Lombardo Turquoise Milling Mining v. Hemanes

5 Citing cases

  1. Kenny v. Greer

    656 P.2d 857 (Nev. 1983)   Cited 16 times
    In Kenney v. Greer, 13 Ill. 432, 447, decided in 1851, this court observed with respect to circuit courts that "By a fiction of law, all transitory actions are supposed to arise in the county where the action is brought."

    Gray et al. v. Coykendall et al., 53 Nev. 466, 475, 6 P.2d 442, 444 (1931); Gibson v. Hjul, 32 Nev. 360, 108 P. 759 (1910). See Silver King Co. v. Conkling Co., 255 U.S. 151, 162 (1921); Lombardo Turquoise Milling Mining v. Hemanes, 430 F. Supp. 429, 442 (D.Nev. 1977). On the other hand, where monuments or stakes do not define the boundaries of a claim with some certainty, the calls in the recorded location certificate must control.

  2. State of S. D. v. Andrus

    614 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir. 1980)   Cited 31 times
    Holding that nondiscretionary approval of a mineral patent under the Mining Act a ministerial action, and thus not within the ambit of NEPA

    In recent years the mining laws governing the locating of mineral claims have remained unchanged, 30 U.S.C. § 22, 26, and modern decisions have continued to allow locators of mining claims to extract minerals without a patent provided they have met the statutory prerequisites. See, e. g., Lombardo Turquoise Milling Mining Co. v. Hemanes, 430 F. Supp. 429 (D.Nev. 1977). In light of the fact that a mineral patent in actuality is not a federal determination which enables the party to mine, we conclude in present context that the granting of such a patent is not a "major" federal action within the meaning of § 102(2)(C).

  3. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.

    409 F. Supp. 3d 738 (D. Ariz. 2019)   Cited 6 times

    A claimant may not use the deposit present in one location to lend validity to an adjacent location. SeeWaskey v. Hammer , 223 U.S. 85, 91, 32 S.Ct. 187, 56 L.Ed. 359 (1912) ("A discovery without the limits of the claim, no matter what its proximity, does not suffice."); Lombardo Turquoise Milling & Mining Co. v. Hemanes , 430 F. Supp. 429, 443 (D. Nev. 1977). Likewise, a claimant may not draw the lines of their claim so large as to encompass both the deposit and land beyond the acreage allowable by statute.

  4. Marathon Oil Co. v. Lujan

    751 F. Supp. 1454 (D. Colo. 1990)   Cited 9 times
    In Marathon, which arose at a time when subordinate BLM officials could still issue patents, "the only thing standing between Marathon and its patents" was the signature of such an official, and the delay at issue was fourteen months.

    Such compliance, measured primarily by a good faith standard, is sufficient. See, e.g., Continental Oil Co. v. Natrona Serv., Inc., 588 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1978) (interpreting the Supreme Court's opinion in Union Oil Company v. Smith, 249 U.S. at 337, 39 S.Ct. at 308 as requiring substantial compliance with the element of possession and working); Rasmussen Drilling, Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., 571 F.2d 1144 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862, 99 S.Ct. 183, 58 L.Ed.2d 171 (1978) (affording indulgence to a miner who attempts to comply with laws regarding the perfection of a valid location in good faith); Lombardo Turquoise Milling Mining Co., Inc. v. Hermanes, 430 F.Supp. 429 (D.Nev. 1977), aff'd, 605 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1979) (under Nevada law, senior locators were held to a standard of substantial compliance with statutes regarding certificate of location)

  5. Tosco Corp. v. Hodel

    611 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Colo. 1985)   Cited 23 times
    Discussing background of oil shale disputes

    Decisional law considering the question whether actual or substantial compliance with mining statutes is required is clear on the point that substantial compliance is sufficient and that such compliance is measured primarily by a good faith standard. See, e.g., Continental Oil Co. v. Natrona Service, Inc., 588 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1978) (interpreting the Supreme Court's opinion in Union Oil Company v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337, 39 S.Ct. 308, 63 L.Ed. 635 (1919) as requiring substantial compliance with the element of possession and working); RasmussenDrilling v. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., 571 F.2d 1144 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862, 99 S.Ct. 183, 58 L.Ed.2d 171 (affording indulgence to a miner who attempts to comply with laws regarding the perfection of a valid location in good faith); Lombardo Turquoise Milling Mining Co., Inc. v. Hermanes, 430 F. Supp. 429 (D.Nev. 1977) aff'd 605 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting that under Nevada law, senior locators held to standard of substantial compliance with statutes regarding certificate of location); Inman v. Ollson, 213 Or. 56, 321 P.2d 1043 (1958) (noting well-established rule that substantial compliance with mining laws is all that is generally required); Scoggin v. Miller, 64 Wyo. 206, 189 P.2d 677 (1948) (defendants did not forfeit rights under placer mining claims where they made good faith effort to comply with statutory requirements). The Court made clear in United States v. Locke, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 1798, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985) that less than full compliance with the statute would not result in an automatic loss of the claim.