Opinion
7203 Index 570427/17 66968/14
10-02-2018
In re 92 COOPER ASSOC., LLC, Petitioner–Respondent–Appellant, v. Peggy ROUGHTON-HESTER also known as Peggy Maloof, Respondent-Appellant-Respondent.
Himmelstein, McConnell, Gribben, Donoghue & Joseph LLP, New York (William Gribben, New York, of counsel), for appellant-respondent. Sperber Denenberg & Kahan, PC, New York (Eric Kahan, New York, of counsel), for respondent-appellant.
Himmelstein, McConnell, Gribben, Donoghue & Joseph LLP, New York (William Gribben, New York, of counsel), for appellant-respondent.
Sperber Denenberg & Kahan, PC, New York (Eric Kahan, New York, of counsel), for respondent-appellant.
Renwick, J.P., Gische, Kahn, Kern, Moulton, JJ.
Order of the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court, First Department, entered December 4, 2017, which reversed a judgment of the Civil Court, New York County (Jean Schneider, J.), entered on or about November 7, 2016, after a nonjury trial, awarding possession of the subject rent-stabilized apartment to petitioner landlord in this nonprimary residence holdover proceeding, and directed a new trial, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs and the judgment of possession awarded in favor of petitioner landlord reinstated. The clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
The trial court's determination that respondent did not utilize the subject apartment as a primary residence was based on a fair interpretation of the evidence, including respondent's testimony that she spent only 139 and 161 days in the apartment in 2012 and 2013, respectively, and used a Pennsylvania address on her tax returns and voter registration records. Although other records listed the apartment as respondent's address, the trial court properly concluded that she did not maintain a substantial physical nexus with the apartment during the relevant period. Since the trial court's findings were supported by a fair interpretation of the evidence, Appellate Term and this Court may not substitute their own views of the trial evidence (see 409–411 Sixth St., LLC v. Mogi, 22 N.Y.3d 875, 976 N.Y.S.2d 681, 999 N.E.2d 159 [2013] ; Matter of Houston St. Mgt. Co. v. La Croix, 158 A.D.3d 554, 71 N.Y.S.3d 468 [1st Dept. 2018] ; Matter of 135 W. 13 LLC v. Stollerman, 151 A.D.3d 598, 55 N.Y.S.3d 52 [1st Dept. 2017] ).
In the context of a housing dispute over a tenant's statutory rights of occupancy, no single factor "shall be" dispositive of the issue of primary residence, including the place of residence identified on a tax return ( 9 NYCRR 2520.6 [u][1] ). It is but one factor to be considered in resolving the dispute and determining that issue ( Matter of Brookford, LLC v. New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 31 N.Y.3d 679, 82 N.Y.S.3d 788, 107 N.E.3d 1258 [2018], 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 04381, 2018 WL 2974438 ; compare Mahoney–Buntzman v. Buntzman, 12 N.Y.3d 415, 881 N.Y.S.2d 369, 909 N.E.2d 62 [2009] )
Notwithstanding the trial court's use of the word "dispositive" in its decision, it is evident from the four corners of the trial court's order that respondent's tax returns and voter registration records were not, in fact, the sole factors it considered in deciding that respondent does not maintain the apartment as her primary residence.