The trial judge stated that there is no "opportunity for the vessel, the M/C BASE, to again leave the United States for the first time." Lockheed Petroleum Services, Ltd. v. United States, 557 F. Supp. 583 at 588 (Ct. Int'l Trade, 1982) (emphasis added). Because Lockheed failed to file the abstract prior to the departure of the M/C BASE, Customs had no opportunity to verify the contents of the abstract through an examination of the vessel.
This addition is consistent with the underlying purpose of the original statute: "to encourage the production of articles for export in the United States, thus increasing domestic manufactures, increasing foreign commerce and aiding American industry and labor." Lockheed Petroleum Services, Ltd. v. United States, 4 CIT 25, 28, 557 F. Supp. 583, 586 (1982) (citing United States v. International Paint Co., Inc., 35 C.C.P.A. 87, 90 (1948); United States v. National Sugar Refining Co., 39 C.C.P.A. 96, 99 (1951)). As such, the Court believes that the legislative history of subsection (p) is helpful in assessing whether Marathon's claims were eligible for drawback under § 1313(b).
Id. "Over the years, the courts have held that the allowance of drawback is a privilege and compliance with the regulations is a prerequisite to securing it where the regulations are authorized and reasonable." Lockheed Petroleum Services, Ltd. v. United States, 4 CIT 25, 28-29, 557 F. Supp. 583, 586 (1982) (citing United States v. Ricard-Brewster Oil Co., 29 CCPA 192, C.A.D. 191 (1942); Garret-Hewitt Int'l v. United States, 65 Cust.Ct. 656, C.D. 4154 (1970). Even if this Court were to interpret a statute differently, in a first instance situation, if an interpretation of a statute by an agency charged with its execution is reasonable, it should be followed unless there are compelling indications the interpretation is wrong.