of adequacy of the home offered.
To discover the legal rule on this point, we must read and consider together the various relevant sections of the Old Age Security Law. Section 2001, Welfare and Institutions Code, is the general provision declaring the policy of the law. As already noted, it limits the persons eligible for aid to those "in need". Section 2004 casts some light on this provision by declaring that the chapter does not repeal other acts for the support of "the poor", and is an additional method of supporting and providing for "the aged poor". Other sections operate to fill in the details of the picture outlined by these provisions. Thus section 2020 limits the total amount of aid to be granted to the amount by which $35 per month exceeds the applicant’s income from all other sources--certain described income being excluded from consideration here. By sections 2164 and 2165 a single person owning real property assessed at more than $3,000, or either one of a married couple which owns such property, cannot be given aid. Section 2163 prohibits aid to one owning personal property the value of which exceeds $500. The person receiving aid is not to be deemed a pauper or dubbed an indigent by reason thereof. Section 2009. From these provisions it is obvious that to be "in need", or to be one of the "aged poor", a person need not be entirely without resources, but may own any property and receive any income below the limits stated in these sections.
What of support offered or furnished by a relative responsible for the support of the person? Does such offer or furnishing render the person to whom support is offered or furnished ineligible for aid under this law? We naturally expect to find the law dealing with these problems, and looking at section 2160 we find its answer to them. That section begins with the statement: "Aid shall be granted under this chapter to any person who comes within all of the following descriptions:" Then follow separate lettered paragraphs of descriptive matter, covering age, citizenship, residence, status as inmate or not of an institution, nonconveyance of property to qualify for aid, and this: "(f) Who is not receiving adequate support from a husband, wife, or child, able and responsible under the law of this State to furnish such support". This provision is negative, rather than positive, and is quite similar in its effect to an exception. It debars from the receipt of aid persons who are receiving support as specified. It is the only provision of the law dealing with the subject of support by relatives, and must be regarded as covering the whole subject of such support, whether offered or furnished. To this provision must be applied the rule that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another, Homestead Valley Sanitary Dist. v. Donohue, 1938, 27 Cal.App.2d 548, 550, 81 P.2d 471; Merchants Nat. Bank v. Continental Nat. Bank, 1929, 98 Cal.App. 523, 532, 277 P. 354, and we must conclude that no further limitation or exception regarding support from relatives was intended. Those who are receiving adequate support from relatives are not, for the purpose of the law, "in need". But no such declaration is made regarding those to whom support has been offered but who have not accepted it. If otherwise eligible, they remain, both in law and in fact, "in need". One who is without food, clothing and shelter is in need of them, even though he has just rejected an offer to supply them. Whether, upon such rejection, he should be entitled to apply for and receive from the public aid toward getting them is a question of policy for the legislative power. Since it has spoken on the subject, the courts cannot declare otherwise.
This construction of the statute is favored by a consideration of its history. This chapter of the Welfare and Institutions Code is a codification of a previously existing "Old Age Security Act", St.1929, p. 914. Section 2 of that act set forth the qualifications necessary to entitle one to receive aid, covering the same subject matter as section 2160 of the present law; and, as amended by Statutes of 1935, page 1767, paragraph (f) of said section 2, read as follows: "(f) Has no relative of the following degree of kindred; Husband, wife or child, able and responsible under the law of this State for his support". By the effect of this provision the mere existence of relatives responsible and able to support an old person excluded him from the benefits of the law. After this provision was placed in section 2160 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, in 1937, an amendment was made to it, at the same session, to make it read as we have already quoted it. See Stats.1937, pp. 1083-4, 1343-4. Thus the legislature went from the one extreme, of denying aid to one having responsible relatives, to the other, of denying it only to those actually supported by such relatives. The legislature might have stopped at the intermediate position of declaring that no aid should be granted to those to whom an offer of support had been made. Its failure to do so is significant of its intention not to establish such a condition to the furnishing of aid.
The legislature manifestly intended to leave considerable freedom of action to those receiving aid. Thus the county granting aid cannot render it in kind but must pay it in warrants for money (section 2183), which, of course, the person aided may expend as he sees fit. One receiving aid may move from one county to another without losing his right to aid (section 2200). The statute, as we have construed it on the point under consideration, is in accord with this apparent policy; it leaves the person in need free to accept or reject a home and support offered by a relative. The legislature might properly expect that he would accept in cases where the support offered was adequate and, if the one to be supported was invited into the home of the supporter, where the relations between the parties were reasonably harmonious. It might also have believed that in other cases it was better to let the support be furnished by the public and the amount thereof later collected from the relative, if able to pay, thus avoiding family contention and unpleasantness. Such considerations would afford sufficient justification for casting the legislation in the mold which, we think, was used.
Any judgment rendered against defendant, under section 2224, must be based on her ability to pay the amount thereof. The amount of the judgment here is $738, with interests and costs. It appears that defendant has an annual income of approximately $2,700, and a $3,300 mortgage against her house, and she has one eighteen-year-old son to support, as well as herself. Nothing is shown as to the amount of her necessary expenses. The trial court must be allowed a considerable amount of discretion in balancing other duties and other expenses against the duty of reimbursement imposed by the Old Age Security Law. Upon the meager evidence produced by defendant on this point we cannot say that such discretion was abused, or that the finding of defendant’s ability to pay is not supported by the evidence.
The judgment is affirmed.
YORK, P. J., concurred.
WHITE, Justice (concurring).
I concur in the judgment, but am not in accord with some of the views and reasoning of my associates.
A reading of the reporter’s transcript of the testimony given in this case impresses me that the trial court was justified in finding that the support offered her parents by appellant was not of that "adequate" character contemplated by subdivision (f) of section 2160 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. However, it was the theory of the trial court, and upon which the majority opinion herein seems to place its imprimatur, that no matter how "adequate" might be the support offered by responsible relatives, the needy person is not required to avail himself or herself thereof, but is entitled to public aid by simply rejecting the support offered. By its language the main opinion holds that the legislative policy, as enumerated in the Old Age Security Law, "leaves the person in need free to accept or reject a home and support offered by a relative", which is tantamount to saying that an applicant for aid under the act in question is entitled to receive support in cash from public funds by rejecting adequate support tendered by responsible relatives. I cannot bring myself to believe that such is the intent or purpose of the statutes. I do feel that there are cases wherein the support offered by relatives might be determined to be inadequate, not only by reason of the amount of cash support offered, but as well because of the conditions under which the needy person might be required to live, such as the inadequacy of accommodations offered or incompatibility existing in the home. If the law is as stated in the majority opinion, it matters not how "adequate" the support offered may be, the needy person may, nevertheless, obtain public aid by refusing to accept any kind of support, however adequate, offered by responsible relatives.
To my mind this conclusion does violence to the plain intent of the provisions of subdivision (f) of section 2160 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, which entitles a person to old age relief, among other things, only when such person "is not receiving adequate support from a husband, wife, or child, able and responsible under the law of this State to furnish such support". (Italics added.)
It is to be noted that the statute does not require from the responsible relative financial or cash support, but only such support as is "adequate".