See Winfield v. O'Brien, 775 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2014) (acknowledging ?high bar? to overturn state court decision under AEDPA). ?[C]ollateral federal review is limited to determining whether the state courts' decision . . . 'was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'? Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. ? 2254(d)(1)) (internal brackets omitted). Under the first category, ?A state court determination is 'contrary to' clearly established law 'if the court ?'applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth' by the Supreme Court or 'confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.'?'? Linton v. Saba, 812 F.3d 112, 122 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Hensley v. Roden, 755 F.3d 724, 730?731 (1st Cir. 2014)); accord Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 165-166 (2000) (decision is contrary to ?clearly established federal law if it applies a legal rule that contradicts? the ?prior holdings? of Supreme Court or ?reaches a different result from? Supreme Court case ?despite confronting indistinguishable facts?). Under the second category, the federal court may grant the writ if the relevant state court decision ?'involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'? Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-405 (2000) (quoting statute with ellipses omitted).

We review de novo the district court's denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Linton v. Saba, 812 F.3d 112, 121 (1st Cir. 2016). "Under the ‘peculiarly deferential standards’ of the [AEDPA], ‘error by a state court, without more, is not enough to warrant federal habeas relief.’ "

"That the SJC applied Latimore rather than Jackson does not diminish its claim to deference under AEDPA, as 'the Latimore test . . . is functionally identical to the Jackson . . . standard.'" Linton v. Saba, 812 F.3d 112, 123-24 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Logan, 790 F.3d at 71). "In evaluating the evidence, the reviewing court must exercise 'some degree of intellectual rigor,' and not credit 'evidentiary interpretations and illations that are unreasonable, insupportable, or overly speculative.'"

The First Circuit, when analyzing a habeas claim of insufficient evidence under section 2254(d)(1), reviews the facts under a "clear and convincing" standard that is consistent with that set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See Smith v. Dickhaut, 836 F.3d 97, 101 (1st Cir. 2016) (citing Linton v. Saba, 812 F.3d 112, 116 (1st Cir. 2016)). Section 2254(e)(1) provides: In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.

[a] state court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by the Supreme Court or confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent. Linton v. Saba, 812 F.3d 112, 122 (1st Cir. 2016) (alterations in the original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "And a state court adjudication constitutes an unreasonable application [of clearly established federal law] if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court's then-current decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case."

The federal habeas court "faced with a record . . . that supports conflicting inferences must presume . . . that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution." Linton v. Saba, 812 F.3d 112, 123 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326); see Housen v. Gelb, 744 F.3d 221, 226 (1st Cir. 2014) ("[A] habeas court may not freely reweigh competing inferences but must accept those reasonable inferences that are most compatible with the jury's verdict." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

“For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” Linton v. Saba, 812 F.3d 112, 122 (1st Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) ). “A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of [the state court's] decision.” Id. at 122–23 (alteration in the original) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004) ). “The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.”

In fact, the Court “must accept the state court findings of fact unless convinced by clear and convincing evidence that they are in error.” Linton v. Saba, 812 F.3d 112, 116 (1st Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and punctuation omitted) (quoting Lynch v. Ficco, 438 F.3d 35, 39 (1st Cir. 2006))

It is well established that "[a] criminal conviction may be supported by circumstantial evidence alone." Linton v. Saba, 812 F.3d 112, 123 (1st Cir. 2016). "This principle [that direct evidence is not required to uphold a conviction] is even more firmly established in connection with the deferential approach to state-court decisionmaking that federal habeas review demands."

The AEDPA presumes that the state court's factual findings are correct and requires rebuttal by the petitioner with "clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) ("The petitioner carries the burden of proof."); see also Linton v. Saba, 812 F.3d 112, 116 (1st Cir. 2016) ("We must accept the state court findings of fact unless convinced by clear and convincing evidence that they are in error." (internal citation and internal punctuation omitted)).