Opinion
No. 4:19 CV 96
04-16-2020
DESI LIGGINS, JR., Plaintiff, v. TITLE IV-D AGENCY, et al., Defendants.
OPINION and ORDER
This matter is before the court on defendants' motions to dismiss. (DE ## 9, 19.) For the reasons that follow, the motions will be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Desi Liggins, Jr., filed a pro se complaint alleging that defendants Jasper County Prosecutor's Office, Jasper County, Indiana, Tippecanoe County, Indiana, and "Title IV-D Agency" "purposely concealed, misrepresented material facts" related to his child support obligations, in order to seize his personal property. (DE # 1 at 1.) Plaintiff claims that compliance with child support obligations is voluntary and defendants concealed and misrepresented this fact. He claims that his rights were violated when defendants seized his property to satisfy his child support obligations. (Id. at 9.) Liggins alleges that defendants are liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C §§ 1983, 1988, and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242.
Defendants now move to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The court first focuses on defendants' arguments that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine (discussed in more detail below), as it must be considered first and is dispositive. Wright v. Tackett, 39 F.3d 155, 157-58 (7th Cir. 1994) (analysis of jurisdictional principals implicated by Rooker-Feldman doctrine must precede other substantive matters).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The question of subject matter jurisdiction falls under Rule 12(b)(1). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion can present either a facial or factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction. Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebucks & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 443-44 (7th Cir. 2009). A facial attack, like this one, is a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleading itself. Id. at 443. When such a challenge has been presented, the court takes all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 444; Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999).
III. DISCUSSION
At the heart of this dispute is the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which derives its name from two decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The doctrine precludes lower federal court jurisdiction over claims seeking review of state court judgments. Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660, 664 (7th Cir. 2002). The doctrine "is not limited to just those claims alleging that the state court judgment itself caused the federal plaintiff's injury; the doctrine also precludes federal jurisdiction over claims 'inextricably intertwined' with a state court determination." Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 990, 996 (7th Cir 2000) (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483-84 n.16). As the Seventh Circuit has noted, "it can be difficult to discern which claims are and which claims are not 'inextricably intertwined' with a state judgment." Id. The pivotal inquiry in applying the doctrine is whether the federal plaintiff seeks to set aside a state court judgment or whether he is presenting an independent claim. Id.
In this case, defendants argue that by bringing this suit complaining about state court child support orders, plaintiff is inviting a lower federal court to examine and pass judgment upon a state court ruling. Plaintiff argues that the doctrine is inapplicable because he does not seek to overturn the state court judgment; instead he seeks damages for injuries caused by constitutional violations that occurred during the course of state court proceedings.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has made clear that plaintiff's argument is meritless. Though a complaint may technically assert a "constitutional violation" seeking damages, the problem still remains that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the complaint unless a finding is made, by a lower federal court, that the state court erred in some respect in issuing the order which caused the monetary damage. Such review of a state court judgment is something Rooker-Feldman does not permit. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005) (Rooker-Feldman prohibits federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments").
Rooker-Feldman's application is particularly obvious where, as here, it is not simply damages being sought, but also injunctive relief directed at the state court itself. Notably, a state court judgment may not be attacked in a complaint filed in federal district court even if the procedures allegedly employed at the state court level were unconstitutional. GASH Assoc. v. Village of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Rooker-Feldman . . . bar[s] . . . litigation . . . where the plaintiff's injury stem[s] from the state judgment—an erroneous judgment, perhaps, entered after procedures said to be unconstitutional, but a judgment nonetheless.").
The Seventh Circuit has applied this principle to numerous complaints filed in federal district court which sought to challenge state court child support orders. See, e.g., Dixon v. Rick, 781 F. App'x 561, at *1 (7th Cir. 2019) (Rooker-Feldman barred complaint alleging constitutional violations related to child support order); Syph v. Arce, 772 F. App'x 356, 357 (7th Cir. 2019) ("Syph thus cannot sidestep Rooker-Feldman by arguing that the state court denied him due process" in course of child support proceedings); Gorzelanczyk v. Baldassone, 29 F. App'x 402, 403 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[E]ven though Gorzelanczyk labels his lawsuit as a § 1983 action alleging due process violations, his real injury is the child support order, not any alleged denial of due process."); see also T.W. v. Brophy, 124 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying Rooker-Feldman to child custody decision). The same principle applies here, and Rooker-Feldman bars plaintiff's lawsuit.
It is worth noting that, even if this court had jurisdiction over this case, several additional roadblocks would stand in plaintiff's way. First, the "domestic relations exception" to federal jurisdiction would apply to bar this suit. The "domestic-relations exception" discourages federal courts from hearing cases that would traditionally fall within the ambit of domestic-relations or family courts. See e.g. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 305-306 (2006); Jones v. Brennan, 465 F.3d 304, 306 (7th Cir. 2006). The Seventh Circuit has applied this exception to cases involving child support orders, holding that the exception bars suits like this one. See, e.g., Dixon, 781 F. App'x at 561; Syph, 772 F. App'x at 357; Dawaji v. Askar, 618 Fed. Appx. 858, 860 (7th Cir. 2015); Friedlander v. Friedlander, 149 F.3d 739, 740 (7th Cir. 1998).
Second, the Jasper County Prosecutor's Office would likely enjoy prosecutorial immunity from suit. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420 (1976). Furthermore, the Title IV-D Child Support Program does not appear to be a separate suable entity. Indiana assigns implementation responsibilities for Title IV-D, "Child Support and Establishment of Paternity," of the Social Security Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 651, to the Child Support Bureau within the Indiana Department of Child Services. See Ind. Code § 31-25-4-7; Ind. Code § 31-25-3-1. To the extent that plaintiff intended to sue this state agency for monetary damages, the agency is immune from suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. See Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2001). The same is true of plaintiff's suit against the Jasper County Prosecutor's Office. There are exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity, but they do not apply here. See MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n, 183 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 1999).
Finally, Liggins attempts to hold defendants civilly liable under two criminal statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, the criminal analogs of § 1983. However, these criminal statutes provide no basis for civil liability. See Boyd v. Jacobs Project Mgmt. Co., 740 F. App'x 99, 101 (7th Cir. 2018) ("18 U.S.C. § 241 . . . is a criminal statute that empowers only federal prosecutors, not private citizens."); Nasserizafar v. Indiana Dep't of Transp., 546 F. App'x 572, 574 (7th Cir. 2013) ("§ 242 does not create a private right of action").
This is not the first time Liggins has made these types claims. In June 2018, Liggins filed suit in Liggins v. Child Support Bureau, et al., 4:18-cv-38, before this court. In that case, as in this one, Liggins challenged child support orders arising from Tippecanoe County and sought an order discharging him from those state court obligations. This court dismissed his complaint for want of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at DE # 3. Liggins also filed similar claims related to his child support obligations arising out of Marshall County, Indiana. See Liggins v. Indiana Child Support Bureau, et al., 3:18-cv-486. That case, too, was dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at DE # 3. Liggins is now well aware that he may not proceed with these types of claims in federal court, and he is cautioned that he may be sanctioned if he continues with similar suits in the future.
Though it is usually necessary "to give pro se litigants one opportunity to amend after dismissing a complaint[,] that's unnecessary where, as here, it is certain from the face of the complaint that any amendment would be futile or otherwise unwarranted." Carpenter v. PNC Bank, Nat. Ass'n, 633 Fed. Appx. 346, 348 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Luevano v. Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2013); Hukic v. Aurora Loan Servs., 588 F.3d 420, 432 (7th Cir. 2009) ("[C]ourts have broad discretion to deny leave to amend where . . . the amendment would be futile." (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS defendants' motions to dismiss. (DE ## 9, 19.) The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.
SO ORDERED.
Date: April 16, 2020
s/James T. Moody
JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT