The undersigned has considered the parties' arguments, the text of the relevant statutes, and the cases interpreting them, and concludes that the defendants' position is correct. In the interest of brevity and economy of judicial resources, the court hereby ADOPTS and INCORPORATES BY REFERENCE the opinion of Chief Judge Robert L. Hinkle in Lopez v. ML #3, LLC, 607 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1311-14 (M.D. Fla. 2009). See also Berry v. Cook Motor Cars, Ltd., Civil No. AMD 09-426, 2009 WL 1971391, slip op. at 2 (D. Md. June 29, 2009). For the reasons stated therein, the defendants' Motion to Dismiss the plaintiffs' CROA claim, Claim Five, is ALLOWED.

Because only state law claims remain, supplemental jurisdiction should be declined. See Williams v. Cmty. Health Nw. Fla., No. 3:19CV75-RV-CJK, 2019 WL 938406, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2019) (declining supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after recommending dismissal of claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:19CV75-RV-CJK, 2019 WL 937928 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2019); see Lopez v. ML #3, LLC, 607 F.Supp.2d 1310, 1314 (N.D. Fla. 2009) (declining supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim where the court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction). Accordingly, Plaintiff's state law theft and conversion claims should be dismissed without prejudice to being pursued in state court.

The court in Hernandez v. Saybrook Buick GMC, Inc., No. 20-438, 2020 WL 7137417, at *9 (D. Conn. Dec. 4, 2020), in addition to serving as an instructive guidepost, aptly summarized cases that have embraced a similar view. See Lopez v. ML # 3, 607 F.Supp.2d 1310, 1314 (N.D. Fla. 2009) ("In sum, when the Act is considered as a whole and in light of its explicitly stated purposes, it is clear that it applies only in the credit-repair context."); Berry v. Cook Motor Cars, Ltd., No. 09-426, 2009 WL 1971391, at *2 (D. Md. Jun. 29, 2009) ("This court agrees with the analysis in In re Wright."); Karakus v. Wells Fargo Bank, 941 F. Supp. 2d 318, 338 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2013) ("Although some authority exists for the ... proposition that 'no person' should be read broadly enough to include mortgage lenders like Wells Fargo, this interpretation would run afoul of the purposes the statute was designed to achieve."); Moret, 2009 WL 1288062, at *3 ("The Court agrees with the Defendants that [the Credit Repair Organizations Act] was not intended to apply where no credit repair organizations, as defined by the Act, was involved."); Rautu v. U.S. Bank, N.A., No. 12-12961, 2013 WL 866480, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 7, 2013) (analyzing § 1679b(a)(1) in the context of the statute as a whol

A number of other district courts have reached the same conclusion. SeeLopez v. ML # 3 , 607 F.Supp.2d 1310, 1314 (N.D. Fla. 2009) ("In sum, when the Act is considered as a whole and in light of its explicitly stated purposes, it is clear that it applies only in the credit-repair context."); Berry , 2009 WL 1971391, at *2 ("This court agrees with the analysis in In re Wright. "); Karakus , 941 F. Supp. 2d at 338 ("Although some authority exists for the ... proposition that ‘no person’ should be read broadly enough to include mortgage lenders like Wells Fargo, this interpretation would run afoul of the purposes the statute was designed to achieve."); Moret , 2009 WL 1288062, at *3 ("The Court agrees with the Defendants that CROA was not intended to apply where no credit repair organizations, as defined by the Act, was involved."); Rautu v. U.S. Bank, N.A. , No. 2:12-cv-12961, 2013 WL 866480, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 7, 2013) (analyzing § 1679b(a)(1) in the context of the statute as a whole and concluding that "[i]nterpreting § 1679b ) as applicable to persons not affiliated with credit repair organizations would exp

When the items in the list are read in pari materia, the reference to other "person" means another person connected with a credit-repair organization—just as the references to an "officer, employee, [or] agent" means an "officer, employee, [or] agent" of a credit-repair organization.Lopez v. ML #3, LLC, 607 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1313-14 (N.D. Fla. 2009). Additionally, it seems unlikely that Congress intended for a statute designed to protect consumers against unfair practices by CROs to also be used to subject those same consumers to liability. District courts in this circuit and others have come to the same conclusion. See, e.g., Enriquez v. Countrywide Home Loans, FSB, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1063 (D. Haw. 2011) (holding that claim against mortgage lender failed because lender was not a credit repair organization); Henry v. Westchester Foreign Autos, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 2d 610, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("Congress' focus in enacting the CROA was on the credit repair industry, and specifically for regulation of credit repair organizations.

Although some courts have taken an expansive view that proscriptions in § 1679b(a) apply to "any person," see, e.g., Bigalke v. Creditrust Corp., 162 F. Supp. 2d 996, 999 (N.D. Ill. 2001), this court previously has determined that the prohibited practices in § 1679b(a) apply "only to 'persons' acting in the context of credit repair organizations and services." Bentley v. Alan Vester Auto Grp., Inc., No. 5:07-CV-434-F, 2009 WL 3125539, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 29, 2009) (incorporating Lopez v. ML #3, LLC, 607 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1311-14 (M.D. Fla. 2009)). a) Claims Against Aegis and CCDN, LLC Under § 1679b(a)(3) and (a)(4)

, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 29, 2009)(expressly incorporating the opinion of Chief Judge Robert L. Hinkle in Lopez v. ML # 3, LLC, 607 F.Supp.2d 1310, 1311–14 (M.D.Fla.2009)). Under the CROA, a “credit repair organization” is

The canons that a word in a statute should be given its plain meaning and that different words in a statute ordinarily should be given different meanings do not require a broader reading of this statute. 607 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1312-14 (N.D. Fla. 2009). Indeed, such a reading is consistent with the broader purpose of the statute, as provided in § 1679(b):

Although some courts have taken an expansive view that proscriptions in § 1679b(a) apply to "any person," see, e.g., Bigalke v.Credittrust Corp., 162 F, Supp. 2d 996, 999 (N.D. Ill. 2001), this court previously has determined that the prohibited practices in § 1679b(a) apply "only to 'persons' acting in the context of credit repair organizations and services." Bentley v. Alan Vester Auto Grp., Inc., No. 5:07-CV-434-F, 2009 WL 3125539, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 29, 2009) (expressly incorporating the opinion of Chief Judge Robert L. Hinkle in Lopez v. ML #3, LLC, 607 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1311-14 (M.D. Fla. 2009)). Along this vein, Defendants argue that Southwood's CROA claim should be dismissed because she failed to allege any facts demonstrating that any of the named Defendants are "credit repair organizations" within the meaning of the CROA.

Although by its terms, Section 1679b(a) provides that " no person may . . . make or use any untrue or misleading representation of the services of the credit repair organization," 15 U.S.C. § 1679b(a) (emphasis added), courts have inferred from the provision as a whole and Congress' purpose in enacting the CROA that only a credit repair organization or a person associated with a credit repair organization can violate this provision. See In re Wright, No. 05-40829-JJR-13, 2007 WL 1459475 at *11-12 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. May 16, 2007); Lopez v. ML# 3, LLC, 607 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1314 (N.D. Fla. 2009). But see Lacey v. William Chrysler Plymouth Inc., No. 02 C 7113, 2004 WL 415972, *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2004).