Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2525-13T4
06-17-2015
EARL LOCKAMY, Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and EAGLE CHAUFFEURED SERVICES INC., Respondents.
Earl Lockamy, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Francesco Ferrantelli, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondent Eagle Chauffeured Services Inc. has not filed a brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Haas and Higbee. On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 433,658. Earl Lockamy, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Francesco Ferrantelli, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondent Eagle Chauffeured Services Inc. has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Appellant appeals from the December 27, 2013 decision of the Board of Review (Board) affirming a decision of the Appeal Tribunal that he was disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) because he left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work. We affirm.
Appellant was employed as a driver by Eagle Chauffeured Services Inc. (Eagle) from October 2002, until he quit his job on May 24, 2013. Up until August 2012, appellant had no problems with his employer.
On August 16, 2012, however, appellant alleged he injured his shoulder while changing a tire. Appellant reported the incident to his supervisor and stated he needed to see a doctor. The supervisor agreed, but appellant testified Eagle did not report the injury to its workers' compensation carrier. As a result, appellant did not receive medical attention. Although appellant did not miss any work as a result of his injury, he maintained that he continued to suffer pain in his shoulder.
Appellant testified that he contacted his attorney, who sent a letter to Eagle on October 28, 2012, demanding that it report the injury to the insurance carrier. The attorney stated that if Eagle failed to do so, appellant would "seek[] medical treatment for which [Eagle] will be responsible." However, appellant did not see a doctor for his condition.
On December 16, 2012, appellant stated he re-injured his shoulder while carrying luggage. Eagle submitted this claim to its insurance carrier and appellant began receiving treatment for his shoulder in January 2013. An MRI revealed that appellant had a ruptured and separated rotator cuff, which required surgery in March 2013.
Appellant testified that his doctor cleared him to return to work without any restrictions on May 23, 2013. However, on May 24, 2013, appellant told Eagle's "Quality Control" supervisor that he was quitting his job. Appellant explained "that [he] did not want to come back to work with them because [he] didn't believe [he] would be responsibly supervised in the future; that something like this would happen[] again." Appellant conceded that work was available to him at the time he quit and his job was not in jeopardy.
Appellant filed an application for unemployment benefits, which was denied by a deputy on July 11, 2013 because appellant had left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work. Appellant appealed and the Appeal Tribunal affirmed the denial of benefits. The Appeal Tribunal stated:
While i[t] is unfortunate the employer for reasons unknown failed to react to [appellant's] initial requests for medical attention for a properly reported work[-] related injury[, t]he issue was eventually resolved properly. [Appellant] had no issues with the employer prior to the work injury. The employer had no problems with [appellant] prior to the work injury. While it is understandable the experience may have
left [appellant] with bad feelings toward the employer[, appellant's] leaving due to fear the employer [might] act inappropriately toward him in the future, is speculative. [Appellant's] reason for leaving is not: compelling, reasonable, material, and substantial.
In a decision dated December 27, 2013, the Board upheld the Appeal Tribunal's decision. This appeal followed.
On appeal, appellant argues that he had good cause to leave his employment because of his belief that his employer would not handle a future workers' compensation claim properly if he was again injured on the job. We disagree.
Our review of an administrative agency decision is limited. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). "'[I]n reviewing the factual findings made in an unemployment compensation proceeding, the test is not whether [we] would come to the same conclusion if the original determination was [ours] to make, but rather whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs.'" Ibid. (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of Review, 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985)). "If the Board's factual findings are supported 'by sufficient credible evidence, [we] are obliged to accept them.'" Ibid. (quoting Self v. Bd. of Review, 91 N.J. 453, 459 (1982)). Only if the Board's "action was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable" should it be disturbed. Ibid.
An employee is disqualified for benefits:
For the week in which the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, and for each week thereafter until the individual becomes reemployed and works eight weeks in employment[.]An employee who has left work voluntarily has the burden of proving that he or she "did so with good cause attributable to work." Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 218; N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(c).
[N .J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).]
"While the statute does not define 'good cause,' our courts have construed the statute to mean 'cause sufficient to justify an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks of the unemployed.'" Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 192 N.J. Super. 284, 287 (App. Div. 1983) (quoting Condo v. Bd. of Review, 158 N.J. Super. 172, 174 (App. Div. 1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b) defines "'good cause attributable to such work'" as "a reason related directly to the individual's employment, which was so compelling as to give the individual no choice but to leave the employment."
Here, the determination that appellant left work without good cause attributable to the work is amply supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole and is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Appellant testified that his sole reason for quitting his job was because he was dissatisfied with how Eagle handled his initial workers' compensation claim. However, it is well-established that "'[m]ere dissatisfaction with working conditions which are not shown to be abnormal or do not affect health, does not constitute good cause for leaving work voluntarily.'" Domenico v. Bd. of Review, supra, 192 N.J. Super. at 288 (quoting Medwick v. Bd. of Review, 69 N.J. Super. 338, 345 (App. Div. 1961)).
"'The decision to leave employment must be compelled by real, substantial and reasonable circumstances . . . attributable to the work.'" Shuster v. Bd. of Review, 396 N.J. Super. 240, 244-45 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Fernandez v. Bd. of Review, 304 N.J. Super. 603, 606 (App. Div. 1997)). "[I]t is the employee's responsibility to do what is necessary and reasonable in order to remain employed." Domenico, supra, 192 N.J. Super. at 288.
Although Eagle may not have reported the August 2012 incident to its insurance carrier, appellant was not without a remedy. As his attorney stated in his October 28, 2012 letter, appellant could have sought medical treatment and billed Eagle. N.J.S.A. 34:15-15. Appellant's attorney also could have pursued appropriate monetary penalties for Eagle's inaction. N.J.S.A. 34:15-28.1. Moreover, appellant conceded that Eagle properly reported his December 2012 injury and the matter was handled properly thereafter.
Thus, as the Appeal Tribunal found, appellant's concern that Eagle would not report a future injury to its carrier was "speculative" and did not provide him with good cause to leave his job "for no employment at all." Zielenski v. Board of Review, 85 N.J. Super. 46, 52 (App. Div. 1964). Under these circumstances, and mindful of our deferential standard of review, we discern no basis for disturbing the Board's determination that appellant left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION