Opinion
03-14-1899
LORD v. SIMONSON et al.
E. B. Goodell and James M. Trimble, for complainant. James B. Blauvelt, for defendants.
Bill by Francis Lord against Anthony Simonson and another. Heard on bill, answer, and proofs. Decree for complainant.
E. B. Goodell and James M. Trimble, for complainant.
James B. Blauvelt, for defendants.
PITNEY, V. C. This is a bill to quiet title to a lot said to contain 4.60 acres situate at Upper Montclair, formerly called Speartown, in Essex county. The complainant derives title through the devisees of Rhoda Simonson, who, on March 5, 1879, died seised of this and other lots, and by her will devised the lot in question, with others, to her four sons, through whom the complainant claims. The defendants Caroline Belding and Anthony Simonson, who are the grandchildren of Rhoda Simonson, claim that, under the same will, the lot here in question was charged with the payment of two several legacies,—one for $1,000, in favor of the defendant Anthony Simonson, and another for $500, in favor of the defendant Caroline Belding. The object of the bill is to determine the validity of this claim of lien. The testatrix's will was made on the 18th of July, 1877, a little less than 20 months before her death. And it is well enough to remark that it seems to have been drawn by a person accustomed to the verbiage of such instruments, but probably not well versed in the law. By the first item she directed the payment of her debts, physicians' bills, funeral and testamentary expenses, and all mortgages which might be a lien upon or exist against any of her real estate (of which there were none), and also to erect a tombstone or monument over her grave, to cost not less than $100. By the second item, upon the true construction of which the validity of the charge must depend, she gave and devised unto her husband, Anthony Simonson (what he was clearly entitled to by law without any devise), "the use, for and during the term of his natural life, of the homestead and lands and premises belonging thereto, situate in the said township of Montclair, and upon which I now reside, with the appurtenances, free of rent; and also, for and during the term of his natural life, the use of all the furniture and household goods and chattels, horses, cows, wagons, carriages, and farming utensils and implements, and goods and chattels, not including money or moneyed securities or evidences of indebtedness belonging to me at the time of my decease"; and, upon the death of her husband, she directed that the said homestead lot and premises, and also the abovementioned articles of personal property, should be sold. By a third item she forgave her son George Simonson a debt which he owed her. By the fourth item she gave and bequeathed to her family physician, in trust, the sum of $1,000, to be put at interest, for the benefit of her grandson (the defendant) Anthony Simonson, Jr., during his minority, and that after he arrived at age the same should be paid over to him. By the fifth item she gave and bequeathed to one Van Riper the sum of $500 on a like trust, in favor of her grandchild the defendant Caroline Sherman (now Belding), until she should attain the age of 21 years, then to be paid to her. To her grandson John Simonson she gave the sum of $100, to be paid as soon as practicable after her decease. And, seventhly, in case her personal estate should be insufficient to provide for the making of the foregoing investments and payment of the above legacies in full, then in such case she made the same a charge upon "all my real estate, except the homestead and premises mentioned in the second section of this will." All the rest of her estate she gave to her four sons, John, Isaac, George, and Jesse, and appointed them executors.
The question, then, is whether the lot of land here in question was included in the language of the second section of her will, by which she gave the use for life of "the homestead and lands and premises belonging thereto upon which I now reside" to her husband. If the lot in question is included within that description, then it is not subject to the charge of the legacies in question. The only other real estate that the testatrix died seised of was the equal undivided one-half of a wood lot of about four acres, situate three miles north of Speartown, in Passaic county, the value of that one-half being from $1 to $200. Her personal estate was inventoried at $1, 186.86. That included, apparently, all the farming utensils, horses, harness, and other articles given to her husband for life, and also all the household furniture. These articles, inventoried at $435, and two bonds and mortgages, amounting to $725, besides the interest, made up the amount above mentioned. Theexecutors presented their account for settlement on the 19th of March, 1887, showing a balance due the accountants of $61.79. Exceptions were filed to that account, and, after the hearing on the exceptions, the estate showed a balance in their bands of $17.17. In that account they charge themselves with the whole amount of the inventory, and with $25, excess received above the appraised value of one of the mortgages, and claim a credit for a deficiency of $119 on the sale of the personal property.
I admitted the evidence with regard to the amount of the personal estate, and the report of the accounting, as a proper matter to be taken into consideration in determining what the testatrix meant by the language used in her will. The testatrix lived upon a small farm in Speartown, situate on each side of what is called the "Valley Road," which runs northwest and southeast, and being also crossed by the New York & Greenwood Lake Railway. The farm had no frontage on any street except the Valley Road, and near it was the farm house and buildings. The farm proper is oblong in form, several times longer than wide, narrower at the east than the west end, and contains something more than 20 acres. Immediately to the east of it, but separated from it by a small piece of land containing about 3 acres, owned by one Spear, is the lot of land here in question, partly woodland and partly plowland, and being about 12 chains and 73 links long, and 3 chains and 30 links wide. This width corresponds precisely with the width of the Spear lot, and with the width of the easterly end of the farm proper, the north and south lines of the Spear lot and the outlot being apparently a continuation of the north and south lines of the farm proper. But it was not shown by direct proof that the Spear lot had ever been a part of either the farm tract proper or the outlot, although the lines of the lots indicate it. Both the farm proper and the wood lot originally belonged to one Van Gieson. In 1843 he conveyed them to Isaac D. Sigler and Cornelius Egbertson, and in 1853 Egbertson conveyed his undivided one-half interest to Sigler, who was the father of Mrs. Simonson, and in 1853 put her in possession of the premises, including the small outlot. Mrs. Simonson occupied and used the premises, including the outlot, by the permission of her father, for 20 years, and during his lifetime. She had access to the outlot by a wood road, over the lot of Spear, which was also woodland; and she cultivated a part of it occasionally, and got firewood from the other part. Her father, Sigler, by his will dated in 1873, a few months before he died, devised the premises to his daughter Rhoda Simonson, by this language: "Second. To my daughter Rhoda, wife of Anthony Simonson, I give the Van Gieson farm on which she now lives. I also give to her one-half of my wood lot on the top of the mountain, adjoining lands of John Van Riper," etc. Whatever title Rhoda Simonson had to the lot in question she derived from that devise, and all parties here claim exclusively through her.
If the lot in question was not separated from the larger or home lot by the small lot owned by Spear, there could be no doubt but that it would be considered an actual part of the homestead farm; and the question is whether that separation is sufficient to prevent its being included in the gift to the husband in the second clause of Rhoda Simonson's will, by the language there used, as follows: "The homestead and lands and premises belonging thereto upon which I now reside." And I come with much regret to the conclusion that it is Included within the language of that devise, and hence that it was excluded from the charge of the defendants' legacies. The word "homestead" seems to be an abbreviation of "home-steading," or "home-buildings," and by its force includes no more than the actual buildings, and so much land immediately contiguous thereto as is necessary to make a home. Enc. Dict.; Bouv. Law Dict.; Webst. Dict.; Worcest. Dict tit. "Homestead." Where used to express more land, it is usual to add "farm," and say "homestead farm." Its use by the testatrix here has little significance, except to identify the property as that occupied by her. But the addition of the words "lands and premises belonging thereto" are quite comprehensive. This little outlot was conveyed with the principal farm by Van Gieson to Sigler, and the possession of it was handed over to the testatrix with the farm proper, and used by her as a part of that farm for many years. The result is that it is quite impossible to escape the conviction that it is properly included within the words "lands and premises belonging thereto." Then we have the further descriptive words "upon which I now reside." Strictly speaking, the testatrix did not reside "upon" any of the land, except a very small portion of the main farm. This shows that the word "upon" cannot have a restrictive force. The result will be, of course, that the defendants get nothing from their legacies; and the circumstance that the personal estate of the testatrix was, at the very best, manifestly quite insufficient to pay these legacies, and must have been so known to her, and that the only other land she had, to wit, her one-half interest in the woodlot, was but a mere trifle as a source of payment, has induced me to exercise great Industry and ingenuity to see if I could not find some warrant in the language of the testatrix for fastening the charge in the will on this lot. But I am unable to do so. I will advise a decree accordingly.