In our view, these cases - and others like them - best align with the text of § 523(a) and the Supreme Court's decisions in Archer and Cohen, and we follow their approach today.See TranSouth Fin. Corp. of Fla. v. Johnson, 931 F.2d 1505, 1505-06 (11th Cir. 1991) (reasoning that "[o]nce a debt has been determined nondischargeable," a creditor's contractually guaranteed attorney's fees incurred in "collect[ing]" that debt "are included as part of the nondischargeable debt"); In re Loder, 796 F. App'x 698, 701 (11th Cir. 2020) (reiterating TransSouth's holding); In re Florida, 164 B.R. 636, 639 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994) ("costs of securing" payment of a debt for willful and malicious injury are non-dischargeable because they "have a direct and apparent genesis in the original claim"); In re Steward, No. 16-00479, 2017 WL 4842366, at *3 (Bankr. D.D.C. Oct. 18, 2017) ("damages relating to collection of the nondischargeable debt" also non-dischargeable); In re French, 563 B.R. 212, 223-24 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2016) (per Cohen, the "debt associated with" the fraudulently obtained money "includes post judgment interest as well as Plaintiff's costs, expenses, and fees, including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred as the result of the enforcement of the agreement or collection of the indebtedness"); In re Wine, 558 B.R. 438, 445-46 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2016) (Cohen "quite definitively dictates that collection fees . . . arising from money fraudulently obtained are nondischargeable"); In re Hathaway, 364 B.R. at 248-50 (con
Loder then appealed to this Court, which also affirmed. In re Loder, 796 Fed.Appx. 698 (11th Cir. 2020) (unpublished).
And collateral estoppel can bar the relitigation of issues in bankruptcy dischargeability proceedings. In re Loder , 796 F. App'x 698, 701 (11th Cir. 2020). Normally, "[c]ollateral estoppel requires that: (1) the issue be identical in both the prior and current action; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the determination of the issue was critical and necessary to the judgment in the prior action; and (4) the burden of persuasion in the subsequent action not be significantly heavier."
See also In re Loder, 796 Fed.Appx. 698, 700 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Heckert with approval); In re Sasso, 2016 WL 3548819, at *3 (Bankr. D.N.M.) (citing and following Heckert); In reMaudsley, 2006 WL 6810971, at *7 (9th Cir. BAP) ("bankruptcy court generally does not enter a new money judgment but simply declares that the state court awards, or some portion of them, are nondischargeable"); In re Comer, 27 B.R. 1018, 1020-22 (9th Cir. BAP 1983), aff'd, 723 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1984) (same). That is what happened here.
Collateral losses arising from a debtor's wrongful conduct, such as attorney's fees and costs, may be nondischargeable. Loder v. Icemakers, Inc. (In re Loder), 796 F. App'x 698, 701 (11th Cir. 2020). Thus, court costs that directly flow from willful and malicious acts may be nondischargeable under section 523(a)(6).
When reviewing a matter pursuant to Taggart, the Court must: Cases where the Taggart standard applies include Loder v. Icemakers, Inc. (In re Loder), 796 Fed. Appx. 698 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that the [creditor] had a legal basis to conclude debt was nondischargable); In re Craig, 608 B.R. 565 (Bankr. N.D. Al. 2019) ("[T]here was a fair ground of doubt under the particular circumstances of this case as to whether the actions of Jackson County by its enforcement officer were lawful under the discharge order . . . ."); In re Laudato, Case No. 17-15129, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 2886 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Sept. 17, 2019) (finding that debtors did not prove it was objectively unreasonable for the County Treasurer to post delinquency in the normal course). [D]iscern whether an objectively reasonable basis exists for concluding that Respondent's conduct was lawful.