Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-0953-M
January 7, 2002
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
By Order of Reference dated November 29, 2001, the United States District Court referred Defendants District Judges Paul Banner and John Ovard's Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6), filed November 26, 2001, to the undersigned United States Magistrate for findings and recommendation.
Background
This lawsuit arises from the state court litigation of various causes of action to which the plaintiff was a party. In his forty-seven page First Amended Complaint, the plaintiff alleges inter alia that he was the victim of a conspiracy carried out by a group of state court judges and local law firms. Among those state court judges named as defendants are the movants herein, Judge Paul Banner and Judge John Ovard ("Defendant Judges"). Further, the plaintiff alleges that Judge Banner lost his bid for re-election, therefore qualifying as a "former judge," and that he acted as "little more than a henchman" to the other alleged co-conspirator judges and attorneys. Plaintiff's primary allegation against Judge Ovard is that he improperly assigned Judge Banner to preside over a portion of the plaintiffs case. The plaintiff seeks to stay the proceedings that are currently pending before the Defendant Judge(s), and requests a "declaration of void process of the state courts complained of."
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, p. 21.
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, p. 3, 21.
Although it is slightly unclear, it appears as though the plaintiff is arguing that Judge Banner's rulings should be rendered void because he lacked "subject matter jurisdiction" due to the fact that he was assigned by Judge Ovard, and was not the original judge presiding over the case. In any event, the plaintiff fails to substantiate his claims, offering only conclusory allegations of conspiracy and impropriety.
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, p. 21, 29.
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, p. 45.
In his forty-seven page First Amended Complaint, it is unclear as to whether the plaintiff seeks money damages for the actions of the Defendant Judges. However, on page two of the Plaintiff's Motion and Brief for Partial Summary Judgment, filed October 29, 2001, the plaintiff states that he "makes no claim for money damages against state judges." For purposes of this motion, and in the interest of caution, the Court will proceed as if monetary damages are included in the requested relief. Discussion of the validity of a claim for such relief is contained in the "Judicial Immunity" portion of this Recommendation.
Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted. Lowrey v. Texas AM Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997). A district court cannot dismiss a complaint, or any part of it, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of her claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). In ruling on such a motion, the court cannot look beyond the face of the pleadings. Baker, 75 F.3d at 196; Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1229 (2000). A plaintiff, however, must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations, to avoid dismissal. Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992).Analysis
I. Judicial Immunity
Judicial Officers are entitled to absolute immunity from claims for damages arising out of acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions. Graves v. Hampton, 1 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1993). The alleged magnitude of the judge's errors or the mendacity of his acts are irrelevant. Young v. Biggers, 938 F.2d 565, 569 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1991). Judicial immunity can be overcome only by showing that the actions complained of were nonjudicial in nature or by showing that the actions were taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 288, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991). A judge's acts are judicial in nature if they are "`normally performed by a judge'" and the parties affected "`dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.'" Id, 112 S.Ct. at 288 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1107, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978)). Finally, the fact that it is alleged that a judge has acted pursuant to a conspiracy and committed grave procedural errors is not sufficient to avoid absolute judicial immunity. Mitchell v. McBryde, 944 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991); Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517, 522 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1037, 106 S.Ct. 605, 88 L.Ed.2d 583 (1985); Adams v. McIlhaney, 764 F.2d 294, 298 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101, 106 S.Ct. 883, 88 L.Ed.2d 918 (1986).
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant Judges conspired to "lynch" him by "implement[ing] their scheme to deprive him of his fundamental rights." Plaintiff further alleges that the judgments entered against him are the "byproduct and evidence of the poisonous tree of state and private actors in conspiracy," and that the Defendant Judges have been the subjects of "improper influence," resulting in repeated judgments entered against the plaintiff. The plaintiffs First Amended Complaint is filled with similar conclusory allegations as to the impropriety of the relationships among the Defendant Judges and opposing attorneys, and lacks specific facts that are necessary to survive a Motion to Dismiss. Nowhere in the pleadings does the plaintiff allege when and where the conspirators met, or describe any agreement that they reached.
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, p. 12.
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, p. 14.
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, p. 16.
As a primary matter, Judges Banner and Ovard are entitled to judicial immunity from suit, since the plaintiff has failed to show that the Defendant Judges' actions were nonjudicial in nature or that the actions were taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 288, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991). In fact, the basis of the complaint relies on the premise that the defendants presided over litigation to which the plaintiff was a party. The actions taken by the Defendant Judges (which are the basis of the plaintiffs complaint against them) are distinctly judicial in nature. When a judge issues jury instructions, rules on a matter before him, or assigns another judge to a case, three of the allegedly wrongful actions taken by the Defendant Judges, he is certainly carrying out activities that are "normally performed by a judge," and the plaintiff here unquestionably "dealt with the judge[s] in [their] judicial capacity." Id., (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1107, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978)). In ordering that a portion of the plaintiffs claims be heard by Judge Banner, Judge Ovard was clearly performing an act in the exercise of his judicial function. Graves v. Hampton, 1 F.3d at 317. Moreover, the plaintiffs allegations that Judge Banner acted inappropriately during his trial, and that the Judge's rulings should be disregarded because he lost his bid for re-election are without merit, since Judge Banner was properly assigned to preside over the matter pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 74.054. Therefore, the judge's reelection status has no bearing on the validity of his ruling. If, as the plaintiff alleges, Judge Banner indeed qualified as a "former judge" at the time Judge Ovard assigned him to hear all or a portion of the plaintiffs claims and the plaintiff did not timely object to that assignment, then under Texas law, regardless of whether the plaintiff had notice of the assignment, Judge Banner was not subject to disqualification and therefore did not lack "all jurisdiction" over the plaintiffs claims. Tex.Gov't Code Ann. § 74.053; Turk v. First Nat'l Bank of W. Univ. Place, 802 S.W.2d 264, 265 (Tex.App.-Houston [1St Dist.] 1990, writ denied); see also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). The plaintiff concedes that he made no objection to Judge Banner's assignment, an admission that further supports the proposition that Judge Banner had the requisite jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claims.
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, p. 21.
Plaintiff alleges no specific facts that would lead to the conclusion that the Defendant Judges' actions were nonjudicial in nature, or that they lacked jurisdiction to perform the acts of which the plaintiff complains. Therefore, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Defendant Judges are entitled to absolute immunity and the plaintiffs claims against them should be dismissed.
II. Staying the State Court Causes of Action/Vacating Prior State Court Decisions
The jurisdiction of federal courts is limited. Owen Equipment and Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978). In the federal context, the Supreme Court of the United States is the only court that can conduct an appellate review of state court decisions. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 486, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). Thus, federal District Courts may not adjudicate attacks on the validity of earlier state trial and appellate court decisions. Id. Furthermore, no court of the United States may enjoin the proceedings of a state court except where expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments. 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
To the extent that the plaintiff is asking the Court to "issue a temporary stay against the subject [state] courts and [state] judges" involved with or presiding over pending matters to which he is a party, the District Court lacks jurisdiction. The grounds for granting a stay, as articulated by the plaintiff, appear to be premised upon the vague allegation that the Defendant Judges are involved in a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of his Constitutional rights. Therefore, none of the statutory exceptions listed above are present here, and the District Court lacks jurisdiction to stay the state court proceedings, or to enjoin the Defendant Judges from presiding over those proceedings. Additionally, it is not within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court to declare a state court decision void. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482, 486 (1983).
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, p. 45.
III. Constitutionality of the Texas statute
A. The Texas Constitution
Section 74.054 of the Texas Government Code governs the assignment of a judge who is not the elected presiding judge of the court, allowing "former" judges to be assigned to pending cases for purposes of expediting judicial processes. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §n 74.054. The statute has repeatedly been held constitutional by various state courts, and the outcome of the instant case should not differ. See Tivoli Corp. v. Jewelers Mutual Ins. Co., 932 S.W.2d 704 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996); Eucaline Medicine Co. v. Standard Inv. Co., 25 S.W.2d 259 (Tex.Civ.App. 1930, writ ref'd); Currie v. Dobbs, 10 S.W.2d 438, 439 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1928, no writ). Article V, § 5 of the Texas Constitution recognizes that the Legislature has broad powers to assure that the court system functions smoothly and expeditiously, and it is well-established that the Texas Constitution does not limit the power of the Legislature to enact laws for the orderly administration of the court system. Tivoli Corp. v. Jewelers Mutual Ins. Co., 932 S.W.2d at 708. Therefore, a statute that allows presiding state court judges to assign cases to former judges is in keeping with the Texas Constitution and the plaintiffs claims that the statute is violative of the Constitution are without merit.
B. The United States Constitution
The plaintiff claims that the Texas statute violates the First Amendment, as well as the due process and equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.
One aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the government is the right of access to the courts. See California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 92 S.Ct. 609, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972); Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1979); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 336, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963); Coastal Sales Marketing Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1363 (5th Cir. 1983). Access to the courts is a constitutionally protected fundamental right. See Chambers v. Baltimore Ohio Railroad, 207 U.S. 142, 28 S.Ct. 34, 52 L.Ed. 143 (1907). A mere formal right of access to the courts does not pass constitutional muster. Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967 (1983). The access must be adequate, effective, and meaningful. Id.
The plaintiff claims that the subject statute violates his First Amendment right of Access to the Courts. Neither the assignment of a former judge nor the provision in the statute making notice of assignment optional deprives litigants of the fundamental right of access to the courts. Litigants retain the same rights in a hearing before an assigned judge as they do in hearings before presiding judges, and the assigned judge's actions have the same force and effect as those of a presiding judge. And, although notice of assignment is not mandatory, the litigants retain the right to object to the assignment before trial regardless of whether formal notice has been given. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 74.053. Therefore, the litigants' access to the courts is equally as adequate, effective, and meaningful as if the proceeding were conducted by a presiding judge.
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, p. 22.
The plaintiff also claims that the statute permitting assigned former state judges to preside over cases after the expiration of their elected terms is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In determining whether state action has violated an individual's right to procedural due process, a court must address two questions. Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1984). First, it must decide whether the state action has deprived the individual of a protected interest — life, liberty, or property. Id. Finding such a deprivation, the court must then determine whether the state procedures available for challenging the deprivation satisfy the requirements of due process. Id.; see also Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1153, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535-37, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912-13, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981); Ingraham v. White, 430 U.S. 651, 672, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1413, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977).
Although the plaintiff does not reference a specific statute(s) in his complaint, the Court will assume for purposes of this motion that the allegedly unconstitutional statutes include Tex.Gov't Code Ann. § 74.052 — § 74.054.
Assuming arguendo that Judge Banner qualifies as a "former judge," and that the plaintiff was indeed deprived of a property interest as a result of his ruling, it can hardly be said that the deprivation occurred without due process of law. The Texas Statute at issue merely allows for the assignment of an alternate individual to hear a pending case or portion thereof. The decision or judgment of the assigned judge is equally as susceptible to appeal as that of a presiding judge. The mere fact that the assigned judge was not elected has no consequence with respect to due process issues. In fact, this Court cannot logically conceive of an argument that would equate a judgment after a trial or similar proceeding to a "deprivation" necessitating a due process inquiry. Under the subject statute, litigants are afforded a hearing; the cornerstone upon which the principle of due process is founded. Therefore, the fact that an assigned judge presides over the matter instead of an elected judge has no detrimental effect on that process for constitutional purposes.
Since the voluminous allegations in the plaintiff's First Amended Complaint are not particularly ordered, it is difficult to discern whether the plaintiff is in fact claiming that he has suffered the deprivation of a fundamental right, and if so, exactly which right that is. However, the plaintiff does argue that at some point during the six years of litigation leading up to the current lawsuit, he "suffered millions of dollars in damages." Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, p. 25. The plaintiff also argues that as a result of "the threat of a continuum of deprivation of property and rights at the hands of state actors," he is entitled to relief. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, p. 25. Thus, the Court shall construe the plaintiff's complaint liberally, inferring by the context of the statements that these arguments are an attempt to assert that the plaintiff has been deprived of money and/or assets as a result of judgments entered against him.
To the extent that the plaintiff is arguing that the provision of the statute allowing for the assignment of a former judge without prior notice to the parties is violative of due process, it is important to note that the assignment of a judge in no way constitutes a deprivation of the plaintiffs property. Nevertheless, for purposes of argument, the statute does state that notice is clearly optional and not mandatory. Turk v. First Nat'l Bank of W. Univ. Place, 802 S.W.2d 264, 265 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied). However, by the terms of the statute, the plaintiff has the right to object to the assignment prior to the proceeding; a process that provides the litigant with an opportunity to have his case heard by another judge. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 74.053. Therefore, the statute essentially creates an avenue to appeal the court's decision to assign an alternate judge to the matter. As such, a procedure to dispute the assignment does exist, and the statute is therefore in keeping with due process requirements.
As to equal protection, the plaintiff argues that "Texans are subject to unequal status" as a result of the subject statute. Assuming that the foregoing argument is in fact true, it is important to note that the citizens of the state of Texas do not constitute a suspect class for purposes of equal protection. Furthermore, as discussed supra, the subject statute does not deprive Texans of a fundamental right. Therefore, in terms of constitutionality, the effect of the statute is required to bear a mere rational relation to the state's objective. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993). The assignment of former judges to preside over pending matters, thereby reducing the caseload of state district judges is certainly rationally related to the purpose of expediting the judicial process. Thus, sections 74.052,.053, and .054 do not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, p. 22.
Conclusion
Judges Banner and Ovard had jurisdiction to preside over the state court matters to which the plaintiff was a party' and are therefore entitled to judicial immunity. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 288, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991). Conclusory allegations suggesting that the Defendant Judges have acted pursuant to a conspiracy are not sufficient to avoid absolute judicial immunity. Mitchell v. McBryde, 944 F.2d at 230; Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d at 522; Adams v. McIlhaney, 764 F.2d at 298. The statute allowing for the assignment of former judges to preside over pending litigation is constitutional under both the Texas and United States Constitutions. See Tivoli Corp. v. Jewelers Mutual Ins. Co., 932 S.W.2d 704; Eucaline Medicine Co. v. Standard Inv. Co., 25 S.W.2d 259; Currie v. Dobbs, 10 S.W.2d at 439; see also Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d at 327; Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S.Ct. 3194; Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. at 428; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. at 535-37; Ingraham v. White, 430 U.S. at 672; Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. at 320.
Finally, the District Court is without jurisdiction to stay the proceedings or vacate the earlier judgments of the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2283; District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482, 486.
RECOMMENDATION
This Court recommends that the Defendants' Motion be GRANTED, and that the plaintiffs claims as to Judges Banner and Ovard be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.