After citing Maddie, the trial court asserted that Owens “failed to plead specific facts that the defendant either (1) consciously desired the physical result of his act or (2) knew that the result was substantially certain to follow from his conduct.” Based on this analysis, the trial court then found that Owens did not have a right of action to proceed in tort and his exclusive remedy is workers' compensation citing Lloyd v. Shady Lake Nursing Home, Inc., 47,025 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/9/12), 92 So.3d 560, writ denied, 12–1318 (La.9/28/12), 98 So.3d 844 and Lloyd's citation to footnote 2 in Brewton v. Underwriters Ins. Co., 02–2852 (La.6/27/03), 848 So.2d 586 . In Lloyd, 92 So.3d 560, a widower and children brought a wrongful death action against the decedent wife's former employer, a nursing home.
As a court of general jurisdiction, the district court has jurisdiction over a claim generally related to workers' compensation unless the legislature, through some specific provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, designated the claim a workers' compensation matter or otherwise granted hearing officers (workers' compensation judges) authority to adjudicate the claim. Lloyd v. Shady Lake Nursing Home, Inc., 47,025 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/9/12), 92 So.3d 560, 564, writ denied, 2012-1318 (La. 9/28/12), 98 So.3d 844.
Because it is a court of general jurisdiction, the 4th Judicial District Court had jurisdiction over Mr. Palowsky's underlying lawsuit in the Cork case. See , Lloyd v. Shady Lake Nursing Home, Inc. , 47,025 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/9/12), 92 So.3d 560, 564, writ denied , 12-1318 (La. 9/28/12), 98 So.3d 844. As a Supernumerary Judge pro tempore for the 4th Judicial District Court, Judge Jones was generally empowered to discuss legal issues pending before the Court and to assist in the case-deciding process.
enied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment at the initial hearing date, rather than giving the parties additional time to supplement their evidentiary filings, plaintiff could have filed a subsequent motion for summary judgment addressing the same issue(s), this time with the proper documentary evidence. Because a party may re-urge a previously denied motion for summary judgment, the initial denial of summary judgment on an issue does not bar a second motion for summary judgment on the same issue. Simpson v. Davidson, 35,048 (La.App.2d Cir.10/31/01), 799 So.2d 652 ; Gailey v. Barnett, 12–0830 (La.App. 4th Cir.12/05/12), 106 So.3d 625, writ denied,12–2761 (La.02/22/13), 108 So.3d 770 ; State ex rel. Div. of Admin., Office of Risk Management v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Louisiana, 10–0689 (La.App. 1st Cir.02/11/11), 56 So.3d 1236, writ denied, 11–0849 (La.06/03/11), 63 So.3d 1023. As noted by this court in Lloyd v. Shady Lake Nursing Home, Inc., 47,025 (La.App.2d Cir.05/09/12), 92 So.3d 560, writ denied,12–1318 (La.09/28/12), 98 So.3d 844, the denial of a motion for summary judgment is merely an interlocutory ruling that does not bar reconsideration of the same issues raised in the unsuccessful motion. In this case, the trial court's decision to continue the matter to a later date rather than denying summary judgment initially, then requiring plaintiff to refile for summary judgment, something that would be costly and time consuming, was well within its discretion.