Opinion
C082239
07-28-2017
SUSAN L. LIGHT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SACRAMENTO REGIONAL TRANSIT DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 34201300144026CUWTGDS)
Plaintiff Susan L. Light appeals from a judgment in favor of her former employer, Defendant Sacramento Regional Transit District (Regional Transit), after a bench trial on Light's complaint for disability discrimination, failure to engage in the interactive process, and failure to provide a reasonable accommodation under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA; Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.). On appeal, Light reargues her case without any coherent claim of error by the trial court that is adequately supported by legal authority or citations to the record. As it is not our function to simply reweigh the evidence, we will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
After a bench trial, the trial court issued a tentative decision and proposed statement of decision. In it, the court found Light failed to demonstrate that she suffers from a protected disability under FEHA. The trial court relied on testimony from a physician who released Light back to work without restriction within days of three industrial injuries in 2008. Light's physician did not consider her later occasional "flare ups" to constitute an activity restriction. Light's lack of disability was fatal to all three of her claims.
With respect to her disability discrimination claim, even assuming that Light had a protected disability, the trial court also found Regional Transit was not aware of it. Additionally, the court found that Regional Transit's decision to terminate Light was based on legitimate, non-discriminatory factors. Specifically, Light was terminated for failure to comply with the Operator's Attendance Program. "Although [Light] provided some documentation that the days off were industrially related and therefore exempt, [Light]'s absenteeism still exceeded the [Operator's Attendance Program]. If there was a doubt about the nature of [Light]'s request for time off, she was given the benefit of the doubt. The Attendance Coordinator . . . documented [Light]'s leave and verified whether the requested time off was exempt. When in doubt, he would not include the time in calculating time off under the [Operator's Attendance Program]. Giving [Light] the benefit of the doubt, [she] was still in violation of the [Operator's Attendance Program] during the period preceding her 'Final Warning' and the period triggering her termination. . . . It is ironic that [Light] had the ability to avoid termination by complying with the [Operator's Attendance Program]. [Light] was well aware of her attendance obligation and the disciplinary process, yet continued to absent herself from work and/or failed to provide adequate documentation of an exempt basis for those absences. The Court has no doubt if [Light] had complied with her obligations under the [Operator's Attendance Program], her termination could have been avoided."
With respect to her claim that Regional Transit failed to provide a reasonable accommodation, the trial court also assumed that Light's request for two days off per month in the event that she had a "flare up" of her condition was a request for an accommodation. Nonetheless, it found there was no evidence Regional Transit failed to permit her the requested time off for this reason and that Light's absences during the relevant time period "far exceed[ed] . . . two or three days off per month." Likewise, the court rejected Light's claim of failure to engage in the interactive process.
After no objection was filed to the proposed statement of decision, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Regional Transit on April 29, 2016.
Light timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
In reviewing a judgment based on a statement of decision following a bench trial on FEHA claims, " ' "any conflict in the evidence or reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts will be resolved in support of the determination of the trial court decision. [Citations.]" [Citation.] In a substantial evidence challenge to a judgment, the appellate court will "consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference, and resolving conflicts in support of the [findings]. [Citations.]" [Citation.] We may not reweigh the evidence and are bound by the trial court's credibility determinations. [Citations.] Moreover, findings of fact are liberally construed to support the judgment. [Citation.]' [Citation.]
" 'Questions of statutory interpretation, and the applicability of a statutory standard to undisputed facts, present questions of law, which we review de novo. [Citation.]' [Citation.] What plaintiff had to show in order to prevail on [her] FEHA claim is a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo." (Cuiellette v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 757, 765.) B. Light's Failure to Demonstrate Error
"It is the appellant's burden to demonstrate the existence of reversible error." (Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 766.) "To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error. [Citations.] When a point is asserted without argument and authority for the proposition, 'it is deemed to be without foundation and requires no discussion by the reviewing court.' " (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) As the reviewing court, we will not perform an independent, unassisted review of the record in search of error or grounds to support the judgment. (McComber v. Wells (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 512, 522.) These rules of appellate procedure apply to Light even though she is representing herself on appeal. (Id. at p. 523.)
Before we analyze whether Light has presented any meaningful legal analysis, we pause to discuss the state of the record before us and Light's use of it. The parties stipulated to use the original superior court file instead of a clerk's transcript. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.128(a) ; Ct. App., Third Dist., Local Rules of Ct., rule 2, Stipulation for use of original superior court file.) Doing so "does not relieve either party of its obligation to provide this court with explicit page citations to the record." (Bernard v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1203, 1205.) As a general matter, Light's briefing is lacking in citations to specific pages of the record and we disregard any factual assertions that are not supported in this manner. (Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Sheily (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 824, 826, fn. 1.) Light provides some citations to specific pages of the Reporter's Transcript, but those are generally only partially supportive of the propositions they follow. Other citations are to exhibits attached to her opening brief. We rejected Light's request to take judicial notice of these documents. Additionally, her use of the documents as exhibits does not make them part of the record: "A party filing a brief may attach copies of exhibits or other materials in the appellate record or copies of relevant local, state, or federal regulations or rules, out-of-state statutes, or other similar citable materials that are not readily accessible." (Rule 8.204(d), italics added.) To the extent that some or all of these exhibits may also appear somewhere in the superior court file, "[i]t is not the task of the reviewing court to search the record for evidence that supports the party's statement; it is for the party to cite the court to those references." (Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Sheily, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 826, fn. 1; see also rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) Light's only citations to a particular page in the original superior court file demonstrate that one of these exhibits was submitted in opposition to Regional Transit's motion for summary judgment. Regional Transit asserts this exhibit was not offered and/or admitted at trial, and we have no evidence to the contrary. Nonetheless, as we will discuss next, the shortage of record citations in Light's briefing is compounded by a larger issue—Light has not presented us with any coherent legal argument.
Undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
The appellant must "[s]tate each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point." (Rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) "This is not a mere technical requirement; it is 'designed to lighten the labors of the appellate tribunals by requiring the litigants to present their cause systematically and so arranged that those upon whom the duty devolves of ascertaining the rule of law to apply may be advised, as they read, of the exact question under consideration, instead of being compelled to extricate it from the mass.' " (In re S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.) "Failure to provide proper headings forfeits issues that may be discussed in the brief but are not clearly identified by a heading." (Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172, 179.) The argument section of Light's opening brief contains two headings: (1) "Disability" and (2) "Failure to Engage In The Interactive Process and Failure To Provide Reasonable Accommodation." Under each, she proceeds to reargue her case rather than make any assertion of error on the part of the trial court. Thus, her minimal citations to the record and to legal authority are of no assistance because they are not connected to any assertion of error on the part of the trial court. In particular, she cites or quotes authorities regarding general requirements for establishing her claims without any further development to suggest how these authorities establish any claim of error. Light does not allege, for instance, that any of the findings in the trial court's statement of decision were not supported by substantial evidence or that any particular aspect of the decision was contrary to the law she cites. She never even cites the court's written decision or attacks it directly. We are left with the impression that Light misunderstands our role in these proceedings. We do not reweigh the evidence on appeal. (Cuiellette v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 765.) More critically, "[w]e are not bound to develop appellants' arguments for them. [Citation.] The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the contentions as waived. [Citations.] We do so here." (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830.)
For this reason, any lurking argument in Light's statement of facts that the court erred by excluding certain exhibits is forfeited. Even if it were not forfeited for this reason, Light also failed to include necessary citations to the record or California authority, or to establish she was prejudiced by the alleged error. (In re S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The Sacramento Regional Transit District shall recover its costs on appeal. (Rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)
/S/_________
RENNER, J.
We concur:
/S/_________
BLEASE, Acting P. J.
/S/_________
ROBIE, J.