Opinion
2012-11-28
Mabel LOPEZ, respondent, v. Kelly A. KELLEHER, et al., appellants.
Richard T. Lau, Jericho, N.Y. (Linda Meisler of counsel), for appellants.
, J.P., RUTH C. BALKIN, LEONARD B. AUSTIN, and ROBERT J. MILLER, JJ.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Rebolini, J.), dated February 28, 2012, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident ( see Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 N.Y.2d 345, 350, 746 N.Y.S.2d 865, 774 N.E.2d 1197;Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955, 956–957, 582 N.Y.S.2d 990, 591 N.E.2d 1176). The defendants' motion papers failed to adequately address the plaintiff's claim, set forth in the bill of particulars, that she sustained a medically determined injury or impairment of a nonpermanent nature which prevented her from performing substantially all of the material acts which constituted her usual and customary daily activities for not less than 90 days during the 180 days immediately following the subject accident ( cf. Tinsley v. Bah, 50 A.D.3d 1019, 1019–1020, 857 N.Y.S.2d 180).
Since the defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden, it is unnecessary to determine whether the papers submitted by the plaintiff in opposition were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316, 476 N.E.2d 642).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.