Opinion
No. 5000420
August 4, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiff, Jean Y. Lindor, brings the present action in two counts alleging injuries arising from a motor vehicle collision that occurred on or about November 10, 2004 in the town of Groton, Connecticut. In an amended complaint dated February 16, 2006, the plaintiff alleges in count one a cause of action sounding in negligence. In count two, the plaintiff alleges statutory recklessness pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295. The defendant, Denise L. Green, moves to strike count two of the plaintiff's amended complaint on the ground that count two fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for recklessness under General Statutes § 14-295. The plaintiff objects to the motion to strike arguing that she has sufficiently pleaded statutory recklessness. Both parties have filed memoranda of law in support of their respective positions. The motion to strike is presently before the court.
DISCUSSION
"[A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading, and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court . . . We take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint . . . and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency . . . [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied . . . Thus, we assume the truth of both the specific factual allegations and any facts fairly provable thereunder. In doing so, moreover, we read the allegations broadly, rather than narrowly." Larobina v. McDonald, 274 Conn. 394, 400, 876 A.2d 522 (2005). "Moreover . . . [w]hat is necessarily implied [in the allegation] need not be expressly alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lombard v. Edward. J. Peters, Jr., P.C., 252 Conn. 623, 626, 749 A.2d 630 (2000).
General Statutes § 14-295 provides: "In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property. The owner of a rental or leased motor vehicle shall not be responsible for such damages unless the damages arose from such owner's operation of the motor vehicle."
"Our appellate courts have not yet addressed the degree of specificity needed to satisfy the pleading requirements of § 14-295." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carawlanis v. Kaczmarczyk, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 06 5001507 (June 7, 2006, Rodriguez, J.). This court has previously recognized that "[t]he trial courts of this state are split on the issue of whether a plaintiff must allege additional facts to support a claim of recklessness that are distinct from any claim of negligence in order to survive a motion to strike and seek double-treble damages under General Statutes § 14-[295] . . . A minority of courts continue to require a plaintiff to plead specific factual allegations, above and beyond facts pled in a negligence claim . . . The majority point of view, on the other hand, is that a plaintiff, in addition to pleading facts constituting negligence, need only make the general allegations mentioned in § 14-295: that the defendant has deliberately or with reckless disregard violated one of the enumerated statutes, and that the violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Chung v. Place Motors, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 560074 (February 11, 2003, Hurley, J.T.R.) ( 34 Conn. L. Rptr. 140, 142). Moreover, this court has adopted the majority point of view regarding what is necessary for a plaintiff to plead a statutory cause of action under § 14-295. See Orzechowski v. Kuzel, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 124154 (October 29, 2002, Hurley, J.T.R.).
As this court has previously articulated, the majority view holds that a plaintiff need only state the general allegations mentioned in § 14-295, which are that "the defendant has deliberately or with reckless disregard violated one of the enumerated statutes, and that the violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries." Chung v. Place Motors, Inc., supra, 34 Conn. L. Rptr. 142. In the present case, the plaintiff brings count two pursuant to § 14-295, incorporating the factual allegations of count one, in addition, the plaintiff alleges that the collision and resulting injuries "were caused by [the defendant's] reckless disregard of [General Statutes] §§ 14-218a and/or 14-222." This court finds that these allegations are sufficient to withstand a motion to strike. The plaintiff has alleged that the defendant's reckless disregard of §§ 14-21 8a and/or 14-222 — two of the enumerated statutes set forth in § 14-295 — caused the collision and the plaintiff's injuries.
The defendant argues, however, that even if the reasoning of the majority view is applied, the plaintiff fails to "allege that the alleged reckless conduct and violations of these so-called `trigger statutes' were `substantial factors' in causing the alleged collision, as required by the cases subscribing to the majority view."
"In order to sufficiently plead causation, however, a plaintiff is not required to specifically plead that the defendant's conduct was a `substantial factor' in causing the plaintiff's injuries . . . [I]t is unnecessary to quote the language of [§ 14-295] verbatim." (Citation omitted.) Myers v. Ocean Trace Development, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 00 0375476 (May 3, 2002, Gallagher, J.). "[T]he `substantial factor' causation standard of § 14-295 is the same as the normal proximate cause standard in a negligence action. The Supreme Court has held that `the test of proximate cause is whether the defendant's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's injuries' Given that the standards contained in the language of [§] 14-295 are the same as ordinary recklessness and proximate cause, the plaintiff's complaint, because it includes allegations of recklessness and causation, is sufficient to support a claim for double or treble damages under § 14-295." (Emphasis added.) Id.
In the present case, the plaintiff's complaint alleges that the defendant's "reckless disregard" "caused" the collision and the plaintiff's resulting injury. These allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to strike for purposes of § 14-295. Both recklessness and causation have been sufficiently pleaded. See Myers v. Ocean Trace Development, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 00 0375476, and cases cited therein (where plaintiffs alleged they suffered damages "as a result" of the defendants' recklessness, the court found these allegations sufficient for purposes of § 14-295).
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to strike count two of the plaintiff's amended complaint is hereby denied.