Opinion
01-11-2013
Gumercinda LOPEZ and Nidia Poitan, Plaintiff(s) v. Shauna PODGURSKI, Defendant(s)
Larry Silverstein, Esq., Silverstein & Kahn Esqs., Huntington, for Plaintiff, Poitan. Rosemarie Woodrick, Esq., Office of Robert P. Tusa, Esq., Hauppauge, for Defendant.
Larry Silverstein, Esq., Silverstein & Kahn Esqs., Huntington, for Plaintiff, Poitan.
Rosemarie Woodrick, Esq., Office of Robert P. Tusa, Esq., Hauppauge, for Defendant.
ANDREW G. TARANTINO, J.
NATURE OF THE MOTION
Plaintiff moves this Court, pursuant to N.Y. Civ. Pract. Laws & Rules § 3404, to restore this action to the Trial Calendar after having notified the Court that the action had settled before trial.
HISTORY
This is a personal injury action following a motor vehicle accident in August 2007. On June 21, 2011, the action was transferred to this Court for trial, pursuant to N.Y. Civ. Pract. Laws & Rules (CPLR) § 325(d). Trial was scheduled for October 25, 2011. Trial was then adjourned to December 9, 2011, and again to March 21, 2012, because one of the Plaintiffs was having surgery. On March 9, 2012, based upon Defendant's attorney's request, trial was adjourned until March 27, 2012. On March 23, 2012, because Plaintiff was again having surgery connected to the subject injury, the trial was adjourned until June 20, 2012. On June 18, 2012, after not having received the surgeon's reports, the trial was again adjourned to August 6, 2012. The Court marked the trial as "final" and all parties were directed to be prepared to proceed on that date. On August 6, 2012, the Court received a telefax from, and signed by, Plaintiff's counsel which read, " This letter shall serve to confirm that the above referenced matter has been settled for the sum of $25,000 for Plaintiff Lopez and the sum of $5,000.00 for Plaintiff Poitan."
BASIS OF THE MOTION
Plaintiff moves to restore the matter to the calendar pursuant to CPLR § 3404. In support of the motion were an attorney's affirmation and Plaintiff's affidavit. Plaintiff stated,
"As a result of the accident, I sustained severe and debilitating injuries as follows: medial retinacular injury, contusion, bursitis, left knee, disc bulge at L2–3, L4–5, both encroaching upon the thecal sac, with radiculitis sprain and strain of the lumbar spine, left hip bursitis, muscle spasm,"
and
"I believe I have a meritorious claim and respectfully request that this Court permit my claim to proceed, as I am ready, willing and able to proceed to trial."
Plaintiff's counsel affirmed that:
"Upon conferring with Plaintiff, plaintiff indicated that she would accept said offer of settlement,"
"The court was notified off the record, that the case was settled for $5,000.00,"
"After [notifying the Court], Plaintiff and [Plaintiff's attorney] had further discussions regarding the settlement, at which point it became clear that Plaintiff Poitan did not have a full understanding of the settlement offer,"
"It was Plaintiff's misunderstanding that the offer was net to Plaintiff, as opposed to gross,"
and
"Plaintiff Poitan now rejects said settlement offer as insufficient."
Defendant's attorney opposed the motion.
On December 21, 2012, at the Court's direction, both attorneys appeared to discuss settlement of the motion. Because the motion was based upon the Plaintiff's misunderstanding between "gross" and "net," the financial difference to the Plaintiff was about $1,650.00, or the attorney's contingent fee on the $5,000.00 settlement. The Court asked counsel to explore other means to accommodate that difference. No settlement was reached, so the Court decides the motion as follows.
ANALYSIS
Two issues are presented on this motion:
1) Whether a trial should be restored to the calendar because the Plaintiff misunderstood the difference between "gross" and "net" proceeds after she accepted the Defendant's offer to settle for a sum certain and after she notified the Court in writing that she accepted the offer?
2) Whether an attorney's signed letter of settlement to the Court binds the client to its terms?
To address these issues, the Court analyzed CPLR § 3404 and § 2104. CPLR § 3404 states,
"A case in the supreme court or a county court marked ‘off’ or struck from the calendar or unanswered on a clerk's calendar call, and not restored within one year thereafter, shall be deemed abandoned and shall be dismissed without costs for neglect to prosecute."
The other, CPLR § 2104, states,
"An agreement between parties or their attorneys relating to any matter in an action, other than one made between counsel in open court, is not binding upon a party unless it is in writing subscribed by him or his attorney or reduced to the form of an order and entered."
The Court finds that CPLR § 3404 does not apply. Virtually all of the decisional law under this section involved cases that were struck or marked off the calendar because a party did not appear. In fact, the section is captioned "Dismissal of abandoned cases." [emphasis added ] The case herein was settled not abandoned which may account for the paucity of decisional law addressing "change of mind" situations such as is presented herein. The Court's interpretation is supported by cases such as Kamara v. Ambert, 89 A.D.3d 612, 933 N.Y.S.2d 38 (1st Dep't 2011), relied upon by Plaintiff. That Court stated
"a party seeking to have a case restored to the trial calendar must demonstrate a meritorious cause of action, a reasonable excuse for the delay, a lack of intent to abandon the action and the absence of prejudice to the opposing party."
It would seem illogical to require a movant to demonstrate a lack of intent to abandon an action that has been settled. No one would remotely view a settled case as abandoned. Therefore, the Kamara four-pronged test simply was not meant to apply to a case such as this.
Assuming arguendo that CPLR § 3404 did apply, the Court finds that Plaintiff's motion still failed. First, there was no showing of a meritorious cause of action. It is statutory that a litigant must establish a "serious" injury, as defined in N.Y. Insurance Law § 5102, in order to recover for pain and suffering following a motor vehicle accident. And not every injury is a "serious" injury. For example, even a diagnosis of a bulging or herniated disc, by itself, does not constitute a serious injury. See, Manzano v. O'Neil, 285 A.D.2d 966, 727 N.Y.S.2d 231 (4th Dep't 2001), rev'd on other grounds, 98 N.Y.2d 345, 746 N.Y.S.2d 865, 774 N.E.2d 1197 (2002) ; Scudera v. Mahbubur, 39 A.D.3d 620, 833 N.Y.S.2d 239 (2d Dep't 2007). It is well established that the injured party must show more such as a comparative determination of the degree or qualitative nature of an injury based on the normal function, purpose and use of the body part. See, Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Systems Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 345, 746 N.Y.S.2d 865, 774 N.E.2d 1197 (2002). In her affidavit, Plaintiff merely set forth a list of alleged injuries including disc bulges. She did not offer any proof, such as a comparative determination of the injuries or a description of the impact on her daily routine, which would have assisted the Court in evaluating the merits of her action. The Court must also surmise that the Plaintiff and her attorney accepted the $5,000.00 settlement only after counsel determined the "value" of the case. Lastly, misunderstanding "gross" proceeds with "net" does not establish a meritorious action. Next is whether Plaintiff had a reasonable excuse for the delay. Here, again, the case was not marked "off" or dismissed because of Plaintiff's failure to appear or prosecute. The Court sees no basis even for inquiry into this prong. Next is whether Plaintiff demonstrated a lack of intent to abandon the action. In actuality, the Plaintiff intended to settle the case and the question of abandonment is hardly a consideration. Finally, contrary to Plaintiff's contention, the Defendant would be prejudiced if this trial was restored to the calendar. After weighing its options, Defendant offered Plaintiff $5,000.00 which Plaintiff accepted in a writing signed by her attorney. Considering that this motion stems from Plaintiff's misunderstanding between "gross" and "net" proceeds, or $1,650.00 in this case, the Defendant could be liable after trial for a significantly higher award to the Plaintiff. Under these circumstances, the prejudice to the Defendant in granting this motion far outweighs the prejudice to the Plaintiff if the motion was denied.
The Court distinguishes this case from that in McGuffin v. Port of New York Authority, 58 A.D.2d 793, 396 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1st Dep't 1977). In that case, the litigant was not aware the trial was "going on" and was never consulted about a settlement figure before the attorney agreed to it. In this case, the settlement was proffered to the Plaintiff before trial which she then accepted before notifying the Court. The Court in McGuffin restored the trial to the calendar finding that the Defendant did not prove that Plaintiff's counsel was authorized to settle. However, the Court of Appeals in a later decision provided guidance that attorneys have apparent authority to settle by virtue of the attorney-client relationship. See, Hallock v. State of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 224, 485 N.Y.S.2d 510, 474 N.E.2d 1178 (1984). In the present case, the circumstances were quite opposite. Plaintiff's counsel affirmed,
"An offer of settlement was proffered to Plaintiff in the sum of $5,000.00. Upon conferring with Plaintiff, Plaintiff indicated that she would accept said offer of settlement."
Also distinguishable is the most recent case, Gyabaah , wherein the 1st Department held that the a party was not bound by a settlement that never took effect. Gyabaah v. Rivlab Transportation, 102 A.D.3d 451, 958 N.Y.S.2d 109 (1st Dep't 2013). In that case the Plaintiff's acceptance was never communicated to the Defendant. In the present case, the acceptance was communicated.
The Court finds that CPLR § 2104 is the more applicable statute herein. Plaintiff's counsel characterized the situation as "the court was notified off the record." A more appropriate characterization is that the Court was notified in writing by Plaintiff's counsel that the action was settled. The Court finds that Plaintiff's counsel had the apparent authority to settle the action on Plaintiff's behalf. See, Hallock v. State of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 224, 485 N.Y.S.2d 510, 474 N.E.2d 1178 (1984).
An agreement negotiated through e-mail to settle a dispute for 60% of the amount demanded was sufficiently clear and concrete to constitute an enforceable contract. Williamson v. Delsener, 59 A.D.3d 291, 874 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1st Dep't 2009). It is well settled policy of all the courts of the State of New York to encourage agreements of compromise and settlement; therefore a stipulation of settlement will not be set aside absent a showing of such good cause as would invalidate a contract. American Express Travel Related Services, Inc. v. Vassall, 27 Misc.3d 1217(A), 910 N.Y.S.2d 760 (N.Y.City Civ.Ct., 2010). Such good cause could include fraud, collusion, mistake, accident, or some other ground of the same nature, that would open the door to possible abuse and make litigation interminable. American Express Travel Related Services, Inc. v. Vassall, 27 Misc.3d 1217(A), 910 N.Y.S.2d 760 (N.Y.City Civ.Ct., 2010). See also, Caroli v. Allstate Insurance Co., 100 A.D.3d 941, 955 N.Y.S.2d 128 (2d Dep't 2012) ; Dykstra v. Dykstra, 211 A.D.2d 745, 621 N.Y.S.2d 693 (2d Dep't 1995). Similar to Williamson, Plaintiff's counsel telefaxed a letter to the Court signed by counsel stating in sufficient terms the settlement amounts for each Plaintiff. Agreements are to be signed by the party against whom they are sought to be enforced; in this case, the Plaintiff. Had this motion been made by Defendant, its disposition may deviate because the settlement was not signed by the Defendant. But it is Plaintiff against whom the settlement is being enforced, and the settlement was provided by Plaintiff's counsel. A further defect in the Plaintiff's motion was that there was no showing of fraud, collusion, mistake, accident, or some other ground as would invalidate a contract. "Mistake" must be one which arose between the Plaintiff and Defendant. It is insufficient that the mistake may have been Plaintiff's misunderstanding with her counsel about the difference between "net" and " gross" proceeds. There is no decisional authority that "change of mind" was intended to be included as a good cause for invalidating a contract. To the contrary, a subsequent change of mind as to the adequacy of a bargain which has been made is wholly insufficient in law or equity to destroy a contract of compromise and settlement. American Express Travel Related Services, Inc. v. Vassall, 27 Misc.3d 1217(A), 910 N.Y.S.2d 760 (N.Y.City Civ.Ct., 2010).
By reason of the above, it is hereby
ADJUDGED that CPLR § 3404 is inapplicable in this case and, even if it was, that the Plaintiff failed to meet her burden in establishing why the case should be restored to the trial calendar; and it is further
ADJUDGED that the telefax signed by Plaintiff's counsel informing the Court that the case had been settled for the sum of $5,000.00 was a stipulation binding upon the Plaintiff; and it is further
ADJUDGED that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate fraud, collusion, mistake, accident, or some other ground as would invalidate a contract; and it is further
ORDERED, that this motion is denied in its entirety.
This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.