Locklayer v. State

14 Citing cases

  1. Payne v. State

    168 Ind. App. 394 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976)   Cited 20 times

    This substantive defense goes to the merits of the charge against the defendant and is a factual question to be resolved by the jury. Locklayer v. State (1974), 162 Ind. App. 64, 317 N.E.2d 868. The jury was instructed on the defense of entrapment, and it denied the defense by returning a verdict of guilty.

  2. State v. Watson

    231 Neb. 507 (Neb. 1989)   Cited 18 times
    In Watson, the court reviewed dozens of cases in other jurisdictions and identified various factors that other courts have previously relied upon in upholding a drug-related conviction.

    ; State v. Cunningham, 17 Ariz. App. 314, 497 P.2d 821 (1972); People v. Sonleitner, 183 Cal.App.3d 364, 228 Cal.Rptr. 96 (1986); People v. Garcia, 166 Cal.App.3d 1056, 212 Cal.Rptr. 822 (1985); People v. McLean, 56 Cal.2d 660, 365 P.2d 403, 16 Cal.Rptr. 347 (1961), cert. denied 370 U.S. 958, 82 S.Ct. 1613, 8 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1962); People v. Sanchez, 197 Cal.App.2d 617, 17 Cal.Rptr. 230 (1961); People v. Partin, 254 Cal.App.2d 89, 62 Cal.Rptr. 59 (1967); People v. Rios, 127 Cal.App.2d 620, 274 P.2d 163 (1954); In re Waylon M., 129 Cal.App.3d 950, 181 Cal.Rptr. 413 (1982); People v. Tipton, 124 Cal.App.2d 213, 268 P.2d 196 (1954); People v. Steiner, 640 P.2d 250 (Colo. App. 1981); People v. Edwards, 198 Colo. 52, 598 P.2d 126 (1979); A.A. v. State, 461 So.2d 165 (Fla. App. 1984); State v. Schofill, 63 Haw. 77, 621 P.2d 364 (1980); The People v. Robinson, 14 Ill.2d 325, 153 N.E.2d 65 (1958); Copeland v. State, 430 N.E.2d 393 (Ind. App. 1982); Warthan v. State, 440 N.E.2d 657 (Ind. 1982); Locklayer v. State, 162 Ind. App. 64, 317 N.E.2d 868 (1974); Pettit v. State, 258 Ind. 409, 281 N.E.2d 807 (1972); Edwards v. Commonwealth, 489 S.W.2d 23 (Ky. 1973); People v. Boyd, 65 Mich. App. 11, 236 N.W.2d 744 (1975); State v. Kerfoot, 675 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. App. 1984); State v. Neal, 624 S.W.2d 182 (Mo. App. 1981); State v. Starr, 204 Mont. 210, 664 P.2d 893 (1983); State v. Dunn, 155 Mont. 319, 472 P.2d 288 (1970); State v. Pipkin, 101 N.J. Super. 598, 245 A.2d 72 (1968), cert. denied 393 U.S. 1042, 89 S.Ct. 668, 21 L.Ed.2d 590 (1969); People v. Jewsbury, 115 A.D.2d 341, 496 N.Y.S.2d 164 (1985); People v. Kenny, 30 N.Y.2d 154, 282 N.E.2d 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1972); Cory v. State, 543 P.2d 565 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975); Commonwealth v. Leskovic et al., 227 Pa. Super. 565, 307 A.2d 357 (1973); Commonwealth v. Aikens, 179 Pa. Super. 501, 118 A.2d 205 (1955); Miller v. State, 168 Tex.Crim. 570, 330 S.W.2d 466 (1959); State v. Hutton, 7 Wn. App. 726, 502 P.2d 1037 (1972); State v. Frazier, 162 W. Va. 602, 252 S.E.2d 39 (1979); State v. Hall

  3. Warthan v. State

    440 N.E.2d 657 (Ind. 1982)   Cited 9 times
    In Warthan v. State (1982), Ind., 440 N.E.2d 657, 659, the supreme court held that the identity of a substance can be proved by circumstantial evidence.

    When he returned, Defendant and Ash were gone, and none of the alleged contraband was recovered for chemical analysis. Even though contraband is not recovered, the State may prove Defendant's possession of LSD by circumstantial evidence, e.g. Pettit v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 409, 281 N.E.2d 807; Locklayer v. State, (1974) 162 Ind. App. 64, 75, 317 N.E.2d 868, 874; however, Middleton's testimony (quoted above), the only evidence upon the element of possession, is not probative evidence from which the element may be found. In Slettvet v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 312, 315, 280 N.E.2d 806, 808, a unanimous Court reversed a conviction for possession of LSD stating, "LSD is a colorless, tasteless, and odorless substance (see 22 A.L.R.3d 1326 n. 1) so that none of these characteristics can be a basis for identifying the substance.

  4. Watkins v. State

    436 N.E.2d 83 (Ind. 1982)   Cited 6 times

    Recognizing that the defense of entrapment is a factual matter to be resolved by the jury, the defendant argues that the rule of probable cause is closely related to the defense of entrapment, and that "accordingly the probable cause rule arising in an entrapment case is a question of law for the court." The State is therefore, defendant argues, precluded from utilizing evidence obtained absent probable cause for "baiting a trap," citing Locklayer v. State, (1974) 162 Ind. App. 64, 317 N.E.2d 868. The defendant claims that the denial of the motion was a denial of his right to challenge the evidence contained in State's Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2 and testimony relating to the exhibits. "Probable cause to suspect" is no longer an issue in entrapment cases.

  5. Shipp v. State

    265 Ind. 108 (Ind. 1976)   Cited 6 times

    Appellant's arguments presented here do not focus upon a very closely related issue, namely, whether the judge or the jury is the proper arbiter to decide whether probable cause to initiate an entrapment plan exists. That issue received extensive consideration recently by Judge Lybrook of the First District Court of Appeals in Locklayer v. State, (1974) 162 Ind. App. 64, 317 N.E.2d 868. Here, appellant does not distinguish between the probable cause and the substantive aspects of the defense of entrapment and, consequently, does not argue the relative merits of these two entities as arbiters of entrapment probable cause.

  6. Osborne v. State

    805 N.E.2d 435 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 19 times
    Providing that the “decision to stop a vehicle is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred”

    Indiana courts have long approved of this investigatory practice. See McCollum v. State, 582 N.E.2d 804 (Ind. 1991); Marlowe v. State, 786 N.E.2d 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); Whirley v. State, 408 N.E.2d 629 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Locklayer v. State, 317 N.E.2d 868, 162 Ind. App. 64 (1974). The key to the controlled buy is that the police are in control of the situation at all times.

  7. Whalen v. State

    442 N.E.2d 14 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982)

    A motion to suppress is not an appropriate vehicle for the determination of this issue. Locklayer v. State, (1974) 162 Ind. App. 64, 317 N.E.2d 868. Therefore, the court committed no error in denying the motion to suppress without holding a hearing.

  8. Copeland v. State

    430 N.E.2d 393 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 24 times
    Finding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing experienced drug addict to testify as an expert witness regarding identity of dilaudid

    The circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to affirm a conviction, must consist of opinion testimony of someone sufficiently experienced with the drug who identifies the substance. Locklayer v. State, (1974) 162 Ind. App. 64, 317 N.E.2d 868. Although Ussery was a properly qualified expert, we remain unpersuaded that his testimony constituted sufficient evidence. Ussery's testimony did not illuminate how he identified the drug, that is, whether the pills had any distinguishing markings or any other method to determine that the substance was dilaudid.

  9. Williams v. State

    408 N.E.2d 123 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 9 times

    The quantum of evidence necessary to support the probable cause to set in motion an entrapment scheme is minimal. For example, it is less than that required to support a search warrant. Locklayer v. State, (1974) 162 Ind. App. 64, 317 N.E.2d 868, 872 n. 3. In the case at hand the probable cause to suspect the defendant was supplied by Wilson.

  10. Stayton v. State

    400 N.E.2d 784 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 8 times

    When the probable cause to suspect requirement was in effect, it was analogous to the probable cause necessary to support a search warrant or an arrest warrant, except that the evidentiary threshold was lower. Locklayer v. State, (1974) 162 Ind. App. 64, 317 N.E.2d 868; See Hauk v. State, (1974) 160 Ind. App. 390, 312 N.E.2d 92. Probable cause may be based upon credible hearsay evidence. Credible hearsay may be supplied by a reliable informant, that is an informant who has previously provided reliable information.