Articles 24 and 26 of Maryland Declaration of Rights are the state constitutional counterparts to the Fourteenth and Fourth Amendments, respectively, and both provisions are ordinarily interpreted in pari materia with their federal analogs. See, e.g., Littleton v. Swonger, 502 Fed.Appx. 271, 274 (4th Cir.2012) (โArticles 24 and 26 are construed in pari materia with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitutionโ); McDaniel v. Arnold, 898 F.Supp.2d 809, 847โ48 (D.Md.2012); Dent v. Montgomery Cnty. Police Dep't, 745 F.Supp.2d 648, 661 (D.Md.2010) (Articles 24 and 26 โare construed in pari materia with the Fourteenth and Fourth Amendments of the United States Constitution, respectivelyโ); Doe v. Dep't of Pub. Safety and Corr. Servs., 185 Md.App. 625, 636, 971 A.2d 975, 982 (2009) (Article 24 โis in pari materia with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendmentโ); Padilla v. State, 180 Md.App. 210, 226, 949 A.2d 68, 78 (cataloging cases and stating that โthe cases are legion in which Maryland Courts have construed Article 26in pari materia with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitutionโ), cert. denied,405 Md. 507, 954 A.2d 468 (2008). Of import here, however, qualified immunity is not a defense to an excessive force claim brought under Articles 24 and 26 of t
These claims can be analyzed together, because Article 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights are interpreted in pari materia with the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Littleton v. Swonger, 502 Fed. App'x 271, 274 (4th Cir. 2019).
Article 24 is ordinarily interpreted in pari materia with its federal analog. See, e.g., Lewis, 2024 WL 1609101, at *6 n.4; Littleton v. Swonger, 502 Fed.Appx. 271, 274 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating that Article 24 is โconstrued in pari materia with the . . . Fourteenth Amendment[ ]โ); Dent v. Montgomery Cty. Police Dept., 745 F.Supp.2d 648, 661 (D. Md. 2010) (stating that Article 24 is โconstrued in pari materia with the . . . Fourteenth Amendment[ ]โ); Tyler v. City of College Park, 415 Md. 475, 499-500, 3 A.3d 421, 435 (2010)
However, the federal law doctrine of qualified immunity is not a defense to claims brought under the Maryland Declaration of Rights. See, e.g., Littleton v. Swonger, 502 Fed.Appx. 271, 274 n.2 (4th Cir. 2012); Richardson v. Orangeburg Sch. Dist. No. 1, 53 F.3d 329 (table), 1995 WL 255941, at *3 n.2 (4th Cir. 1995); Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 201, 757 A.2d 118, 140 (2000); Thacker v. City of Hyattsville, 135 Md.App. 268, 290, 762 A.2d 172, 183-84 (2000).
Count III of the Amended Complaint brings a malicious prosecution claim against all four Defendants under Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. As Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights โare construed in pari materia with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, โ Littleton v. Swonger, 502 Fed. App'x. 271, 274 (4th Cir. 2012), the elements of malicious prosecution and the standard for probable cause are identical to the federal constitutional claim. See Humbert, 866 F.3d at 561 n.7; e.g., Veney v. Prince George's Cnty., No. 1313, Sept. Term 2016, 2018 WL 1778644, at **2-4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2018).
Doe v. Dep'tof Pub. Safety andCorr. Servs., 185 Md.App. 625, 636, 971 A.2d 975, 982 (2009); see Littleton v. Swonger, 502 Fed.Appx. 271, 274 (4th Cir. 2012); Dent v. Montgomery Cnty. Police Dep 't, 745 F.Supp.2d 648, 661 (D. Md. 2010). Accordingly, the due process claims under State law go the way of the ยง 1983 claims premised on due process.
Thus, Article 24 is ordinarily interpreted in pari materia with its federal counterpart. See Tyler v. City of College Park, 415 Md. 475, 499-500, 3 A.3d 421, 435 (2010) (recognizing that Maryland courts "interpret Article 24 in pari materia with the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution."); see also Littleton v. Swonger, 502 F. App'x 271, 274 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating that Article 24 is "construed in pari materia with the . . . Fourteenth Amendment[]"); Meyers v. Balt. Cty., 981 F. Supp. 2d 422, 430 (D. Md. 2013); Dent v. Montgomery Cty. Police Dept., 745 F. Supp. 2d 648, 661 (D. Md. 2010); Doe v. Dept. of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 185 Md. App. 625, 636, 971 A.2d 975, 982 (2009).
With respect to Cottman's claims against Crowder under Articles 16, 24, 25, and 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Counts One, Two & Three), Warden Crowder's qualified immunity argument is equally unsuccessful as qualified immunity is not a defense to claims under the Maryland Constitution. See Jones, 2017 WL 2472220, at *33 (citing Littleton v. Swonger, 502 F. App'x 271, 274 & n. 2 (4th Cir. 2012)).
I note that qualified immunity is only a defense to the ยง 1983 claims against the Individual Defendants, and not the state constitutional tort claims against the State. See Littleton v. Swonger, 502 F. App'x 271, 274 & n.2 (4th Cir. 2012); Jones v. Chapman, No. ELH-14-2627, 2017 WL 2472220, at *33 (D. Md. June 7, 2017); Okwa v. Harper, 757 A.2d 118, 140 (Md. 2000). 2. Counts I, II, and III
With respect to Younger's claims against Crowder under Articles 16, 24, and 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Counts Two & Three), Crowder's qualified immunity argument is equally unsuccessful as qualified immunity is not a defense to claims under the Maryland Constitution. See Jones, 2017 WL 2472220, at *33 (citing Littleton v. Swonger, 502 F. App'x 271, 274 & n. 2 (4th Cir. 2012)).