Opinion
May 27, 1936.
June 26, 1936.
Beneficial and fraternal societies — Procedure — Internal dispute — Exhausting remedies afforded by by-laws — Courts — Inquiry into merits of case — Legal and reasonable action by tribunal of society — Evidence — Division of lodge — Jurisdiction of directors.
1. In a proceeding in equity to enforce the division of a lodge of a fraternal society, the evidence was on appeal held sufficient to sustain the findings of the chancellor that the petition had been signed by one-half of the members of the lodge and that dissension existed within the lodge, as required by the by-laws of the society for a division. [293-5]
2. Where, after the decision of the directors of the society for a division of the lodge but prior to its confirmation by formal resolution, some of the signers of the petition withdrew, such action did not deprive the directors of jurisdiction to pass upon the question. [294]
3. The fact that the trial board of the society reversed the action of the directors, and that no appeal was taken from the order of the board to the convention, the highest tribunal, did not preclude plaintiffs from seeking the aid of the court, where it appeared that the trial board did not have jurisdiction in disputes of the character involved and that its decree was a nullity; and this was especially so where it appeared that, while the present action was pending in the court below, defendants appealed to the convention from the decision of the directors and suffered an adverse ruling. [294]
4. The remedies afforded by the by-laws of a fraternal association must be completely exhausted before the aid of a court can be invoked to settle an internal dispute. [294]
5. Where the officers of an unincorporated association, in good faith, and in a reasonable, proper and legal manner under their by-laws and constitution, exercise their duties as a tribunal to settle disputes on matters pertaining to the association or the rights of any of its members, the court will not go into the merits of the case. [294-5] Appeals — Review — Findings of chancellor.
6. The findings of fact of the chancellor supported by competent evidence and affirmed by the court in banc, will not be disturbed on appeal. [293-4]
Before KEPHART, C. J., SCHAFFER, MAXEY, LINN, STERN and BARNES, JJ.
Appeals, Nos. 129 and 130, March T., 1936, by defendants, from decree of C. P. Allegheny Co., July T., 1934, No. 2206, in case of Lodge No. 19, Svete Ime Isusovo, otherwise known as Lodge No. 19, Croation Fraternal Union of America v. Svi Sveti, otherwise known as Lodge No. 1, Croation Fraternal Union of America et al. Decree affirmed.
Bill in equity. Before REID, P. J.
The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.
Adjudication filed sustaining bill of complaint. Exceptions to adjudication dismissed and final decree entered. Defendants appealed.
Errors assigned, among others, were various rulings on evidence.
Alexander H. Schullman, with him Harold H. Harter, for appellants.
John D. Meyer, with him Louis Z. Marohnic, for appellees.
Argued May 27, 1936.
Appellants contend that the action of the Supreme Board of Directors of the Croation Fraternal Union of America in ordering a division of Lodge No. 1 was invalid, because the petition was not signed by one-half of its members and there is no evidence of dissension making it impossible to have peace within the lodge, as required by the by-laws for a division. Our review shows there was ample evidence supporting the findings of the court below, affirmed by the court en banc, that one-half the members of Lodge No. 1 had signed the petition and sufficient dissension existed. We will not disturb them on appeal: Glenn v. Trees, 276 Pa. 165; Equitable L. Assur. Soc. v. Klein, 315 Pa. 156. Appellants were accorded a full and impartial hearing, and the decision of the directors was not arbitrary nor fraudulent but a reasonable exercise in good faith of the discretionary power vested in them.
The attempt of twenty-one signers to withdraw after the decision of the directors but prior to its confirmation by formal resolution was abortive. The directors had acted on the petition and granted a charter to Lodge No. 19. The signers had no power to withdraw and thus deprive the directors of jurisdiction to pass upon the question after they had conferred jurisdiction.
It is a settled principle that the remedies afforded by the by-laws of an association must be completely exhausted before the aid of a court can be invoked to settle an internal dispute: Acri v. Bruscia, 265 Pa. 384; Beeman v. Supreme Lodge S. of H., 215 Pa. 627, 631. Appellants contend that the court below should have dismissed the bill because appellees failed to avail themselves of their right under the by-laws to appeal to the convention from the order of the trial board. The by-laws do not give the trial board appellate jurisdiction in disputes of this nature, and the court below properly held that its decree reversing the directors was a nullity, from which no appeal could be taken.
Furthermore it appears that while this action was pending in the court below appellants appealed to the convention from the decision of the directors and suffered an adverse ruling. This adjudication by the highest tribunal of the society is decisive of their rights, once it is determined that the laws of the society were strictly complied with, and that the officers acted reasonably and in good faith. Under such circumstances, this court will not go into the merits of the case: Maloney v. U. Mine Workers of A., 308 Pa. 251, 257. We conclude that the rights of appellants were properly decided by the supreme board of directors and the convention, which tribunals had jurisdiction over the dispute, accorded them a fair and impartial hearing, and exercised their discretionary power in a reasonable and just manner.
Decree affirmed at appellants' cost.