Opinion
C. A. 8:24-cv-0290-DCC-JDA
04-26-2024
Lewis Logan, Plaintiff, v. John Fuller, Cherokee County Sheriff Officer, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
Lewis Logan (“Plaintiff”) brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendant violated his rights under the United States Constitution. Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se and in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons explained below, this action is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee at the Cherokee County Detention Center. [Doc. 1 at 2-3.] Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint on the standard court form [Doc. 1], in which he makes the following allegations.
Plaintiff contends Defendant has violated his rights by engaging in “obstruction of justice” in that “some of [his] money [is] missing.” [Id. at 3.] Plaintiff alleges he was pulled over on December 28, 2022, by Trooper G. M. Baker, who searched Plaintiff. [Id. at 4.] Plaintiff had $1,800 in cash. [Id.] Plaintiff was transported to the Cherokee County Detention Center along with his $1,800 in cash. [Id. at 4-5.] While Plaintiff was being searched, Trooper L. H. Greene searched his truck in which Plaintiff had an additional $1,800 in cash in his console. [Id. at 5.] Plaintiff alleges Trooper Greene turned over the $1,800 to Defendant. [Id. at 6.] Defendant also confiscated the $1,800 that Trooper Baker took from Plaintiff while booking him in at the Detention Center. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that no inventory of his personal property was taken. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that he had a total of $3,606 that Defendant confiscated from him. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that Defendant only deposited $1,806, leaving the other $1,800 unaccounted for. [Id.] Plaintiff has attached documents to his Complaint showing that $1,806 that was confiscated is subject to a forfeiture arising from the criminal charges pending against him. [Id. at 8.]
Plaintiff does not identify any injuries on the “Injuries” section of the Complaint form. [Id. at 5.] For his relief, Plaintiff asks to have the “situation looked into” and asks to have his money returned to him. [Id.]
The Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff has been charged in the Cherokee County Court of General Sessions with the following crimes: drugs/MDP, narcotic drugs in Schedule I(b) & (c), LSD, and Schedule II, 3rd or subsequent offense at case number 2022A1110101557; drugs/manufacture, distribution, etc. of cocaine base, 3rd or subsequent offense at case number 2022A1110101558; drugs/possession of 28 grams or less of marijuana or 10 grams or less of hash, 1st offense at case number 2022A1110101559; and drugs/trafficking in methamphetamine or cocaine base, 100 grams or more, but less than 200 grams, at case number 2022A1110101560. See Cherokee County Seventh Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex. sccourts.org/Cherokee/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case numbers) (last visited Jan. 23, 2024). Those charges all remain pending against Plaintiff at this time.
See Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
Plaintiff has also been charged in the Cherokee County Magistrate Court with a traffic/seatbelt violation at case number 20222351246026; driving under suspended license at case number 20222351246534; and traffic/vehicular tire violation at case number 20222351246535. See Cherokee County Seventh Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Cherokee/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case numbers) (last visited Jan. 23, 2024).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute, which authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would still be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411,417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his pleadings, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (holding that a plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to a precise legal theory). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
The Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
The crux of this action is Plaintiff's contention that Defendant either lost or stole approximately $1,800 of Plaintiff's money during his arrest. Thus, liberally construed, the Complaint appears to assert a due process claim.
However, deprivations of personal property do not support actions for damages under § 1983. See Baker v. Stevenson, No. 8:13-cv-466-JFA-JDA, 2013 WL 4866337, at *1 (D.S.C. Sept. 11, 2013). This is so because negligence, in general, is not actionable under § 1983. See Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 75-78 (4th Cir. 1995); Ruefly v. Landon, 825 F.2d 792, 793-94 (4th Cir. 1987). Moreover, § 1983 does not impose liability for violations of duties of care arising under state law. In other words, “[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . does not transform every tort committed by a state actor into a constitutional violation.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200-03 (1989). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a random and unauthorized deprivation of personal property by a state official does not rise to a federal due process violation where the state provides post-deprivation procedures to secure the return of the property or to compensate for the loss. See Mora v. City of Gaithersburg, 519 F.3d 216, 230-31 (4th Cir. 2008); Bogart v. Chapell, 396 F.3d 548, 561-63 (4th Cir. 2005).
Instead, the availability of a state cause of action for an alleged loss of property provides adequate procedural due process; in other words, where state law provides such a remedy, no federally guaranteed constitutional right is implicated. See Yates v. Jamison, 782 F.2d 1182, 1184 (4th Cir. 1986) (“[A] government official's random and unauthorized act, whether intentional or negligent, which causes the loss of private property is not a violation of procedural due process when the state provides a meaningful postdeprivation remedy.”). South Carolina law provides post-deprivation procedures to secure the return of personal property or to compensate for the loss. “[I]n South Carolina, prisoners may bring a civil action in state court for recovery of personal property against prison officials who deprived them of property without state authorization.” Drake v. Brown, No. 6:09-cv-1449-JFA-WMC, 2009 WL 1749375, at *2 (D.S.C. June 22, 2009) (citing McIntyre v. Portee, 784 F.2d 566, 567 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding South Carolina's post-deprivation remedy under S.C. Code Ann. § 15-69-10, et seq. sufficient to satisfy due process requirements)); see also Mosley v. Scarcella, No. 1:19-cv-1550-RMG-SVH, 2019 WL 4280129, at *2 (D.S.C. June 19, 2019), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 3406612 (D.S.C. July 29, 2019).
To the extent Plaintiff asserts a claim for negligence related to his lost property, such a claim may be cognizable under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, SC Code Ann. § 15-78-10 et seq. Section 15-78-30 and its subparts encompass a “loss” of property from an occurrence of negligence proximately caused by a person employed by the State of South Carolina, a state agency, or political subdivision while acting within the scope of his or her employment. However, suits brought under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act must be brought in a state court within the boundaries of South Carolina. See S.C. Code Ann. §15-78-20(e) (providing that the State of South Carolina does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, consents to suit only in a court of the State of South Carolina, and does not consent to suit in a federal court). Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff alleges a claim under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, Plaintiff cannot pursue such a claim in this Court.
The Court makes no determination on the possible success of any claim Plaintiff may have in the state court.
Further, an unauthorized deprivation of property by a state employee, even if intentional, “does not violate the Due Process Clause if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for loss is available.” Hammond v. Dean, No. 3:07-cv-654-SB, 2007 WL 3002362, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 9, 2007) (emphasis in original) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984)). Thus, even if Defendant intentionally took Plaintiff's money, Plaintiff has a remedy under South Carolina law to obtain relief in state court. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 530-36 (holding that intentional deprivations of property by State employees do not violate due process until and unless the State refuses to provide a suitable post-deprivation remedy); Mora, 519 F.3d at 230-31 (finding that the state courts were open to the plaintiff for claims of conversion or trespass to chattels and finding no reason to think that the state process was constitutionally inadequate); see also Samuel v. Ozmint, No. 3:07-cv-178-PMD-JRM, 2008 WL 512736, at *7 (D.S.C. Feb. 25, 2008) (noting that claims related to taking of personal property are cognizable under South Carolina state law); Greene v. Stonebreaker, No. 9:06-cv-3392-PMD-GCK, 2007 WL 2288123, at *6 (D.S.C. Aug. 6, 2007) (noting that a person in South Carolina appears to have adequate post-deprivation remedies for personal property loss). Plaintiff can bring an intentional tort civil action in the South Carolina state courts to remedy any intentional taking of his property. Therefore, Plaintiff's § 1983 claim based on any deprivation of his personal property fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Consequently, for the reasons stated above, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action without issuance and service of process pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal).
The undersigned finds that Plaintiff cannot cure the defects in his Complaint by mere amendment and therefore recommends that the instant action be dismissed without affording Plaintiff an opportunity to amend because amendment would be futile. See Thomas v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., No. 6:18-cv-169-AMQ, 2018 WL 5258811, at *2 (D.S.C. July 25, 2018) (declining to automatically give plaintiff leave to amend because plaintiff could not cure the defects in his claims against defendant by mere amendment), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 5255183 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2018); Workman v. Kernell, No. 6:18-cv-00355-RBH-KFM, 2018 WL 4826535, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2018), aff'd, 766 Fed.Appx. 1 (4th Cir. 2019).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).