Lombardi v. Castro

7 Citing cases

  1. Munene v. Mayorkas

    CV-19-00220-TUC-RM (JR) (D. Ariz. Jun. 28, 2024)

    For a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish the adverse action would not have occurred but for the protected activity. Id. at 362-63; Lombardi v. Castro, 675 Fed.Appx. 690, 691 (9th Cir. 2017).

  2. Armijo v. Costco Wholesale Warehouse, Inc.

    Civ. 19-00484-ACK-RT (D. Haw. Apr. 28, 2022)   Cited 4 times

    For such a retaliation claim, the plaintiff must establish that the protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer. Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2533, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013); see also Lombardi v. Castro, 675 Fed.Appx. 690, 691-92 (9th Cir. 2017). Temporal proximity between an employer's knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment action is sufficient to establish a prima facie case, but the temporal proximity must be โ€œvery close.โ€

  3. Prowse v. Mayorkas

    Civ. 21-00057 ACK-WRP (D. Haw. Mar. 7, 2022)   Cited 1 times

    The plaintiff must establish that her protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer. Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2533, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013); see also Lombardi v. Castro, 675 Fed.Appx. 690, 691-92 (9th Cir. 2017). โ€œEssential to a causal link is evidence that the employer was aware that the plaintiff had engaged in the 30 protected activity.โ€

  4. Gonzalez v. Buttigieg

    20-cv-530-GPC (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2021)

    The filing of an EEO complaint constitutes protected activity. See Lombardi v. Castro, 675 Fed.Appx. 690, 691 (9th Cir. 2017). Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that she was placed on leave and was later dismissed from her job with DOT, both of which constitute adverse employment actions for purposes of Title VII retaliation claims.

  5. Alozie v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents

    No. CV-16-03944-PHX-ROS (D. Ariz. Feb. 20, 2020)

    This is distinguishable from the months-long periods which the post-Nassar Ninth Circuit have found to be insufficient to support findings of but-for causation, and is significantly less than the five weeks which the Ninth Circuit has previously found to constitute "close temporal proximity." Compare Bagley v. Bel-Aire Mech. Inc., 647 F. App'x 797, 801 (9th Cir. 2016) (denial of summary judgment appropriate where five-week gap constituted "close temporal proximity" and other evidence supported claim) with Knickmeyer v. Nevada ex rel. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 716 F. App'x 597, 599 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding that a gap of "many months" between protected activity and adverse employment action was not "so close as to support an inference of but-for causation"), Lombardi v. Castro, 675 F. App'x 690, 692 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding no but-for causation when "substantial time" passed between protected act and decision not to promote), and Serlin v. Alexander Dawson Sch., LLC, 656 F. App'x 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding that a three-month gap between protected act and adverse action, without any other evidence, was insufficient causation evidence). Some circuits, including the Third and Sixth, have explicitly addressed the role of temporal proximity in the but-for causation analysis, and have held that close temporal proximity, on its own, is sufficient to prove causation.

  6. Sabatini v. Cal. Bd. of Registered Nursing

    Case No.: 18-CV-2036-AJB-AGS (S.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2019)   Cited 2 times

    Thus, given the narrow scope of the Nieves case, the Court chooses not to disturb the well-settled Ninth Circuit authority applying the "but-for" test to determine causation for ADA retaliation claims. See, e.g., Lombardi v. Castro, 675 F. App'x 690, 692 (9th Cir. 2017) ("The third element of a prima facie [ADA retaliation] case requires showing 'but-for causation, not the lessened causation test stated in ยง 2000e-2(m),' which applies to discrimination claims."). Tellingly, Plaintiff himself states that "insofar as Plaintiff is aware, no court has yet ruled on whether that articulation in Nieves applies to ADA and other retaliatory laws. . . ."

  7. Kuehu v. United Airlines, Inc.

    Civ. No. 16-00216 ACK-KJM (D. Haw. May. 26, 2017)   Cited 2 times   1 Legal Analyses

    See Sanford v. LandmarkProt., Inc., No. C 10-0447 RS, 2011 WL 1877904, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2011), aff'd, 495 F. App'x 783 (9th Cir. 2012) (granting summary judgment where defendant asserted that the adverse employment action resulted from an administrative mistake and plaintiff made no showing of pretext). As such, no reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff's protected ADA activity was the but-for cause of her termination or that Defendant's stated reasons for terminating her were pretextual. See Lombardi v. Castro, No. 15-55276, 2017 WL 104836, at *2 (9th Cir. Jan. 11, 2017) (granting summary judgment where plaintiff had not shown but-for causation or that stated reasons were pretextual, as evidenced by interview notes demonstrating plaintiff interviewed poorly and lacked relevant experience). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion as to the retaliation claims.