See also Crumley, 797 F. Supp. at 352 (concluding that "to apply the 1991 Act retroactively would impact substantially on defendant's previous rights"). But see Kimble, 784 F. Supp. at 253 ("I can find no basis for an unconditional right in this case."); Lockley v. Chao, 812 F. Supp. 246, 253 (D.D.C. 1993) (concluding that the Act's provisions only alter the level of damages and therefore retroactive application is appropriate); Savko, 800 F. Supp. at 274 (same); Tyler, 793 F. Supp. at 101 (same). The third factor in the manifest injustice test weighs heavily in favor of prospective application of the 1991 Amendments.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs replacement by an African-American does not necessarily preclude her from establishing a prima facie case. See Edwards v. Wallace Community College, 49 F.3d 1517, 1521 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that a race-discrimination plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination despite the fact that the employer hired someone from the same protected class to fill the vacancy left by the plaintiff); accord Lockley v. Chao, 812 F. Supp. 246, 250 n. 5 (D.D.C. 1993) (Revercomb, J.). To make out her prima facie case, however, Plaintiff must come forward with some evidence showing that "a comparable non-protected person was treated better," i.e., that non-Blacks were not terminated "for the same or similar conduct."

In ruling upon a summary judgment motion, the court must assume the truth of the non-movant's evidence and draw all justifiable inferences in that party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Lockley v. Chao, 812 F. Supp. 246, 248-249 (D.D.C. 1993). This does not mean, however, that a non-moving party may rest upon the mere allegations contained in his or her pleadings in defense of a summary judgment motion.

In ruling upon a summary judgment motion, the court must assume the truth of the non-movant's evidence, drawing all reasonable and justifiable inferences that may arise therefrom in favor of that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Lockley v. Chao, 812 F. Supp. 246, 248-249 (D.D.C. 1993). This does not mean, however, that the non-moving party may rest upon the allegations contained in his or her pleadings in defense of a summary judgment motion.

In ruling upon a summary judgment motion, the court must assume the truth of the nonmovant's evidence, and draw all justifiable inferences in that party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Lockley v. Chao, 812 F. Supp. 246, 248-249 (D.D.C. 1993). This is not to say, however, that a non-moving party may rest upon the allegations contained in his or her pleadings in defense of a summary judgment motion.

Since the decision of the Court of Appeals in Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, Inc., 975 F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1992), which established a framework for determining whether provisions of the new Act apply retroactively, the judges of this district have reached contradictory conclusions in ruling on the retroactivity of § 1981a(a)(1). Compare Lockley v. Chao, 812 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1993) (Revercomb, J.) (holding that the section applies retroactively) with Thomas v. Lane Bryant, Inc., No. 91-3154, 1993 WL 25534 (D.D.C. Jan. 28, 1993) (Richey, J.) (holding that the section does not apply retroactively). Of these analyses, the Court chooses to follow Thomas, which it finds more persuasive, and, therefore, holds that the plaintiffs cannot seek damages under § 1981a(a)(1).