Opinion
C. A. 23-2082-RMG-PJG
07-20-2023
David Antonio Little, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Sheriff Deputy Marc Weiss; Sheriff Deputy Clay Sikes; Sheriff Deputy Spence Vaughn; Sheriff James Dixon; Jail Admin Sheila Buckman; Jailer Marcia Marine; Nurse Genie Chisholms; Major Teal; Jailer Taylor McQueen; Chesterfield County Sheriff's Office, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff David Antonio Little, Jr., a self-represented state prisoner, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A. By order dated May 18, 2023, the court provided Plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint to correct deficiencies identified by the court that would warrant summary dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to § 1915A. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on June 9, 2023. (ECF No. 17.) Having reviewed the Amended Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes the Amended Complaint still fails to state a viable claim and should be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance of service of process.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff raises various civil rights claims arising out of his detention at the Chesterfield County Detention Center. Plaintiff alleges that on March 9, 2021, he got into an altercation with Defendants Marcia Marine, Clay Sikes, and Spence Vaughn, who are detention center officers. Plaintiff alleges that he needed to make a phone call and Marine dialed wrong numbers on the phone to annoy Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that Sikes and Vaughn then showed up to arrest Plaintiff without warning, and Vaughn unnecessarily pushed Plaintiff while Plaintiff was trying to explain the situation to him. Plaintiff alleges he hit Vaughn in response and then also hit Sikes because he believed Sikes would taser him. Plaintiff further alleges he needed medical attention after the altercation, but he was not allowed to see the nurse until the next day. Plaintiff alleges he eventually developed a staph infection on his right ankle.
Plaintiff also alleges that he was placed in max segregation in retaliation for the incident and was not given a disciplinary hearing or an incident report. Plaintiff further alleges was criminally charged with assault and resisting arrest and convicted of those charges. Plaintiff alleges the defendants conspired against him because they altered a videotape of the incident that was used at trial and several of the defendants lied on the witness stand when they testified against him.
Plaintiff claims the defendants violated numerous constitutional provisions. Plaintiff expressly asserts that he was falsely convicted of the assault and resisting arrest charges, the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, he was denied due process when he was placed in max segregation, and the defendants conspired against him and neglected to prevent the conspiracy. He seeks damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986.
II. Discussion
The court finds that despite having availed himself of the opportunity to cure the deficiencies previously identified by the court, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint should nonetheless be summarily dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Plaintiff indicates that he raises claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. Section 1983 “ ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.' ” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Meanwhile, § 1985 allows a plaintiff to recover for damages arising out of a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law. A Soc'y Without A Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011). Section 1986, in turn, allows a plaintiff to seek damages against a party who neglects to prevent a conspiracy to violate a person's rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Trerice v. Summons, 755 F.2d 1081, 1085 (4th Cir. 1985).
Plaintiff claims that some of the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, but he fails to plausibly allege that any of the defendants were aware that he may develop a staph infection, or that this lack of treatment until the day after the incident was the cause of his staph infection. See generally Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (stating that to proceed with a claim that officials were deliberate indifferent to an inmate's needs in violation, the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) objectively, the deprivation suffered or injury inflicted was “sufficiently serious,” and (2) subjectively, the prison officials acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.”); Anderson v. Kingsley, 877 F.3d 539, 545 (4th Cir. 2017) (“In sum, the ‘deliberate indifference' defined by Farmer may be characterized by three components: (1) the subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the conscious disregard of that risk; and (3) the absence of intent to cause the harm risked. More concisely, Farmer defines deliberate indifference as the intentional taking of a risk that the defendant knows might cause harm while lacking any intent to cause such harm.”). Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a deliberate indifference claim upon which relief can be granted.
Plaintiff also claims he was falsely convicted of assault and resisting arrest because some of the defendants conspired to alter a video of the incident and lied on the witness stand at trial. However, these claims cannot be raised in a civil rights action for damages unless Plaintiff successfully challenges those convictions. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (holding a state prisoner's claim for damages is not cognizable under § 1983 where success of the action would implicitly question the validity of the conviction or duration of the sentence, unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has been previously invalidated). Also, the defendants would be immune from suit for their testimony in a criminal trial. See generally Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 367 (2012) (stating witnesses have absolute immunity from lawsuits for damages for statements made in the court of a judicial proceeding; Day v. Johns Hopkins Health Sys. Corp., 907 F.3d 766, 771 (4th Cir. 2018) (same). Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence, or a similar constitutional claim upon which relief can be granted.
Plaintiff further claims he was deprived of due process when he was placed in max segregation without a disciplinary hearing. However, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that any of the named defendants were personally responsible for that deprivation. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (providing that a plaintiff in a § 1983 action must plead that the defendant, through his own individual actions, violated the Constitution); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (“In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be ‘affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights. The doctrine of respondeat superior has no application under this section.' ”) (quoting Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977)). Plaintiff appears to assert that Defendant Shiela Buckman is liable for this purported deprivation because she is the jail administrator, but Plaintiff fails to allege that she was personally involved in any decision not to provide Plaintiff with disciplinary hearing. See Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 171 (4th Cir. 2018) (“Importantly, mere knowledge of such a deprivation does not suffice.”); Wright, 766 F.2d at 850 (providing the defendant must have “personal knowledge of and involvement in the alleged deprivation” of the plaintiff's rights to be liable under § 1983). Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a due process claim upon which relief can be granted.
Finally, Plaintiff generally claims the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to deprive him of his rights and neglected to prevent a conspiracy, but his claims are conclusory and lack any specific factual support. See A Soc'y Without A Name, 655 F.3d at 346 (“We have specifically rejected section 1985 claims whenever the purported conspiracy is alleged in a merely conclusory manner, in the absence of concrete supporting facts.”) (quoting Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1376 (4th Cir. 1995)); see also Strickland v. United States, 32 F.4th 311, 361 (4th Cir. 2022) (stating that to demonstrate a conspiracy, the plaintiff must allege a “single plan, the essential nature and scope of which was known to each person who is to be held responsible for its consequences); Trerice, 755 F.2d at 1085 (stating that a cause of action under § 1986 is dependent upon the existence of a claim under § 1985). Consequently, Plaintiff fails to state a § 1985 or § 1986 claim upon which relief can be granted.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the court recommends that this case be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 901 Richland Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).