Opinion
C.A. No. 98C-12-266-JRJ
Date Submitted: June 29, 2001
Date Decided: July 24, 2001
On Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial — DENIED.
F. Philip Renzulli, Esquire Marks, Feiner Fridkin 1211 King Street Wilmington, DE 19806
Christopher Logullo, Esquire Chrissinger Baumberger Three Mill Road, Suite 301 Wilmington, DE 19801
Dear Counsel:
Christina Lloyd ("Plaintiff' or "Lloyd") has filed a Motion for New Trial pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 59. This case arises from an automobile accident which occurred on December 29, 1996 on northbound Interstate 95 at the Interstate 295 split. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Harold Edward Tharpe, Jr. ("Tharpe"), acting as an agent, servant and/or employee of Great Coastal Express, Inc. ("Great Coastal"), in the course and scope of his employment, followed too closely behind Plaintiff and struck the back of her vehicle when Plaintiff braked to avoid obstacles in the roadway ahead of her. Plaintiff claimed she sustained soft tissue injuries to her neck and back as a result of the collision with Tharpe.
The collision between Plaintiff and Tharpe was the last event in a chain of events which began when Third Party Defendant Ioulia Dolinnaya ("Dolinnaya") suddenly attempted to cross several lanes of traffic on I-95 and I-295 to reach the shoulder. When Dolinnaya abruptly changed lanes at a speed of approximately 55 — 60 miles per hour, she collided with a tractor trailer operated by Robert Alderson ("Alderson"). Alderson slammed on his brakes, causing his truck to skid, jackknife and strike a tight pole. The light pole fell across two lanes of I-295. Plaintiff saw these events unfold and braked her vehicle to avoid hitting the light pole. Tharpe, who was traveling behind Lloyd, saw these events, saw Lloyd brake, and attempted to avoid hitting Lloyd's vehicle by moving to the right and braking. As he did so, the left front of Tharpe's truck struck the rear of Plaintiff's vehicle.
The matter was tried to a jury over three days. At the close of defendants' case, defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of negligence. The Court reserved decision on the motion and allowed the case to go to the jury. On June 20, 2001, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants, finding that defendants were not negligent in a manner that proximately caused injury to Plaintiff Plaintiff has filed a Motion for New Trial pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 59 on the ground that the jury's verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial is DENIED.
The Trial
On direct examination, Plaintiff described the events giving rise to the accident but was unable to recall many of the specifics. She acknowledged that she did not know the distance between her vehicle and Tharpe's truck when she first applied her brakes. She also conceded she did not know her speed at the time she braked. On cross-examination, Plaintiff's credibility was called into question more than once. Defendants pointed out that there was a fairly substantial delay from the time of the accident until Plaintiff first sought treatment. Defendants also established that Plaintiff failed to return to work even after her physician released her to light duty. Finally, Defendants established that Plaintiff made a claim for personal injuries against Dolinnaya and obtained a settlement from Dolinnaya before trial.
In sharp contrast to Plaintiff; Tharpe offered a clear and thorough description of the key events. He testified on direct examination that at the time of the accident he had been employed by Great Coastal for 17 years and had been driving tractor trailers for 30 years. Tharpe described the sequence of events that led up to the collision between his tractor trailer and Plaintiff's vehicle. Tharpe testified that when Dolinnaya crossed over several lanes from I-95 to the I-295 shoulder, she struck a tractor trailer truck ahead of Tharpe's tractor trailer. The tractor trailer (driven by Alderson) veered to the right, locked its brakes, started to skid. jackknifed, and then hit a light pole. The light pole then fell across the lanes of I-295. Tharpe saw Lloyd "hard brake" in response to these rapidly occurring events. Tharpe braked and looked to his left to see if he could change lanes safely. He decided he could not move into the left lane safely because of the traffic flow in that lane. He then decided to attempt to move right to avoid the Plaintiff who was braking ahead of him. As Tharpe attempted to move into the right lane, the left fender of his truck hit the rear of Plaintiff's vehicle.
Tharpe testified that he did not know the distance between his vehicle and Plaintiff's vehicle at the time he began braking, but he felt comfortable and safe with the distance between the two vehicles. Tharpe testified that to brake safely for a sudden emergency given the conditions on the day of this accident he required 400-500 feet. However, he also stated that if he left that much distance between his truck and the vehicle ahead of him, it posed a traffic hazard to himself and other motorists because, in his 30 years of trucking experience, he had learned that other vehicles would cut in between him and the vehicle ahead. This testimony was unrebutted.
Dolinnaya testified (by videotape deposition) that she was traveling from Washington, D.C. to New York and this was the first time she had traveled this route. She testified that I-95 was busy. She also testified that the highway divided suddenly and she decided at the last minute to pull over to the right shoulder of I-295 to check her map. Dolinnaya described how she collided with Alderson's tractor trailer when she made her sudden decision to cross several lanes of traffic to reach the I-295 shoulder.
The only evidence of the distance between plaintiff's vehicle and Tharpe's truck was offered indirectly in Defendants' case through the videotaped testimony of Alderson, the driver of the tractor trailer truck that collided with Dolinnaya's vehicle. Alderson testified, with some reservation about his ability to estimate accurately because "everything was happening so fast," that his truck was about three truck lengths ahead of Tharpe's truck at the time of the Dolinnaya-Alderson collision. In closing argument, Plaintiff extrapolated from this testimony to suggest that because Plaintiff's vehicle was ahead of Tharpe's truck, Tharpe must have been less than three truck lengths behind Plaintiff. Plaintiff thus argued that Tharpe was negligent for following too closely.
At the close of the evidence, the Court read several jury instructions which emphasized the jury's role in determining and assessing the credibility of witnesses. The Court advised the jury that it could disregard a witness' testimony if it determined the testimony was not credible. The Court also told the jury that in determining credibility, it should consider, among other things, the witness' "means of knowledge," "strength of memory," "manner or demeanor," and "all circumstances that, according to the evidence, could affect the credibility of the testimony." The Court further instructed the jury about Defendants' third party claim against Dolinnaya and that Plaintiff had already settled her claim against Dolinnaya. With respect to negligence, the Court instructed that "[t]he mere fact that an accident occurred does not mean that someone was negligent. There may have been an unavoidable accident for which no party is responsible."
On the issue of sudden emergency, the parties agreed to a jury instruction that provided, "if you find that defendant Harold Tharpe was operating his vehicle in a reasonably prudent manner and was faced with a sudden emergency situation, then I instruct you that defendant Harold Tharpe was not required to act as a reasonable person who had sufficient time and opportunity to consider what the best course of action would be, but instead that he was required only to react as a reasonable person would under the circumstances." With respect to proximate cause, the jury was instructed that "harm" "directly produced" by an accident which "but for" the accident would not have occurred is, by law, harm "proximately caused" by the accident. Plaintiff did not object to any of these instructions.
Motion for New Trial
Plaintiff argues that the defense verdict is against the great weight of the evidence because Tharpe testified that he did not have enough time and distance to brake his truck in a manner that avoided hitting Plaintiff's vehicle. Plaintiff contends that this testimony amounts to an admission of negligence. Plaintiff also argues the jury verdict was against the great weight of the evidence because (1) Tharpe testified he required a braking distance of 400-500 feet in order to stop safely for a sudden emergency; (2) Alderson said Tharpe was three truck lengths behind him; (3) Tharpe testified Lloyd was ahead of him; and (4) Tharpe testified his tractor trailer was 60-70 feet long. Based on this testimony, Plaintiff argues that Tharpe must have been following at a distance of less than 400-500 feet and was therefore negligent.
Defendants argue that the mere fact there was a collision between Tharpe's and Lloyd's vehicles does not mean Tharpe was negligent. Defendants point out that Alderson's testimony about the distance between his truck and Tharpe's was only an estimate, that Alderson testified he never saw Lloyd's vehicle in his rear view mirror, and that Alderson admitted he did not see the Lloyd-Tharpe collision. Defendants also point out that neither party testified as to the distance between their vehicles, but Tharpe, an experienced trucker, said he felt safe and comfortable with it. According to Defendants, the evidence indicated "that a sudden emergency and/or unavoidable accident occurred when the accident between Dolinnaya and Alderson caused a light pole to fall across I-295." Defendants contend the evidence clearly showed Tharpe did not create the sudden emergency and acted reasonably in response to the emergency.
When considering a Motion for New Trial under Rule 59, the Court is mindful that "[t]raditionally the Court's power to grant a new trial has been exercised cautiously with extreme deference to the findings of the jury." A trial judge is permitted to set aside a jury verdict only when in his or her judgment it is at least against the great weight of the evidence. Thus, on weight of the evidence motions, "barring exceptional circumstances, a trial judge should not set aside a jury verdict on such grounds unless, on a review of all the evidence, the evidence preponderates so heavily against the jury verdict that a reasonable jury could not have reached a result."
Maier v. Santucci, Del. Supr., 697 A.2d 747, 749 (1997) (citation omitted).
Storey v. Camper, Del. Supr., 401 A.2d 458, 465 (1979) (citation omitted).
Id.
There is little question that Dolinnaya's self-described "sudden" multiple lane change was a proximate cause of this accident. There is also little question that Dolinnaya's conduct alone proximately caused a "sudden emergency" — the collision with Alderson's vehicle which, in turn, caused the light pole to break and fall on I-295. The questions then are, did Tharpe act reasonably when presented with the sudden emergency and was he following too closely?
The great weight of the evidence suggests Tharpe did act reasonably under the circumstances and was not following too closely. Tharpe's testimony on the efforts he made to avoid hitting Lloyd's vehicle after the Dolinnaya-Alderson collision was unrefuted. He looked left, decided he could not safely move into the lane to his left, looked right, and decided that the safest evasive maneuver under the exigent circumstances was to move to the right. The only evidence proffered by Plaintiff to prove that Tharpe did not act reasonably, and that his wrongful conduct was a proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries, was the fact that he collided with Plaintiff's vehicle and Alderson's less than emphatic estimate about the distance between his truck and Tharpe' s. Alderson acknowledged he was occupied responding to the rapidly developing emergency ahead of him when he looked in his rearview mirror and saw Tharpe's truck behind him.
The mere fact that there was a collision between Tharpe's truck and Plaintiff's vehicle, in light of all the other circumstances and the chain of events sparked by Dolinnaya's conduct, was insufficient to prove negligence on Tharpe's behalf In short, just because Tharpe hit Plaintiff's vehicle or he was less than 400-500 feet behind Plaintiff does not mean he acted unreasonably or was following too closely. Tharpe played no role in the sudden emergency presented by Dolinnaya's abrupt and unsafe lane changes, and had no obligation to anticipate Dolinnaya's negligence. Given the circumstances, the accident was unavoidable.
See Panaro v. Cullen, Del. Supr., 185 A.2d 889, 891 (1962)
Id.
See Miller v. Miller, Del. Supr., No. 208, 86, Christie, C.J. (February 25, 1987) (ORDER) ( 1987 WL 36710).
Id.
Based on the testimony at trial, the great weight of the evidence established Tharpe acted reasonably when faced with an emergency situation. Moreover, the jury may have inferred from Tharpe's testimony that, absent his significant trucking experience and his quick and considered reaction, there could have been far more vehicles involved in the collision and far greater injury to Plaintiff and other individuals.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein the Court finds that the jury's verdict is not against the great weight of the evidence and, therefore, Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.