Opinion
Civil Action No. 02-1670, Section "B"(2)
July 3, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Lifecare Hospital of New Orleans' Motion to Remand and for Awards of Costs and Fees (Rec. Doc. No. 5) Lifecare claims that it asserts only state law claims and not a claim for benefits under an ERISA policy. For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
BACKGROUND
After Byron Lang was injured in a car accident on November 7, 2000, he was treated at North Shore Regional Medical Hospital until November 30, 2000. At the time of admission to the hospital, Lang was a participant in the New Orleans Electrical Health and Welfare Plan and his coverage was verified, as required under the Plan, before admission. After Lang's discharge, Lifecare learned that benefits under the Plan were excluded because Lang was intoxicated at the time of the accident and therefore was "in the course of commission of a . . . felony or any act of criminal negligence" when injured. Lang's hospital balance remains at $66,653.50.
In state court, Lifecare sued the Plan and Bluebonnet Administrators, Inc., which verified Lang's benefits, for breaching their duties to provide complete and accurate information when they verified Lang's benefits. Defendants removed the action claiming that Lifecare is asserting a claim for benefits under the Plan, which is preempted by ERISA. Lifecare seeks remand, and Defendant Bluebonnet Life Insurance supports the remand.
DISCUSSION
Removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq. is permitted when an action is founded on "a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (b). If a claim is preempted by ERISA, and relates to a plan participant's status as the beneficiary of a benefit plan, it falls within the federal court's jurisdiction and is removable. Hernandez v. Jobe Concrete Products, Inc., 282 F.3d 360, 362 (5th Cir. 2002). The issue before this Court is whether Lifecare's claims relate to Lang's status as a beneficiary of an ERISA benefit plan or relate in any way to an ERISA plan.
Here, the claims in their present posture fail to establish any federal claims which qualify for removal under § 1441. The Court finds that the inferences drawn by Defendants from Lifecare's discovery requests are premature and/or misplaced. Lifecare claims that it would not have admitted Lang if Defendants had provided correct information. Lang's status as beneficiary and the benefits to which he was or was not entitled are irrelevant.
Lifecare has not asserted a derivative ERISA claim in its petition or in any "other paper." In fact, when Defendants asked Lifecare whether it was pursuing or relinquishing its stated federal claims, Lifecare responded that it did not intend to pursue a federal claim. Thus, Lifecare's response negated any potential "other paper" suspected by Defendants as triggering a basis for removal. Since no federal claim appears in the petition, and since Lifecare expressly denied that it was making a federal claim for benefits prior to the removal, there currently is no legal or factual basis for this Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction.
If the defendants receive any amended pleading, motion, order or other paper which justifies removal, they are entitled to file a subsequent removal and then petition for MDL transfer, see S.W.S. Erectors, Inc. v. Infax, Inc., 72 F.3d 489, 492 (5th Cir. 1996); Browning v. Navarro, 743 F.2d 1069, 1079-80 n. 29 (5th Cir. 1984) and 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (b), provided that the voluntary-involuntary rule is satisfied, see Weems v. Louis Dryfus Corp., 380 F.2d 545, 546 (5th Cir. 1967); Bennett v. Kmart Corp., No. 96-2821, 1996 WL 577919, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 8, 1996); Huffaker v. ABC Ins. Co., No. 94-2862, 1994 WL 658471, at *2 n. 2 (E.D. La. Nov. 22, 1994); McLin v. Surgitex, Inc., No. 91-4116, 1992 WL 67801, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 25, 1992); Ratcliff v. Fibreboard Corp., 819 F. Supp. 584, 586-87 (W.D. Tex. 1992); and Canova v. C.R.C., Inc. of Louisiana, 602 F. Supp. 817 (M.D. La. 1985)
While this Court finds remand appropriate, sanctions are not. Defendants were reasonable in interpreting the facts of this case in a way that permitted removal of the action to federal court. The Court therefore finds costs and expenses inappropriate under the totality of the circumstances presented. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Remand is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The case shall be remanded; however, costs and fees are unwarranted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the captioned matter is hereby REMANDED to the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson, State of Louisiana, where this action originated as Civil Action No. 569-725.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. No. 2), is DENIED without prejudice to re-urge in the state court.