Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-0955, SECTION "C"(5).
April 15, 2002
Before the Court is Defendant Walter R. Case's ("Case") Motion for Reconsideration and/or for Relief from Judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) or, alternatively, Rule 60(b)(6). IT IS ORDERED that the Motion is hereby DENTED, as set forth below.
BACKGROUND
On January 24, 2002, after a two-day trial, a jury found that Case, the sole remaining Defendant, had violated Plaintiffs' rights under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (a) and (d). See Rec. Doc. 69. The jury declined to award damages to Plaintiff Lisa Lincoln, but awarded Plaintiff Don C. Weaver $500.00 in compensatory damages and $100,000.00 in punitive damages. See id.
On February 27, 2002, after oral argument, the Court denied Case's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Motion for Judgment N.O.V. pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Alternatively Motion for New Trial pursuant to Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and/or in the Alternative, for a Remittitur. See Rec. Doc. 88. In seeking relief pursuant to Rules 50(b) and 59(a), Case contended during oral argument, in part, that the punitive damages awarded Weaver were constitutionally excessive.
Also on February 27, 2002, the Fifth Circuit remitted a punitive damages award it found was constitutionally excessive in Watson v. Johnson Mobile Homes, No. 00-60768, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 3065 (5th Cir. Feb. 27, 2002) (applying factors for assessing allegedly constitutionally excessive punitive damages axvard established in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575-86, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d (1996)). Case filed the instant motion February 28, 2002, contending that, pursuant to Watson as well as other Fifth Circuit precedent, the punitive damages award in the instant case is similarly excessive and thus warrants either a new trial or remittitur of the award. See Rec. Doc. 89.
ANALYSIS
A motion for reconsideration is considered a Rule 59(e) motion if it is served within ten days of the court's ruling and a Rule 60(b) motion if it is served more than ten days after judgment is entered. the court's ruling. See Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir.1990). The motion here was served February 28, 2002, well more than ten days after judgment was entered January 24, 2002. Thus, Plaintiffs motion here shall be treated as one pursuant to Rule 60(b).
Under Rule 60(b), a court may "relieve a party . . . from a final judgment" under five specific grounds or, under Rule 60(b)(6)," . . . for . . . any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Batts it Tow-Motor Forklift Co., 66 F.3d 743 (5th Cir. 1995). The clause's "`and other reason' language refers to any other reason that those contained in the five entfmerated grounds on which a court may grant a Rule 60(b) motion." Id. at 747 (internal quotations deleted). "Although . . . Rule 60(b)(6) is a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular case when relief is not warranted by the preceding clauses, . . . Rule 60(b)(6) relief will be granted only if extraordinary circumstances are present." Id. (internal quotations and citations deleted).
Here, Case in effect argues that Rule 60(b)(6) relief is appropriate because the Court did not consider Watson and that the Fifth Circuit's decision there compels the Court to relieve Case from final judgment. However, even "`[a] change in decisional law after entry ofjudgment does not constitute exceptional circumstances and is not alone ground for relief from a final judgment.'" Batts, 66 F.3d at 747-48 (quoting Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring Co., 894 F.2d 157, 160 (5th Cir. 1990)) (alteration in original). Furthermore, Watson did not announce a new standard for judging the constitutionality of an allegedly excessive punitive damages award, instead merely applying standing U.S. Supreme Court precedent, see BMW, supra, to a particular set of facts. See Ritter v. Smith, 811 F.2d 1398, 1401-03 (11th Cir. 1987) (Rule 60(b)(6) relief appropriate where supervening change in law was final and definitive ruling by the United States Supreme Court in closely related case, judgment from which relief sought had not been executed, motion was filed soon after the judgment from which relief was sought became final, and considerations of comity were present); Satcher v. Honda Motor Co., 993 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1993) (opinion vacated in Mississippi products liability case where, inter alia, Mississippi Supreme Court held subsequent to opinion but while petition for rehearing was pending that Mississippi products liability law had changed prior to opinion). With regard to the actual analysis in Watson, this Court finds the facts of this case distinguishable for much of the same reasoning cited by Plaintiffs in their response. See Rec. Doc. 90.
Case additionally raises here for the first time an argument that the Court should provide the relief he desires pursuant to the Fifth Circuit's decision remitting an excessive punitive damages award in Rubinstein v. Admin'rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 409 (5th Cir. 2000). In his previous motion pursuant to Rules 50 and 59, Case failed to advance the argument that Rubinstein compels a new trial or remittitur here. The instant motion thus is denied. Cf Bally Export Corp. v. Balicar, Ltd., 804 F.2d 398, 404 (7th Cir. 1986) (motion for reconsideration "improper vehicle to introduce evidence previously available or to tender new legal theories").
Furthermore, the facts of Rubinstein are likewise distinguishable.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that:
Case's Motion for Reconsideration and/or for Relief from Judgment is hereby DENIED.