Opinion
Case No. 1:19-cv-209 Erie
07-26-2019
MATT L. LOPER, Plaintiff v. DONALD TRUMP, UNITED STATES OFAMERICA, and U.S. ATTORNEY, Defendant
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is hereby recommended that the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 1] be GRANTED. The Clerk should be ordered to docket the Complaint.
It is further recommended that this action be dismissed as legally frivolous in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
II. REPORT
A. Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
Plaintiff Matt L. Loper ("Plaintiff"), an inmate incarcerated at the Crawford County Correctional Facility, initiated this pro se civil rights action by filing a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. In his motion, Plaintiff states that he is unable to pay the filing fee associated with this case. Based upon this averment, it appears that Plaintiff is without sufficient funds to pay the costs and fees of the proceedings. Accordingly, his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis should be granted.
B. Assessment of Plaintiff's Complaint
Having been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Plaintiff is subject to the screening provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Among other things, that statute requires the Court to dismiss any action in which the Court determines that the action is "frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Muchler v. Greenwald, 624 Fed. Appx. 794, 796-97 (3d Cir. 2015). A frivolous complaint is one which is either based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory (such as when a defendant enjoys immunity from suit) or based upon factual contentions which are clearly baseless (such as when the factual scenario described is fanciful or delusional). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). The determination as to whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. D'Agostino v. CECOM RDEC, 436 Fed. Appx. 70, 72 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his allegations, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). Moreover, under the liberal pleading rules, during the initial stages of litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997).
With respect to the instant case, Plaintiff identifies the Defendants as President Donald Trump, "U.S. Attorney," and the United States of America. ECF No. 1-5. He states that the following federal laws were violated: "Other Personal Injury, Hush Money, Personal Injury, United States of America Injury, Hush Money." Id. at 2. The factual narrative accompanying the complaint states only the following:
Plaintiff claims the Defendant owes Demand of $72,000 dollars in the amount of, for the full amount.Id. at 4. Construing these allegations extremely liberally, it appears that Plaintiff believes that Donald Trump and the other Defendants owe "Hush Money" to Stephanie Clifford and that Plaintiff may assert this right on her behalf pursuant to federal law.
Plaintiff claims $72,000 dollars with claims that Hush Money is still owed to Stephanie Clifford, and Demand for each party is $72,000 dollars.
Plaintiff claims Foreign Nation Trades.
Plaintiff asks to Order in favor of.
Basis of evidence shows testimony of serious emotional distress that is injured, and wronged by each Defendant.
All other Personal injury of harm suffered should be compensated in favor of Plaintiff, Stephanie Clifford, and each necessary party.
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Stephanie Clifford, known professionally as Stormy Daniels, is an American pornographic actress, stripper, and director.
In this Court's estimation, Plaintiff's incoherent and fanciful "complaint" lacks any arguable basis in law or fact, rendering it frivolous and subject to summary dismissal. Although Plaintiff asserts federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, he has failed to cite any federal statutory provision or constitutional amendment that might form the basis for federal jurisdiction. The remainder of his averments are incoherent and delusional. See Brookins v Cty. of Allegheny, 350 Fed. Appx. 639, 642 (3d Cir. 2009) ("A court may discredit allegations that are 'fanciful, fantastic, and delusional' and thus dismiss a complaint as factually frivolous when the facts alleged 'rise to the level of the irrational or wholly incredible.'") (quoting Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (citations omitted). Moreover, given the nature of these pleadings, the Court finds that they are incapable of being cured by amendment. See, e.g., Johnson v. Trump, 745 Fed. Appx. 445 (3d Cir. 2018) (affirming the district court's determination that leave to amend would be futile, despite the general rule in favor of curative amendments, where the allegations at issue were fanciful, fantastic, or delusional); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that that the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED.
It is further recommended that this action be dismissed as legally frivolous in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and that the Clerk be directed to close this case.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties must seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the Objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of the Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Extensions of time will not be granted. Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).
/s/ Richard A. Lanzillo
RICHARD A. LANZILLO
United States Magistrate Judge Dated: July 26, 2019