Opinion
3:99-CV-51 (DF)
December 6, 2001
ORDER
Plaintiff brought this employment discrimination action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981, alleging that she was suspended and later terminated because of her age and race and that she was retaliated against for filing a charge of discrimination. Plaintiff also asserted a state-law claim for breach of contract. On March 30, 2001, the Court entered an order granting summary judgment for Defendants on the federal-law claims, dismissing the state-law claim without prejudice, and denying Defendants' motion for sanctions under Rule 11. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Court's order in an opinion dated September 19, 2001. Before the Court is Defendants' motion for attorney fees and expenses (tab #89).
Each law under which Plaintiff sued has its own provision governing awards of attorney fees and expenses. For claims brought under Title VII, the prevailing party may be awarded a reasonable amount of attorney fees, including expert fees, as part of the costs. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k) (West 1994). For claims brought under the ADEA, a plaintiff who has been awarded a judgment may recover a reasonable amount of attorney fees from the defendant. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (West 1998). Although the ADEA does not specifically authorize prevailing defendants to recover attorney fees, the Eleventh Circuit has held that prevailing defendants may be awarded attorney fees in certain circumstances. See Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co ., 135 F.3d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1998). Finally, for claims brought under § 1981, the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 provides that the prevailing party may be awarded a reasonable amount of attorney fees as part of the costs. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988(b) (West Supp. 2001).
The ADEA incorporates the enforcement provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(b) (West 1999).
Although prevailing plaintiffs ordinarily should be awarded attorney fees and expenses, prevailing defendants must satisfy an exceedingly stringent standard before they may recover attorney fees and expenses. For example, a prevailing Title VII defendant must show that the plaintiff's claim was "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC , 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978). Similarly, a prevailing § 1981 defendant must show that the plaintiff's claim was "vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or embarrass the defendant." Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 429 n. 2 (1983) (citing Christiansburg Garment Co ., 434 U.S. at 421). Finally, a prevailing ADEA defendant must show that the plaintiff litigated in bad faith. See Turlington , 135 F.3d at 1437.
Because Defendants clearly qualify as prevailing parties, see Head v. Medford , 62 F.3d 351, 355 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that a defendant qualifies as a prevailing party when the district court grants summary judgment in its favor on the federal-law claims and dismisses the state-law claims without prejudice), they are entitled to an award of attorney fees and expenses if they can satisfy the standards described above. Defendants cannot do so. In the order denying Defendants' motion for sanctions, the Court specifically found that Plaintiff's claims were not frivolous. Moreover, Defendants have not argued that Plaintiff litigated in bad faith, and the Court has no reason to believe that she did. Thus, it is inappropriate to award attorney fees and expenses to Defendants because a finding that Plaintiff's claims were frivolous or litigated in bad faith would be inconsistent with the facts and the Court's order denying Defendants' motion for sanctions. Accordingly, Defendants' motion is DENIED.
This decision, of course, has no bearing on whether Defendants are entitled to recover their costs.
SO ORDERED.