Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. Terry Truong, Juvenile Court Referee, Super. Ct. No. CK63860.
Eva E. Chick for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Tracy F. Dodds, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services.
Children’s Law Center of Los Angeles and Abby Kara Eskin for Real Party in Interest Minor.
ALTERNATIVE WRIT OF MANDATE
SUZUKAWA, J.
In this dependency action, petitioner Lorena B., mother of dependent child Brandon B., seeks extraordinary writ review of an order setting the matter for a permanency planning hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26; Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.450, 8.452.) We deny the requested relief.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
BACKGROUND
Brandon, age nine, is the son of Lorena, who is severely and chronically mentally ill, and Lorena’s stepfather Harold, a convicted child molester who is not a party to this writ proceeding. Harold went from being Lorena’s stepfather, during which time by Harold’s own admission he sexually molested Lorena and her sister Adriana as young children, to being Lorena’s live-in boyfriend for the past 20 years or so, during which time he sexually molested Lorena’s now adult son Curtis when Curtis was a young child, as depicted in videotapes that were turned over to the authorities at the start of this case. In the early part of these proceedings, Lorena defended Harold and resisted the suggestion that Harold posed a risk to Brandon’s safety.
The present dependency petition was filed on January 18, 2006, after the Riverside County Department of Children and Family Services (Department or DCFS) received a report that Brandon, then age seven, was either being sexually abused or was at substantial risk of being sexually abused by Harold, and that Lorena was incapable of protecting him from Harold because of her chronic and serious mental illness and victimization as a young child by Harold. (§ 300, subds. (b) [failure to protect], (d) [sexual abuse].) The record in this case includes information regarding Harold’s prior molestations of Lorena, Adriana, and Curtis, as well as information regarding Curtis’s detention by the Department.
Until Lorena was about 10 years old, Harold was married to Cathy, Lorena’s and Adriana’s mother, who is “a diagnosed schizophrenic.” Harold did not dispute below that he sexually molested Lorena and Adriana for about a year during their weekend visits with him when Lorena was 11 years old. After Lorena reported the abuse to Cathy, when Lorena was about 12 years old, Harold was arrested, placed on probation, and given a suspended sentence. Harold was prohibited from having any further contact with Lorena while she was a minor.
At age 13, Lorena gave birth to Curtis, who was conceived as a result of an abusive relationship with a teenage boyfriend. At age 15, Lorena was hospitalized for mental illness, and Curtis was placed in foster care. After Lorena was discharged, Lorena and Curtis remained together in foster care until Lorena turned 18.
When Lorena was 19 years old, Lorena and Curtis moved in with Harold, and Lorena and Harold began living together as an unmarried couple. In 1991, Curtis, who was seven or eight years old, told Lorena that Harold had sexually molested him. Lorena believed Curtis’s allegations. She tried to leave Harold, but had a mental breakdown while alone in a hotel room with Curtis. As a result, Lorena was again hospitalized for mental illness, and Curtis was placed in protective custody. The Department filed a dependency petition regarding Curtis in April 1991, and placed Curtis with Harold. Lorena objected to the placement on the ground that Harold had sexually molested Curtis. When the social worker questioned Curtis about the sexual molestation allegation, however, Curtis admitted only to having been accidentally touched by Harold about one to five years earlier. Unable to confirm that Curtis had been molested, the social worker concluded that, given Harold’s prior conviction of child molestation, living with Harold was not a “long term solution,” and that Lorena should obtain separate housing and become financially independent of Harold. Lorena did not do so, however, and after jurisdiction in Curtis’s case was terminated, resumed living with Harold and Curtis. Brandon, the subject of the present dependency action, was born in 1998.
In the present dependency proceeding regarding Brandon, the reporting party told the social worker that Curtis had recanted his accusation against Harold in the first dependency proceeding because Curtis “was threatened by [Lorena], and he was scared that he would be taken away from his mother. The reporting party stated Curtis is now disclosing the sexual molestation, as he is afraid the same thing may be happening to his younger brother, Brandon.”
In the present dependency proceeding, Lorena explained to the social worker that although she had believed Curtis’s previous allegations of sexual abuse against Harold, because the Department “‘returned [Curtis] home I thought it was o.k. for me to stay with [Harold].’”
While living with Harold, Lorena periodically became angry about his prior abuse and, in 2003, “had a mental breakdown” during which she attacked Harold “with her fists.” Lorena was arrested for domestic violence and placed in a board and care facility for lack of other living arrangements. Harold received voluntary family maintenance services from April to July 2003, and obtained a restraining order that prevented Lorena from returning home to Harold and Brandon. Lorena admitted below that she “violated the restraining order by attempting to break into the residence and was arrested” two or three more times. Eventually, Harold and Lorena reconciled, and she resumed living with Harold and Brandon.
By December 2005, Adriana and Curtis, now an adult, had moved in with Harold, Lorena, and Brandon. Curtis, however, became concerned that Harold had molested or was going to molest Brandon, who was then seven years old, just as Harold had molested Curtis at the same age. On Christmas 2005, Curtis told Adriana that he had been molested by Harold as a child and that there were videotapes in the garage to prove it. Adriana viewed some of those videotapes, and saw scenes of Harold masturbating over Curtis while Curtis was asleep, and of Harold with Brandon, naked, in the shower and jacuzzi. The tapes were turned over to the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department, which began investigating possible child molestation and child pornography charges against Harold. The record in this case contains a sheriff’s report stating that materials confiscated pursuant to a search warrant included graphic scenes of Harold sexually molesting Curtis as a child, and nude photos taken by Harold of both Lorena and Curtis as children. The report further stated that the photos of Lorena and Curtis were shown to Curtis, who identified them. Ultimately, however, no charges were filed against Harold because the limitations period had expired.
After the videotapes were discovered, Curtis and Adriana moved out of Harold’s house. Lorena, however, continued living with Harold and Brandon, because she “felt helpless and had no where to go.” Lorena worked from 4 p.m. to midnight, during which time Brandon was home alone with Harold.
On January 18, 2006, the Department filed the present petition and removed Brandon from Harold’s home after receiving information that Brandon was either sexually abused or at substantial risk of being sexually abused by Harold, and that Lorena was incapable of protecting Brandon due to her chronic and serious mental illness and victimization as a young child by Harold. (§ 300, subds. (b) [failure to protect], (d) [sexual abuse].) Lorena, who has never lived independently, told the social worker that she was “disabled due to her mental illness,” which she described as “Bipolar and schizophrenia.” The social worker advised Lorena, who was still living with Harold, that “given [Harold’s] admitted history of sexual molestation of herself, her sister, and . . . her adult son’s disclosure of sexual abuse,” Lorena should move from Harold’s residence and show her willingness to protect Brandon from possible sexual abuse. Lorena defended Harold, however, and described her own sexual molestation by Harold as “an accident, a mistake.” This prompted the social worker to explain to Lorena that her molestation could not have been an accident or mistake because, by Lorena’s own account, it had lasted for a year and included fondling, oral sex, digital penetration, and the taking of nude photos. The social worker further “advised [Lorena] that her inability to see [Harold] as a sexual predator places [Brandon] at risk of suffering from acts of sexual abuse.” The social worker became additionally concerned by Lorena’s failure to acknowledge the inappropriateness of allowing Brandon “to see his parents naked,” and allowing Brandon to sleep with them when they were in the nude.
In March 2006, Lorena underwent a court-ordered psychological evaluation with Dr. Ryan to assess her ability to parent Brandon, particularly in light of her refusal to acknowledge the danger posed to Brandon by living with Harold. Lorena told Dr. Ryan that she had been forced by the filing of this case to leave Harold, and probably would not have left him but for this case. Dr. Ryan concluded that given Lorena’s inability to live independently and maintain substantial employment, she had developed a dependency upon Harold that was “so strong that she does not perceive the danger of having her son exposed to him. She stated to me that sometimes this son sleeps in their bed, but she also states that she tries to be around to prevent anything from happening. This dependency has remained constant over a period of 20 year[s], and began after he molested her, took nude photos of her as a minor, and molested her sister and her older son. That is a significant dependency and a significant lack of awareness on her part. Her statements indicate strongly that if left to her own decisions she would still be with him. My impression is that she doesn’t believe she can survive without him.”
Dr. Ryan concluded: “The history of her behavior and aberrant relationships dates back to about age 10 and she is 37 now. She has not made any significant growth or change during that period of time and she is not likely to do so in the future, in my opinion. Her dependency needs are so high that even if she is prevented from re-establishing her relationship with [Harold], she would establish another similar relationship, further putting her son at risk. It is my opinion that she is not capable of benefiting from services and that her parental rights to this child be terminated.”
In March 2006, Lorena underwent a court-ordered psychological evaluation with Dr. Suiter. Based on Lorena’s psychological tests, Dr. Suiter concluded that Lorena was “likely experiencing a remarkable degree of emotional distress,” was “prone to have an appreciable degree of underlying anger and hostility and . . . to act out aggressively in certain instances,” was “likely experiencing a heightened degree of anxiety which she has difficulty adequately managing,” and had “a heightened potential of . . . having some delusional thought processes and some cognitive impairment.” Dr. Suiter stated that Lorena’s “presentation and history [are] consistent with her having a severe mental disorder. To that end, it is evident she will likely have difficulty with insight and judgment, which certainly has been evidenced. [¶] It is evident from her presentation with this examiner that [Lorena] would have remarkable difficulties being able to adequately care for her son at this juncture. Further, it is this examiner’s opinion, given her history regarding her remarkably poor judgment in reference to the father of her son, as well as her psychiatric history, it is quite unlikely [Lorena] would be able to benefit from reunification services, at least over the next six to twelve months. It is possible to allow for a consideration that with psychiatric and psychotherapeutic treatment she could reach a point where she could benefit from such services at a later date.”
After reviewing the psychological reports, the dependency court sustained the petition on May 1, 2006. In June 2006, the case was transferred to Los Angeles County from Riverside County because of Lorena’s relocation to live with her sister.
On July 7, 2006, the dependency court ordered that Lorena and Harold be provided reunification services. Lorena was ordered to participate in individual counseling for domestic violence, parenting, mental health, and anger management issues, attend parenting classes, and take all prescribed psychotropic medications. According to the social worker’s reports, Lorena successfully completed parenting classes and began individual counseling, but often did not take her psychotropic medications as directed. After telling the social worker in December 2006 that she was depressed and unable to care for herself, Lorena was hospitalized in January 2007 for “mental health issues.” In February 2007, the social worker observed that Lorena “had a flat affect,” “was not able to stay on the subject,” and did not appear to understand the conversation. By counting the pills in Lorena’s possession, the social worker determined that Lorena had not taken more than half of her prescribed psychotropic medications. Lorena admitted to the social worker that she was not taking her medications most of the time.
In February 2007, Curtis told the social worker that he was now taking care of Lorena, who was living with him, and that he was providing for Lorena’s transportation and managing her disability checks, for which he was the payee. Curtis, who also receives disability checks for schizophrenia, stated that he was not taking his prescribed medications and was encouraging Lorena not to take her medications if she was too sleepy to function.
In late February 2007, Lorena was again hospitalized for mental illness and her medications were changed. Thereafter, she appeared to be “much clearer and able to stay with the conversation.” Lorena again admitted, however, that she was “‘never totally compliant’” with taking her medications.
In April 2007, Lorena moved to a residential facility, the Harbor House, in an attempt to acquire independent living skills. The social worker hoped that upon completing the program, Lorena could move to an independent living program with Brandon.
In August 2007, however, Lorena was terminated from the Harbor House program for violating the no alcohol rule. Lorena resumed living with Curtis, but complained that he did not keep enough food in the house. Although Lorena expressed a desire to move out of Curtis’s apartment, she also admitted that she was “‘not ready to get custody of Brandon.’” Lorena’s rapid mood swings and disjointed conversational style led the social worker to conclude that Lorena was extremely emotionally disturbed. Lorena again admitted that she was not taking her psychotropic medications as directed because she does not need them and they do not work.
In October 2007, Dr. Fairbanks conducted a court-ordered psychological evaluation of Lorena, Harold, and Brandon. In Dr. Fairbanks’s opinion, Lorena’s psychological tests showed that she has a “significant pathology,” was “likely paranoid schizophrenic and clearly experiences delusions,” was “experiencing significant psychopathology and tends to be rather overwhelmed with stress,” was “experiencing significant anxiety,” and “seems to lack boundaries.” Regarding her ability to protect Brandon from sexual abuse, Dr. Fairbanks stated that Lorena’s “own history of being abused and her passivity and lack of boundaries as a result of her own sexual abuse would suggest that she cannot protect her son substantially from [Harold].” Based on his observations of Lorena’s and Harold’s interactions with Brandon, Dr. Fairbanks concluded that Brandon would not benefit from further contact with them, that his attachment to either parent was very minimal, and that he “seems to want to move on with his life and cares very much about his current foster mother. He probably could benefit from moving on without any parent contact and develop attachments with others, which he seems to be very capable of doing.”
Dr. Fairbanks described Lorena as a “paranoid schizophrenic,” stating that “[s]he certainly has significant psychological problems and as a result will need ongoing care and treatment. If she misses her medications, however, she would be a problem for child raising.” Dr. Fairbanks recommended that Brandon stay in foster care and be considered for adoption without continued visitation with his parents.
According to the Department’s November 15, 2007 report, Lorena again admitted “that she is ‘not ready to get custody of Brandon.’” Although Lorena was living with Curtis, Curtis was no longer speaking to her because “he was hurt when he saw the nude pictures of himself, and his mother as a child.” Lorena wanted to move out of Curtis’s apartment and become independent, but had not done so despite receiving housing referrals from the social worker.
On December 11, 2007, the dependency court held a contested permanency review hearing (§ 366.22) at which Dr. Fairbanks, the social worker, Curtis, and Lorena testified. Contrary to the social worker’s reports that Lorena was admittedly not taking her medications, Lorena testified that she always takes her medications, that she never said otherwise, and that she benefits from taking them.
At the permanency review hearing, the dependency court shall order the child to be returned to his or her parent unless it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that returning the child would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child’s safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being. (§ 366.22, subd. (a).) The parent’s failure to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that returning the child would be detrimental. (Ibid.) If a child is not returned to the parent at the permanency review hearing, the court shall order that a permanency planning hearing be held under section 366.26, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that such a hearing would not be in the child’s best interests because the child is not suitable for adoption and has no one willing to accept legal guardianship. (Ibid.)
Brandon’s counsel agreed with the recommendations of the Department and Dr. Fairbanks that reunification services should be terminated and the matter should be set for a permanency planning hearing. Brandon’s counsel stated that despite receiving reasonable services, Lorena remained unable to care for herself, not to mention Brandon, due to her own history of sexual abuse, lack of appropriate boundaries, and mental illness. Brandon’s counsel urged that even though Lorena “is not to blame for her problems,” Brandon should not be returned to an unsafe home where Lorena was incapable of caring for his needs. Brandon’s counsel stated that although it would be ideal for Brandon and Lorena to live with a supervising family member, the only person who might be able to supervise them was Curtis, and Curtis was not suitable, despite his willingness to help, because of his schizophrenia, which was not being treated or controlled by medication, and his understandable difficulty in “just caring for his mother.” Brandon’s attorney also stated that placing Brandon with Curtis would not be in Brandon’s best interest because, “without counseling, it is difficult to understand how Curtis could come to terms with his mother for placing him in a situation in which her husband abused him. If Curtis and mother have remaining issues between them to address, how will they be able to effectively parent Brandon together?”
The dependency court found that returning Brandon to his parents’ custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to his physical and emotional well-being, in that the “parents have not made significant progress in resolving the problems that led to the child’s removal from the home, and that they have not demonstrated the capacity and ability both to complete the objectives of his/her treatment plan and to provide for the child’s safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being.” The court further found that reasonable services had been provided, but that neither parent had complied with the case plan. The court terminated reunification services and set the matter for a permanency planning hearing. (§ 366.26.)
DISCUSSION
Lorena requests that we reverse the dependency court’s findings and orders, and that we either direct the immediate return of Brandon to her custody, or grant an additional period of reunification services, based on: (1) Lorena’s compliance with the case plan; (2) the extraordinary circumstances that weigh in favor of extending reunification services in this case; (3) the denial of reasonable reunification services; and (4) the lack of substantial evidence to support the dependency court’s findings and orders.
Both the Department and Brandon’s counsel, on the other hand, urge that we deny the petition. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the petition lacks merit.
I. Lorena Has Not Fully Complied With the Case Plan
Lorena contends that she completed the court-ordered parenting courses and participated in individual counseling. She points to the favorable reports submitted by her individual therapist, Dr. Walter, dated April 20, August 7, and September 20, 2006. According to those reports, Lorena has made “considerable progress” in understanding the problems that led to her unhealthy relationship with her molester, and that allowed him to molest her son Curtis. Unlike Dr. Ryan, Dr. Suiter, and Dr. Fairbanks, who believed that Lorena was incapable, due to her mental illness, of becoming a responsible parent during the limited statutory reunification period, Dr. Walter stated that Lorena, with the aid of psychotherapy, parenting classes, and psychotropic medications, “has a very good chance of providing a nurturing, loving and safe environment in which to raise her son Brandon as a single mother.”
Despite Dr. Walter’s optimistic assessment, the problem remains that Lorena thereafter failed to take her prescribed psychotropic medications as required by the case plan. Dr. Walter’s reports were prepared between April and September 2006, which was prior to Lorena’s hospitalization in January and February 2007 for mental illness, and prior to her self-reported failures to take her medications. (The record contains no subsequent reports from Lorena’s individual therapist.) Dr. Fairbanks stated in his October 2007 report that if Lorena does not take her medications, she cannot properly parent Brandon. Nothing in Dr. Walter’s earlier reports contradicts that point. In apparent recognition of this fact, Lorena testified at the permanency review hearing that she always takes her medications, but the dependency court rejected that testimony as false in favor of the social worker’s reports to the contrary. Accordingly, the record shows that Lorena did not comply with the case plan because she did not take the psychotropic medications necessary for her to function as a parent.
Lorena’s reliance upon In re Heather P. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1214, overruled on other grounds in In re Richard S. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 857, 866, footnote 5, is misplaced. In Heather P., a one-year-old child was taken into protective custody after her mother was incarcerated for theft without making any provisions for her care. During the reunification period, the mother regularly took her psychotropic medications for schizophrenia, visited the child, participated in psychotherapy, attended parenting classes, and maintained a suitable residence for one year. The social worker nevertheless recommended against returning the child, solely because of the absence of a therapist’s positive evaluation stating that returning the child would pose a low risk of harm. Based on the absence of such a report, the dependency court found that the child’s return to the mother’s custody would create a substantial risk of harm, terminated reunification services, and set the matter for a permanency planning hearing. The appellate court reversed, holding that: (1) the burden of proof was on the department to show that returning the child would be detrimental; (2) the evidence was insufficient to establish a prima facie case that returning the child would be detrimental; and (3) the department had failed to show that returning the child would create a substantial risk of harm. The appellate court pointed out that given the progress made by the mother during the reunification period, it was insufficient to rely on outdated psychological reports in evaluating the risk of harm posed by the mother’s mental illness. Instead of simply assuming that the mother’s mental illness continued to pose a risk of harm to the child, the appellate court stated, the social worker must provide specific examples of the manner in which the mother’s behavior has and will adversely affect the child or jeopardize the child’s safety. (Id. at p. 1228.)
In this case, unlike Heather P., the trial court did not misapply the burden of proof or base its ruling solely on a missing therapist’s report. Whereas the mother in Heather P. had maintained a stable residence for a year, taken her psychotropic medications, and shown herself to be capable of caring for her child, the evidence in this case showed that Lorena was not taking her psychotropic medications as directed, was unable to care for herself, and did not have a suitable home where Brandon could safely live with Lorena under the supervision of another responsible adult. Significantly, Lorena moved in with Curtis after being terminated from the Harbor House program, was dependent upon Curtis to provide for all or most of her needs, and told the social worker just before the permanency review hearing that she was not ready to care for Brandon.
Contrary to Lorena’s assertion that Dr. Fairbanks’s report contains only general statements that fail to support the trial court’s findings, the report explains that Lorena has a serious mental illness that was exacerbated by the sexual molestation inflicted at a young age by her stepfather Harold, who completely broke down her defenses, making her susceptible to his further abuse and allowing for the molestation of Curtis and, possibly, Brandon. Regardless of the progress made during Lorena’s individual therapy sessions with Dr. Walters in the early part of this case, nothing in the record suggests that Lorena is capable of parenting Brandon due to her instability caused by ongoing psychological problems.
II. Extraordinary Circumstances Do Not Exist
Lorena contends that the dependency court may exercise its discretion to extend family reunification services beyond the statutory time limit because there are extraordinary circumstances that weigh in favor of doing so. (Citing In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768; In re Elizabeth R. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1774.) In this case, Lorena argues there are extraordinary circumstances consisting of the external problems she faced in scheduling visitation and finding a suitable visitation site that is conducive to interacting with a nine-year-old child, as well as the foster mother’s efforts to undermine her visitation and relationship with Brandon. Lorena also argues that as in In re Elizabeth R., supra, the social worker simply assumed her to be incapable of caring for Brandon because of mental illness without giving her a chance to do so.
To the extent that there were problems in scheduling Lorena’s visits, which did not progress beyond monitored visitation, the problems were not so great as to preclude visitation, which generally occurred as scheduled at a fast food outlet on the same day (but not at the same time) as Harold’s visits with Brandon. Although Lorena testified that she went without any visits between September and November 2006, because of scheduling problems, Ms. Johnson testified that she had monitored Lorena’s visits on September 19, October 25, November 1, and November 11, 2006. Moreover, the obstacle to reunification was not a lack or shortage of visitation, but Lorena’s failure to comply with the case plan’s requirement that she take her psychotropic medications as directed, coupled with her inability to provide a safe and stable home for Brandon. Not only has Lorena depended on Curtis during the reunification period to handle her finances, buy her groceries, and help her with transportation, but she has never lived independently. The social worker tried to assist Lorena in this critical regard by helping her to enroll at Harbor House to gain independent living skills, with the hope of then enrolling in another facility with Brandon, but Lorena lost that opportunity by violating the no alcohol rule.
We distinguish In re Dino E., supra, 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, in which the dependency court found at the combined 12- and 18-month review hearing that the father, who was never provided with a case plan, was not provided adequate reunification services, but denied his request to extend the reunification period beyond the statutory time limit, believing that it did not have the discretion to do so. The appellate court vacated the order setting the section 366.26 hearing, and directed the dependency court on remand to entertain a motion for continuance of services beyond the statutory time limit. (§ 352, subd. (a) [upon request, the court may continue any hearing beyond the time limit within which the hearing is otherwise required to be held, provided that the continuance is not contrary to the interest of the minor].) It concluded that the dependency court had the discretion either to continue the 18-month review hearing on the ground that the father did not receive adequate services, or to deny the continuance because of the child’s greater need for a prompt custody determination. (Id. at pp. 1777-1779.) As we discuss below, however, the services provided in this case were properly found by the dependency court to be adequate.
We also distinguish In re Elizabeth R., supra, 35 Cal.App.4th 1774, in which the mother of the dependentchildren had substantially complied with the reunification plan, even though the mother was hospitalized for mental illness for all but five months of the reunification period. At the 18-month review hearing, the dependency court was impressed with the mother’s progress and ability to sustain her mental health, but after being informed that it had no discretion to extend the reunification period, set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing, at which the mother’s parental rights were terminated. (Id. at p. 1783.) On appeal, the judgment was reversed and the matter was remanded with directions to entertain a motion to extend the reunification period under section 352.
In this case, on the other hand, the reports of Dr. Fairbanks, Dr. Ryan, and Dr. Suiter indicated that Lorena’s chronic mental illness was so severe that she would not be able to parent Brandon during the foreseeable future, particularly if she was not taking her medications. Given Lorena’s failure to take her medications as directed and her inability to provide Brandon with a safe home, there was no basis for extending the reunification period under section 352. On this record, the dependency court’s refusal to extend the reunification period was not an abuse of discretion.
III. Reasonable Services Were Provided
“‘[T]he focus of reunification services is to remedy those problems which led to the removal of the children.’ (In re Michael S. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1464.) A reunification plan must be tailored to the particular individual and family, addressing the unique facts of that family. (In re Misako R. [(1991)] 2 Cal.App.4th [538,] 545.) A social services agency is required to make a good faith effort to address the parent’s problems through services, to maintain reasonable contact with the parent during the course of the plan, and to make reasonable efforts to assist the parent in areas where compliance proves difficult. (Armando L. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 549, 554-555.) However, in most cases more services might have been provided and the services provided are often imperfect. (Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.) ‘The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.’ (In re Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547.)” (Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 598-599.)
Lorena contends that the Department failed to provide her with reasonable services that were tailored to meet the circumstances and problems leading to her loss of custody. She states that although she “was struggling with her visits with Brandon and with the mean spirited undermining that was taking place via the foster mother,” the social worker did not make reasonable efforts to help her. Moreover, the social worker did not assist her “financially or emotionally,” and “was simply not interested in finding out whether [Lorena] was seeing her therapist, taking her medication, had a home for Brandon, or to hear her side of the story.”
Even though the services provided in this case, as in most any case, were not perfect, the record shows that they were reasonable under the circumstances. The social worker scheduled and monitored Lorena’s visits, and provided Lorena with housing referrals, counseling referrals, and bus tokens when needed. Although there was evidence of some friction between Lorena and the foster mother, the record does not show that the social worker was at fault in the matter. The social worker was not uncaring about Lorena’s mental illness; she met with Lorena several times to discuss the necessity of taking her medications. Had Lorena not been terminated from the Harbor House independent living skills program for violating house rules, the social worker planned to help Lorena enter a residential facility that would allow Brandon to stay with her. Lorena’s failure to complete the program cannot be blamed on the social worker.
The friction between Lorena and the foster mother appeared primarily to concern the frequency of Lorena’s telephone calls to Brandon and appearances at Brandon’s baseball games.
IV. Substantial Evidence
Lorena contends that the order terminating reunification services, based on a finding that Brandon was unlikely to be returned to her custody, was not supported by substantial evidence. In Lorena’s view, “the evidence before the court was that the mother had completed her court ordered case plan and had even taken additional parenting classes in an effort to become a better parent, had made substantial progress in her individual counseling, and that she had a home for Brandon with Curtis. There was no evidence that mother failed to understand what she was learning or that she had NOT dealt with issues of victimization and ‘boundaries.’” We disagree.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the record showed that Lorena was not in compliance with the case plan because she was not taking her medications as directed. Moreover, although Curtis testified that he was willing to provide Lorena and Brandon with a home, it was undisputed that Curtis had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, but was not taking his medications. In addition, there was evidence that Curtis was finding it difficult to care for Lorena, who complained that he did not keep enough food in the house, and that Curtis was angry with Lorena for having failed to protect him from Harold. As Brandon’s attorney stated, placing Brandon with Curtis would not be in Brandon’s best interest because, “without counseling, it is difficult to understand how Curtis could come to terms with his mother for placing him in a situation in which her husband abused him. If Curtis and mother have remaining issues between them to address, how will they be able to effectively parent Brandon together?”
DISPOSITION
The petition is denied.
We concur: WILLHITE, Acting P. J., MANELLA, J.